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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past 30 years, there has been a marked proliferation of the use of public–private 
partnerships (P3s) for the management of agricultural innovation systems. This is part of a larger 
worldwide trend of using P3s in the provision of public goods and services. Despite the large 
number of agricultural P3s in operation, a literature review demonstrated paucity of both case 
studies and of theory, meaning that the study of these emerging business models has not kept 
pace with practice. Over the last 30 years, only 38 peer-reviewed articles have been published. 
The objective of this dissertation is to advance the theory, analysis, and policy review of 
agricultural P3s. There are four independent investigations in this dissertation that advance the 
knowledge of agricultural P3s in seven specific ways. First, these investigations introduce two 
quantitative methodologies to empirically demonstrate the critical role P3s occupy in research 
and development (R&D) innovation networks and in the development, dissemination and 
commercialization of new technologies that enhance global food security. Second, this analysis 
suggests that the key variable influencing the formation of these organizations is people, rather 
than public policy or market incentives. Third, agricultural P3s require large up-front 
investments and they have extended gestation periods; therefore, they are dependent upon public 
support. Fourth, P3s are not a means of privatizing public functions; rather, they represent a new 
and emerging process of collaboration that transcends the public–private dichotomy. Fifth, 
agricultural P3s appear to operate in “orphan spaces,” sectors that, for a variety of reasons, are 
ignored by the public and private sectors. Sixth, there is evidence to suggest that many P3s 
require the services of P3 experts of which there is a shortage, particularly in the developing 
world. Seventh, each agricultural P3 is novel because each is the result of sector-specific 
challenges and has a structure that is dependent upon the types and number of partners and their 
objectives, limiting the ability to transfer explicit lessons from existing models to new P3s.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement and Introduction 
 
Despite high social and economic returns on investment (ROIs) from agricultural research and 
development (R&D), which is critical to global food security, investments have been declining 
for decades. Several factors are responsible for this decline, including cutbacks to public R&D 
expenditures and the growth of privatization programs. As a result, neither the public nor the 
private sector has been able to supply the required R&D to support the technological innovation 
necessary for the development of long-term solutions to food security. In response to the 
combined shortfalls in both public and private investments, there has been a marked rise in the 
use of public-private partnerships to generate R&D for agricultural innovation. Agricultural 
public-private partnerships impart a hybridized organizational structure to the management, 
finance and generation of agricultural R&D, representing a solution that is ahead of current 
theory, analysis and policy. The study of these hybrid agricultural R&D partnerships, in which 
practice has overtaken theory and analysis, remains an emerging and important field. 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to advance the theory, analysis and policy relevance of these 
agricultural public-private partnerships (P3s). The large-scale uptake and unprecedented 
proliferation of the use of P3s in agricultural innovation systems began with the advent of a 
number of new paradigms regarding the role of government and the use of public funds and 
facilities to support the economy, including but not limited to agricultural R&D. Beginning in the 
late 1970s and continuing to the present day, a number of interrelated factors have precipitated 
re-conceptualization of the parameters governing relations between the state and society. First, 
the advent of ideologies such as neo-liberalism and new public management (NPM) have 
challenged the traditional role of government by advocating for the privatization of public 
services and the application of market-based reforms to the management and administration of 
government services. Second, austerity measures have limited both the scale and scope of 
governments, leading to a long-term decline in expenditures related to agricultural R&D which 
has forced users to develop new ways and new sources for financing their technology and 
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innovation requirements. Third, the public-private dichotomy that formerly characterized both 
society and the agricultural R&D system has been challenged by the growth of distributed 
governance and the rise of a network society characterized by the inclusion of new actors that do 
not conform to the public-private spectrum (Rhodes, 1995: 1). Additionally, globalization has 
intensified the impact and intensity of distributed governance. Lastly, the above transformations 
have collectively changed R&D the route to developing and commercializing new agricultural 
technologies from a linear, mostly public-private process to a horizontal process involving 
heterogeneously organized networks operating on a global basis (Phillips and Khachatourians, 
2001: 21). These new paradigms have jointly provided the impetus for the growth in the use of 
these new organizations. 
 
A full explanation of the above transformations requires recognition that there has been a growth 
of international political economy (IPE) as a unique research discipline within political science. 
Beginning in the 1970s, the traditional approach of separating analysis of international politics 
from the operations of the international economy became incapable of explaining changes to the 
global political-economic order itself. Susan Strange’s (1970) article entitled “International 
Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect” and follow-up publications 
by Robert Cohen and Robert Gilpin, among others, noted this phenomenon. The intellectual 
foundations of IPE are formed on the premise that the economic, power and social changes 
affecting national economies and domestic politics are global in nature, the ongoing results of a 
“compression in time and space” caused by unprecedented advancements in communication, 
distribution and transportation systems which have led to global economic and political 
integration and interdependence (Gilpin, 2001: 8). IPE is grounded on the assumption that policy 
change is the result of interactions between states, multinational corporations, interest groups and 
international political and trade regimes that then render the traditional state-market and 
international-domestic dichotomies insufficient frameworks for analysis. 
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1.2 Literature Review  
 
A literature review confirms that the use of P3s in both the agricultural space and in general is a 
recent phenomenon, as the majority of the scholarly articles and books covering both fields have 
been published in the last five years. A keyword search using the ISI Web of Science identified 
all relevant peer-reviewed articles published between the beginning of 1980 to the end of 2012 
relating to P3s in order to contextualize how they apply to agriculture and to identify trends that 
may influence the present research. The reason for the selection of this time frame is that the 
concept of P3s gained prominence in Great Britain during the early years of the Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s government. The process was driven by both ideological preferences and 
contemporary fiscal pressures, as governments sought to privatize functions and services by 
downloading to both the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors.  
 
From an agricultural perspective, 1980 also marks the end of the golden era when the public 
sector transformed global agriculture through targeted R&D efforts and investments. In the 
preceding decades modern improved varieties came to dominate global markets and high 
yielding ‘green revolution’ varieties of wheat and rice largely resolved long-term food insecurity 
in India and China. Again in Great Britain, the Thatcher government privatized all publicly 
funded breeding activities by selling public facilities to the private sector (Heisley et al., 2002: 
8). In the United States, laws governing intellectual property rights (IPRs) and technology 
transfer were drafted to provide near-monopolistic control over new biological products and 
technologies developed in both public and private facilities. This created incentives for private 
investors to fund R&D, which went partway to compensating declining public investments in 
agriculture (Knudson, 2000: 175). Within the Organization for Economic Development and 
Cooperation (OECD), the advent of IPRs, beginning in the 1970s in the form of plant breeders’ 
rights (PBRs) from the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV), facilitated the privatization of many aspects of agricultural R&D (Flugie and 
Schimmelpfenning, 2000: 3–5). This institutional transformation was mirrored in the animal 
sciences, as IPRs and new collaborative methods of financing R&D diminished the role of the 
public sector beginning in the 1980s (Flugie et al., 2000: 136–145). Put simply, 1980 marks the 
end of the era in which the public sector dominated in the provision of agricultural R&D and the 
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beginning of a new institutional environment characterized by collaboration between the public, 
private, academic and volunteer (producer organization) sectors. 
 
The ISI keyword
1
 search identified 1,660 peer-reviewed articles on P3s during the 1980-2012 
timeframe. As noted in Table 1 below, 927 of these articles (56%) were published in 2008-12, 
suggesting the study of P3s is an emerging field. A total of 58 unique research areas were 
identified, each with a minimum of five publications. In agriculture, a total of 38 peer-reviewed 
articles on P3s have been published since 1980. Again, mirroring the general trend in P3s, 17 
(45%) were published in 2008-12, as Table 1.1 below indicates.  
 
Chart 1. Total P3 Publications 
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Table 1.1. Total Peer-Reviewed P3 and Agricultural P3 Publications 
Period in 5-Year 
Segments 
Total P3 
Publications 
Agricultural P3 
Publications 
Ag P3 as a 
Percentage of 
Total 
1983-87 8 0 0% 
1988-92 21 4 .190% 
1993-97 85 1 .012% 
1998-02 216 8 .037% 
2003-07 403 8 .020% 
2008-12 927 17 .018% 
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives and Limitations of Theory 
 
As the study of P3s in general and agricultural P3s in particular, is an emerging field, practice 
has overtaken study. This presents challenges for researchers, as the absence of a unifying theory 
of P3s has led to a paucity of both methodologies and case studies for organizing the study of 
this phenomenon. This gap is especially pronounced in the agricultural literature base, as the case 
studies conducted to date have used interviews, surveys and record analysis as means of 
examination. This research is descriptive by nature and conducted on an isolated basis, making it 
impossible to extrapolate explicit lessons that can be transferred to support the formulation and 
implementation of specific policies for agricultural P3s. In place of a single theory of agricultural 
P3s, the present study relies on a number of divergent perspectives to both ground the research 
and to provide the research trajectory for the four articles that constitute the core of this 
dissertation. Three independent theoretical perspectives guide this research. The first is based on 
public administration literature, generally focused on new public management; the second draws 
on the disparate theories and prior case studies in the agricultural literature; and the third tests 
various theories of innovation. 
 
In the public administration literature, the P3 represents a process and institution that bridges the 
gap between public- and private-sector practices in order to make government more efficient and 
accountable to stakeholders. Essentially, P3s are a new space for democratic engagement. They 
link community stakeholders in networks of shared interests with policy makers, creating new 
procedures and norms to facilitate legitimacy and consent (Skelcher et al., 2005: 20–21). P3s 
permit governments a semblance of control over policy while allowing the development of new 
methods of financing and managing the provision of public goods, such as infrastructure and 
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services. Specifically, the P3 is a vehicle for leveraging public assets in order to acquire private 
financing while enhancing public accountability (McQuaid and Scherrer, 2010: 8). There is a 
tendency to view P3s according to a public-private dichotomy, in which the public sector seeks 
to adopt private-sector practices to enhance efficiency and the private sector seeks new areas in 
which to operate and search for profits. However, P3s actually represent an innovative 
organizational model designed to maximize the comparative advantages of the competencies of 
all partners—public, private and volunteer—by developing self-organizing networks constructed 
upon the need for coordinated and integrated responses to problems that are beyond the control 
of any sector acting in isolation. The P3, rather than being a vehicle for achieving public 
efficiency, is a new paradigm of public governance in an environment characterized by the need 
for citizen engagement, transparency and accountability (Bovaird, 2004: 12–13). 
 
As the literature count demonstrated in Table 1.1, above, shows, there is a rather small collection 
of peer-reviewed publications related to P3s in the agricultural space. As such, there is no true 
agricultural theory or group of theories pertaining to P3s. Instead, there are a range of concepts 
and a small number of case studies that attempt to describe the growing use of P3s in agricultural 
R&D and in agricultural supply chains in both the developed and developing world.  Three 
concepts are important to this dissertation. The first is the role that P3s occupy in R&D networks. 
Specifically, P3s have been labelled “innovation brokers,” as they anchor networks due to their 
unique ability to link the public, private and producer (volunteer) sectors into horizontally 
configured systems (Klerkx et al., 2009: 2–4). P3s act as intermediaries between the disparate 
partners by facilitating trust, communication and collaboration—all essential components of the 
innovation process. The second theme concerns the incentives that draw partners into P3s. The 
private sector engages in P3s to lower the cost of developing new technologies and markets, as 
P3s are by design well suited for developing new value and supply chains, since collaboration 
lowers the costs and risks associated with new technologies and markets. The third concept 
focuses on the constraints that inhibit the development of P3s. Engaging in P3s can result in the 
undesirable transfer of proprietary technologies to competitors, or to producer groups, which 
then inadvertently transfer them to competitors. This includes the transfer of confidential 
practices and financial information that can harm a firm’s market position vis-à-vis its 
competitors.  
 7 
 
A number of theories of innovation attempt to contextualize the proliferation of P3s. One 
perspective, known as the triple helix model, posits that innovation has become complex, 
requiring the collaboration of all sectors to develop the economies of scale and scope needed to 
accelerate innovation. Here, the development of science-based knowledge becomes dependent on 
the use of organic hybrid organizations that incorporate the institutional characteristics of each 
sector—public, private and academic (Etzkowitz and Ranga, 2010: 5). A second perspective 
suggests that innovation depends on the connection to global flows of ideas and technologies, 
requiring the use of novel institutions that link local capabilities and needs with these global 
flows. Bathelt et al. (2004: 31–33) characterize the challenge of linking global pipelines to local 
buzz. A third view suggests that innovation-based P3s are best understood using a number of 
interrelated economic theories that view collaboration as a means of institutional design, which 
lowers the cost of R&D and generates economies of scale that exceed the capability of either the 
public or the private sector alone.  
 
There are a number of limitations associated with the above theories. First, from a generalized 
viewpoint on P3s, there is a paucity of models to evaluate the P3s and generate empirical 
evidence. Specifically, most of the theories are largely descriptive and do not provide any 
specific causal relationship which can be quantified and assessed in terms of input sand outputs. 
The current primary tools for evaluating generic P3s are qualitative, based on interviews, surveys 
and observations (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 5). Second, the primary public administration literature 
views the P3 as a process for achieving efficiencies in the provision of public goods by 
collaborating with the private sector to finance and manage infrastructure projects. Agricultural 
P3s as discussed in this dissertation are of a different order than infrastructure projects: in place 
of the design, building and management of such projects, agricultural P3s are organic 
organizations developed to create something new in the form of technological innovation. 
Therefore, they move away from contract management into the creation of social and scientific 
capital, operating on long-term horizons characterized by uncertainty. Additionally, agricultural 
P3s include a wide variety of partners (e.g., producer groups, NGOs, foundations) that do not fit 
into the strict public-private dichotomy of the literature. Third, the agricultural literature base 
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contains a limited number of discrete case studies, making it difficult to draw explicit lessons 
that can be transferred systematically into policy and into future agricultural P3s. 
1.4 Organization and Purpose of this Study 
 
In addition to the Introduction and Conclusion this thesis consists of four discrete articles that 
have been presented at peer-reviewed conferences. The four articles in this dissertation are 
designed to advance the theory, analysis and policy review of agricultural P3s. The first article, 
“Centerless Governance and the Management of Global R&D: Public–Private Partnerships and 
Plant-Genetic Resource Management,” uses social network analysis (SNA) to empirically 
evaluate the role of P3s at the national, regional and global levels of operations in the pulse R&D 
sector. The pulse sector provides fertile ground for research: pulses are sometimes characterized 
as an “orphan crop,” as their R&D needs are largely ignored by both the public and private 
sectors. Consequently, there exist opportunities for innovative financing and management 
business models; a large number of P3s operate in this sector. This article graphically and 
statistically demonstrates through SNA that P3s are the central actors that provide the structural 
nucleus for the horizontally configured innovation systems that dominate in this research space.  
Moreover, they are vital for linking the various national systems into larger regional/continental 
systems and ultimately into the global system. A sensitivity analysis helps to define the central 
role of P3s in this process. Furthermore, the operational configuration of each P3 depends upon 
the R&D and governance needs of each national or regional network. Specifically, each P3 is 
tailored to the technology-transfer characteristics of each system. This article also demonstrates 
that the use of P3s can confer competitive advantages to users at the macro level of operations. 
 
The second article, “Collaboration and the Generation of New Knowledge in Networked 
Innovation Systems: a Bibliometric Analysis,” merges two methodologies to develop an 
innovative analytic model to measure how collaboration improves technology transfer and 
knowledge dissemination in the Canadian canola sector. Both regression and citation analyses 
are merged into a single analytical model to demonstrate that collaboration, centered around P3s, 
creates economies of scale and scope in demand-driven networks, which are replacing supply-
push linear systems of innovation in agricultural R&D. This paper suggests that traditional 
models of agricultural R&D based on a public-private dichotomy are being replaced by multi-
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sectoral and transient networks organized around P3s, which are governed and financed by the 
users—generally producers—of the resultant technologies. Therefore, innovation is becoming a 
bottom-up and organic process in which pluralistic funding and governance processes are 
challenging the traditional, hierarchically structured systems of technology transfer.  The results 
of the regression suggest that there are optimal configurations for these partnerships—producers, 
academics and industry partners generate differential synergies, as does government (albeit not if 
two or more government engage).  
 
The third article, “A Typology of Research and Development: Agricultural Public-Private 
Partnerships Common to the Developing World Bio-economy,” is a comparative analysis of a 
number of P3s in the developing world, grounded in the agricultural P3 literature. This article 
advances the theory and policy relevance of agricultural P3s in the developing world in five 
ways. First, it develops a working typology by delineating two models of P3s (R&D and value-
chain), illuminating how the utilization of proprietary knowledge, the requirement for networks 
at different stages of their life cycle and the need for P3 specialists differentiate the two models. 
Second, this paper suggests that individuals responding to intractable problems related to food 
security are the key drivers of the formation of P3s—not policies. Third, it argues that the 
successful formation and operation of these new business models is limited by a shortage of P3s 
specialists, researchers and scientists. Fourth, it reveals previously unknown variables—related 
to complexity, financial reporting and gestation periods—that hinder success. Fifth, it 
demonstrates how, as the problems of food security in the developing world exceed the capacity 
of both the private and public sectors to produce and distribute sufficient food, P3s represent the 
leading edge of an emerging global system of institutions dedicated to addressing the growing 
challenge of food security.  
 
The last article, “Public–Private–Producer Partnerships (P4s) in Canada,” is a case-study analysis 
on four P4s currently in operation in Canada. The term public–private–producer partnership 
represents a relatively new concept in agriculture and is a subset of agricultural P3s that has not 
yet been researched. This article examines the growing role that self-organizing producer 
organizations occupy in the financing and management of the R&D process in Canada in 
collaboration with the public sector and academia using P4s. P4s are an emerging business 
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model that permits producers to use production-based levies to finance the development and 
commercialization of new technologies. P4s have developed in response to a variety of factors 
including public austerity measures and the advent of intellectual property rights regimes that 
have engendered new economic spheres that have neither the public nor the private sectors have 
adequately responded to. There are four case studies based on primary and secondary sources 
that illuminate the growing role of P4s in Canadian agriculture. 
 
As each of the four above chapters/articles is by design a discrete probe of the concept of P3s 
that has been presented at peer-reviewed conferences and, in two cases, published, there is no 
single, overarching specific theory and methodology chapter to this dissertation. The reason for 
this is each article uses a methodology unique to that particular investigation.  Therefore, a 
number of theories and concepts central to the understanding of agricultural P3s are repeated and 
refined in each article. 
 
Including the introduction, there are a total of seven chapters to this dissertation. The second 
chapter discusses the genesis of the contemporary conceptualization and theorizing of P3s and 
the multiple factors underscoring the growth of agricultural P3s. This framework is used to 
develop the lineage of agricultural R&D P3s. Chapters three to six contain the four individual 
articles, and chapter seven discusses the findings, implication, possible extensions and 
limitations of this research. 
1.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This summarizes the discussion in chapter 7. Agricultural R&D is being transformed from a 
vertical process characterized by a public-private dichotomy to a horizontal process 
characterized by collaboration. Agricultural P3s are a new business model that due to its 
collaborative structure centres R&D networks by performing the role of gatekeepers by 
controlling the flow of ideas, people, money and technologies. As this dissertation demonstrates, 
agricultural P3s are critical to the generation and commercialization of technologies needed to 
enhance global food security. P3s originally emerged to replace public R&D spending lost to 
austerity but have since evolved into highly-specialized business models that accelerate the R&D 
process by linking dissimilar organizations and institutions into functioning innovation networks. 
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Agricultural P3s integrate science and business by linking R&D expenditures generated by self-
organizing producer organizations with the requirements of the market. 
P3s appear best suited for operating in orphan crops and other spaces that are not serviced by the 
public or private sectors for a variety of reasons. As this investigation demonstrates, agricultural 
P3s emerged to fill gaps in the financing, generation and commercialization of R&D that have 
been created due to a number of factors including public austerity measures, the growth of 
intellectual property rights in agriculture and the inability of the public and private sectors to 
respond to the growing challenge of global food security. Due to the collaborative structure of 
these emerging business models, there is no single model in operation. Their structure is 
dependent on the purpose of the P3—technology transfer, financing of R&D, creation of R&D 
networks or value chains, or the creation of a new agricultural sector. Interestingly, the 
agricultural P3s analyzed in this investigation are not the result of policies, but rather are the 
result of well-connected insiders—boundary pushers and social entrepreneurs—responding to 
challenges related to food security and agricultural R&D by generating hybrid responses in the 
form of P3s. There is evidence that many agricultural P3s depend on the activities of P3 
specialists to provide the initiative, leadership and management capability, and there is a limited 
number available particularly in the developing world. 
Agricultural P3s are expensive, have high transaction costs, require large upfront investments in 
people and technologies. Therefore, they have long gestation periods as the R&D cycle, 
particularly in the plant sciences, can be as long as 15 years. This means that these P3s are 
dependent upon public support until they can commercialize products and services to generate 
cash flows to sustain their operations. Agricultural P3s can be high-risk ventures due to the long 
gestation period and their vulnerability to financial disruptions as most public programs and 
donor organizations work on shorter time horizons. Agricultural P3s are heavily contextualized 
organizations that are characterized by their partners, objectives and the specific product or 
service. This means that each model is unique, which limits the ability to draw explicit lessons 
for other agricultural P3s to emulate. 
This investigation introduced two methodologies to advance the analysis of agricultural P3s. 
Social network analysis (SNA) is a tool that graphically and statistically measures and evaluates 
P3s in a networked and horizontal process by providing a quantitative and hypothesis-based 
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methodology that can identify, categorize and measure relationships, organizations and flows of 
ideas, technologies and resources that previously alluded researchers that govern the R&D 
process. This is important as agricultural P3s are a critical part of an emerging global complex of 
organizations that increasingly depend on collaboration to generate R&D solutions to global food 
security. Additionally, this investigation developed a bibliometric model to identify how 
collaboration can increase the returns from agricultural R&D. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE ORIGINS OF AGRICULTURAL P3S 
 
2.1 Intellectual and Theoretical Origins of P3s 
 
The origins of P3s can be traced back to the advent of new public management (NPM) and neo-
liberalism, two interrelated theories that encompass the state, citizen and economy. Neo-
liberalism and NPM are ideologies that seek to privatize the functions of the state and, where 
possible, dismantle government bureaucracy (Evans and Shields, 2000: 2). A number of factors 
have influenced the development and acceptance of neo-liberalism as a public philosophy. 
Ideologically, its intellectual roots are in classical liberalism, with its focus on the individual's 
utilization of the marketplace to secure all goods necessary for survival. Economically, 
government fiscal cutbacks and program downloading, which began in the 1970s, have helped 
legitimize neo-liberalism (Hall and Reed, 1998: 2). Publicly, the image of government 
bureaucracy has become one of anachronism, arrogance and bloat. Globally, increased trade 
competition and the post-Cold War drive towards democratization have combined to render the 
state bureaucracy a less inefficient provider of many services. Neo-liberalism and NPM seek to 
apply private-sector management techniques and objectives to government. These techniques 
include the use of technology to reduce labour and increase productivity (Boase, 2000: 76–77).  
 
The NPM philosophy of privatization challenges tenets of the welfare state of Keynesian 
economics. The welfare state provided public goods and merged the political and economic 
interests of the individual with a new concept of citizenship that involved explicit guarantee of 
the social welfare of the individual (Sears, 1999: 92–93). Furthermore, the Keynesian state 
regulated and managed the private sector and the labour market. Neo-liberalism and NPM 
changed the citizen into a consumer, responsible for securing his or her own social welfare by 
procuring goods and services in a competitive marketplace. Government has become a manager 
and procurer of goods and services in place of being a supplier of goods and services. In place of 
a direct relationship with the citizen, government increasingly uses financial incentives and 
collaboration with the private sector to provide goods and services to consumers (Milward and 
Provan, 2000: 15). This ongoing process is also known as Alternative Service Delivery (ASD). 
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The UK Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher introduced the NPM-motivated Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) legislation in the late 1970s and early 1980s as one centerpiece of its 
privatization process. PFI introduced competitive bidding to help facilitate the privatization of 
the delivery of public goods. The ultimate objective of the Conservative government through PFI 
was the wholesale privatization of public goods delivery, which in its first instance included the 
transfer of ownership of public facilities such as hospitals, roads and schools (Falconer and 
McLaughlin, 2000: 1). This process provided the intellectual and policy foundation for growth of 
the use of P3s. It was emulated in the US with the Reagan administration, in Canada with the 
Mulroney government and in Australia under the Howard government. 
 
Despite the NPM emphasis on privatization, in the literature P3s do not exclusively focus on the 
privatization of the provision of public goods such as infrastructure, but rather are considered to 
be primarily concerned with addressing the need for multi-sectoral collaborative management, 
financing and governance to provide services that once were the exclusive domain of the public 
sector. The combined effects of ideology, austerity and globalization have obfuscated the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors and in many fields have rendered governments 
dependent upon partnerships with the private sector to provide critical infrastructure and 
services. Under NPM, P3s increase the productive and management capabilities of governments 
faced with reduced bureaucracies and budgets by using the private sector to fund projects. In 
turn, the private sector relies upon user fees to generate cash flows in order to provide a return on 
its investments (Engels et al., 2007: 2, 37). Therefore, P3s are best understood as public-private 
collaborative business models that allocate the risk and return between partners in an equitable 
process. They combine the efficiency of the private sector with the public interest as defined by 
government. At its core, the NPM P3 represents a collaborative relationship regulated by binding 
contracts, emulating a principle-agent relationship characterized by the need to support greater 
efficiency in the provision of infrastructure projects such as roads, schools and hospitals (Velotti 
et al., 2012: 2). 
 
A true P3 involves the equitable sharing of risk, reward, accountability and authority (Torjman 
1998: 3). However, in practice, due to the statutory requirement for governmental accountability 
over the use of public funds and property, most P3s involve public-private collaboration with 
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varying degrees of the sharing of risk and reward (Allen, 1999: 7). The private sector can also 
receive an implicit government revenue guarantee for specific projects. However, regardless of 
the outcome, the government is responsible for public activities and can be liable for costs in the 
case of bankruptcy or failure on the part of the P3, including assuming the operational 
responsibility for an incomplete infrastructure project.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the literature review reveals the absence of a unifying 
theory that characterizes the growing field of P3 study. This contributes to the absence of a 
unified working typology of P3s. Instead, there is a wide range of descriptions and 
characterizations of P3s, making it difficult to categorize them for analysis, as each P3 is 
application- and context-specific. However, there are a number of methods of categorizing P3s. 
From a general perspective, P3s can be viewed on a continuum based on the amount of risk 
transferred from the government to the partner or partnership, ranging from minimal risk transfer 
executed through a contract to a complete risk-transfer process through a build-buy-operate 
agreement (Allen, 1999: 17). A second perspective may categorize P3s by their management 
style, according to three types: designed for network management; process management; or 
project management (Klijin and Teisman, 2000: 11–13). A third approach would be to categorize 
the P3 by the amount of authority the government has transferred to the partnership (Kernaghan, 
1993: 61–65). Finally, P3s can be categorized by their structure; some are quite formal while 
others operate more informally. 
 
The measurement of P3s—as with the overall study of P3s—is an underdeveloped field, due to 
the imprecise nature of these evolving management models and questions’ surrounding what 
constitutes performance. This leads to ambiguity about how to measure performance (Grossman, 
2012: 4). Theory suggests a separate examination for each of the outcome, process and input 
levels of analysis of the partnership. At the outcome level of analysis, a cost/benefit and/or a 
value-for-money evaluation, using an NPV or IRR analysis, can provide one measure of 
performance. This method assumes performance can be effectively computed in terms of return 
on investments and that all inputs can be monetized. It largely overlooks the differences between 
private-sector measurements and public-sector standards, such as social outcomes (Grossman, 
2012: 4). At the process level of analysis, the “causal chain of evaluation” provides a model that 
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compares expectations to the performance and outcomes of the partnership through interviews, 
observations and surveys (Brinkerhoff, 2002: 5–8). P3s can also be evaluated according to the 
amount of monetary, human and technological assets the P3s acquired (Murray, 2000: 5).  
2.2 The Theory of Goods and the Institutional Structure of P3s 
 
The theory of goods employs the concepts of excludability and subtractability to develop a 
continuum of goods from private to public to common pool goods. Institutional economics uses 
the notions of exit, voice and hierarchy to develop a range of institutional structures for the 
delivery of goods to the individual. Positive agency theory is concerned with the measurement 
costs of managing the principal-agent problem, the asymmetry of information between the 
principle and agent expressed as nonseparability and task programmability. The theory of goods 
is constructed from two characteristics of all goods: excludability and subtractability (sometimes 
called rivalry). Excludability refers to the capability of a seller to prevent the distribution of a 
product or service unless the buyer meets the terms set forth by the seller (Savas, 2000: 41). 
Automobiles and clothing are two products that are easily excludable. Excludability is a 
fundamental requirement for private-sector transactions. Subtractability is whether the 
consumption of a product or service by one individual precludes its consumption by another 
individual (Ostrom, 1975: 847). National defense is an example of a nonsubtractable product. 
The marginal cost of a nonsubtractable product is zero; this is a pure public good, distributed by 
government where all citizens have equal access or use of the product or service (Ostrom, 1975: 
847). Conversely, a pure private good is one where both excludability and subtractability are in 
evidence; again automobiles and clothing are two such goods. Common-pool goods are those 
that exhibit varying degrees of excludability and subtractability (discussed further below). 
 
Complementing the theory of goods is the contribution of Albert O. Hirschman, who in 1970 
articulated the theory of the “trilogy of institutional economics” consisting of exit, voice and 
loyalty. Exit is market mechanism that posits when a consumer experiences dissatisfaction with a 
particular product or service he/she either terminates their use of that particular good or seeks out 
a competing vendor to satisfy their demand for the good (Hirshman, 1970: 15–16). Hirschman 
writes that the exit mechanism is a component of Adam Smith’s “hidden hand”. Voice belongs to 
the political spectrum. Voice is a “recuperative mechanism” where a revision of the 
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circumstances of dissatisfaction with a product or service is sought in place of the exit strategy 
(Hirshman, 1970: 30–31). Voice, whether individual or collective, seeks to mobilize opinion to 
facilitate change. Loyalty, closely related to voice, is an emotional or utilitarian bond to a 
particular organization ranging from a business to a nation-state (Hirshman, 1970: 76–79. 
Hirschman writes the significance of loyalty is that it can, under the correct institutional 
arrangements, neutralize exit and give significance to voice. Therefore, voice is critical to 
organizational stability by preventing dissatisfaction from removing its constituent members 
(Hirshman, 1970: 79). Due to its ability to prevent exit behaviour, loyalty induces hierarchy, 
often associated with vertical organizations in business and government.  
 
Combining Hirschman’s trilogy with excludability and subtractability provides a continuum of 
goods from private to public to common-pool. Together the institutional parameters of voice, 
exit and hierarchy (loyalty) and excludability and subtractability define the range of goods and 
the multiplicity of mixed goods that defy explicit characterization. Private goods can now be 
defined as those in which excludability, subtractability and limited voice are in evidence. Public 
goods are those products and services that possess low excludability and low subtractability with 
the need for hierarchy. Common-pool goods are those which exhibit varying degrees of both 
excludability and subtractability but require high voice from the participatory sector. Robert 
Picciotti has developed the following diagram that depicts the combination of goods and the 
institutional parameters required for their delivery. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Picciotto Model 
State Sector
Market Sector Voluntary Sector
A
B
D
C E
F
G 
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Using Picciotto’s (1995: 16) diagram as a reference we can now illuminate the institutional 
structure of goods. (A) represents pure public goods supplied by government in which 
excludability and subtractability are low and hierarchy is a prerequisite for provision, public 
goods include law enforcement, national defense and education. (D) highlights market governed 
private transactions in which excludability, subtractability and exit are present and hierarchy and 
voice are minimized. (F) indicates common-pool goods where voice is the critical characteristic 
and where excludability and subtractability vary depending upon the specific product or service. 
(B), (C), (E) and (G) represent institutions that operate between and within the overlapping 
dominant parameters of the public, market and voluntary sectors (P3s and hybrid organizations 
and NGOs respectively), all exhibiting different levels of voice, exit or loyalty characteristics.  
 
The institutional structure can be framed by the theory of “fiscal equivalence” (Olson, 1969: 5), 
where the fiscal boundaries of the funder of a public good should correspond to the physical 
boundaries of the consumer of a public good. The institutional structure can be further framed by 
the “principle of subsidiarity”, where the lowest level of government in contact with a particular 
public process should be the level of government that governs that process (Paquet, 1994: 190–
194).   
Table 2.1. Typology by Good and Attribute 
Institution Excludability Subtractability Voice 
Public goods supplied by government Low Low Low 
Market goods supplied by the private sector High High Low 
Collective goods supplied by voluntary 
associations (P3s and hybrid organizations and 
NGOs) 
Low Low to high High 
 
2.3 Intellectual and Policy Origins of Agricultural P3s 
 
There are five factors influencing the rise of the use of P3s in agricultural R&D systems. First, 
from an historical perspective, the public sector was once the primary funder of agricultural 
R&D in the developed world. However, beginning in the 1980s, for a wide variety of reasons, 
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public R&D spending has been on a steady decline. From 1945 to the mid-1970s in the OECD, 
the public sector was the primary financier of agricultural R&D and public funding thereof 
expanded on a yearly basis (Alston et al., 1998: 5–9). But beginning in the late 1970s and 
continuing to the present day, the public-sector share of agricultural R&D and level of R&D 
spending has declined precipitously (Beintema et al., 2012: 4–5). This deceleration of public 
spending is currently occurring on a global basis in both the developed and developing world. To 
compound matters, with the exception of a small number of large-acreage crops such as corn and 
soy, private-sector investment has not been expanding to compensate, creating an institutional 
void. Thus, in a number of sectors, nationally and globally, P3s have developed as a response to 
the funding and leadership vacuum. 
 
Second, in the OECD, beginning with the policies in the UK under Thatcher, many public-sector 
institutions have been privatized. The UK Plant Breeding Institute (PBI) was privatized in 1987 
as part of a public rescaling process that occurred throughout the UK, leading to a complete 
divesture of public assets and personnel in agricultural R&D. This contributed to the large gap—
known as the “valley of death” (Phillips et al., 2013: 104)—between the public and private 
sectors, which inhibits the development of pre-commercial technologies needed to develop 
market-ready technologies and varieties. This privatization process has been mirrored to varying 
degrees across the OECD, creating gaps in both the funding and provision of R&D. In Australia, 
a large number of public plant-breeding programs have been either privatized or turned into P3s 
(Linder, 2004: 3–4). In Canada, a number of crop (e.g. canola and specialty fruit) and animal 
R&D programs were privatized or became fee-for-service operations, creating a number of 
agricultural P3s. Due to reductions in spending, many public programs in the US, Canada and 
Australia were forced to seek private funding or to create elaborate collaborative research 
agreements in order to continue operations. 
 
Third, the expanded intellectual property rights (IPR) regime at both the global and national 
levels of analysis has worked to commercialize many of the formerly ad-hoc relationships 
between producers and public agencies. The International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV) convention was first signed in 1961 and subsequently revised in 
1971, 1991 and of particular importance is a 1991 revision to the Act which required all 
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signatories to implement national plant breeders’ rights systems for new plant varieties 
developed for commercial purposes. Specifically, UPOV 1991 requires members to develop a 
national plant variety registration system that assigned IPRs to each distinct variety. The 
objective of UPOV was to commercialize plant breeding in order to help finance continual 
improvements by creating revenues that might to support technological development and 
innovation. As will be discussed below, UPOV 1991 spawned a number of P3s in Canada and 
Australia, as users were forced to start paying for the use of newly registered varieties that 
historically were supplied free of charge by public agencies.    
 
Fourth, a number of developments related to the growth of new technologies have 
commercialized the development of new agricultural technologies. During the 1980s in the US, 
in response to perceptions of American economic decline, the federal government passed 
numerous pieces of legislation to enhance America’s competitive position. The Bayh-Dole Act 
of 1980 permitted universities to patent and license for profit any discoveries that occurred with 
federal funding (Kloppenburg, 2004: 330). This Act was designed to facilitate the 
commercialization of technologies from universities and assist in the financing of future 
research. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 and the Federal 
Technology Transfer Act of 1986 were designed to permit the merging of private interests with 
research from federal laboratories such as the United States Department of Agriculture. The 
commercialization of agricultural R&D in the US is particularly relevant, as these policy changes 
coincided with the development of biotechnology.  
 
Fifth, the growth and expansion of biotechnology in conjunction with the introduction of IPRs 
and the ongoing privatization of agricultural R&D has resulted in a paradigm shift in the 
industrial organization of agriculture. The biotechnology revolution, sometimes known as the 
genomics revolution, has permitted researchers to identify and transfer genes between living 
organisms such as plants, animals and microbes to increase yields and to withstand abiotic and 
biotic stresses. Furthermore, the advent of biotechnology occurred simultaneously with the 
development of IPRs in the United States, which has contributed to the commercialization of the 
plant breeding process. New breeding tools and processes were developed and commercialized 
over the intervening period.  The patenting of recombinant DNA in 1973 and the patenting of 
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key biotechnology breeding discoveries in the 1980s began the virtual land-grab. By 2000, most 
of the genetic sequences identified in the human genome and key commercialized genomes were 
encoded and claimed in patent filings in the US and elsewhere. This “balkanization” of the 
breeding tools and genetic materials has precipitated “freedom to operate” (FTO) problems, as 
no single enterprise or lab had authority to use the appropriate research tools in a way that would 
facilitate fully licensed commercialization. A review of plant breeding patents issued in the 
United States from 1981-2001 indicates the significance of this process. Public institutions in this 
era generated 24% of the key patents, but no single institute possessed more than 2% of the 
patents (Graff et al., 2003: 2-3). The private sector possessed 75% of the key breeding patents, 
with the five largest integrated agri-biotech firms holding 41% of the relevant patents (Graff et 
al., 2003: 2-3), thus limiting the ability of the public sector and producer organizations to 
conduct R&D without securing access to privately held IPRs, and thereby inhibiting 
technological innovation (Galushko et al., 2010: 1–2). 
2.4 A Lineage of Agricultural P3s 
 
It is difficult to precisely determine when and where the use of P3s in agriculture began, as 
collaboration has always been the hallmark of agricultural R&D. However, the use of formal 
partnerships using the above framework can be traced back to the 1970s and 80s. Internationally, 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) began operations in 
1971, linking privately held technologies from the developed world with developing-world food 
security needs. This led to the creation of sixteen individual research centers, each devoted to a 
specific crop species or research topic. Each center includes a wide and permanent array of 
partners, ranging from government agencies to private philanthropic donors, private MNCs, 
international IGOs and NGOs, and developing-world farmer organizations (Binenbaum et al., 
2001: 1–2). As will be discussed in chapter three, the CGIAR individual research centers, which 
usually have different partners from each other, have developed into hubs of international 
agricultural R&D and the global gatekeepers between the developed and developing worlds for 
technologies and new germplasm. Specifically, while the developed world possesses the bulk of 
the advanced agricultural technologies critical to global food security, the developing world is 
home to the majority of the land-race species that contain the genetic material required to support 
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technological innovation. Chapter five discusses developing-world agricultural R&D P3s in 
detail. 
 
In Canada, the first agricultural P3s can be traced to the nascent canola industry of the 1970s, 
when industry associations began funding R&D in order to transform ordinary rapeseed into 
canola (Phillips, 2007: 36–37). The introduction of IPRs, beginning in the 1980s, led to the 
privatization of varietal development in the Canadian canola sector, while simultaneously 
creating a new space between the public and private sectors occupied by producer organizations 
and industry associations. These groups provided funding for R&D and new technologies to 
bridge the funding and R&D gaps that had developed. Since then the P3 model has emerged in 
most of the commodity areas and a range of international P3s have become important partners or 
competitors to Canada. This thesis examines a few of them. 
 
In Canada, SaskCanola, a 26,000-strong producer partnership, has developed its own R&D 
system as a means of compensating for deficiencies in both the public and private supply of 
R&D. SaskCanola provides stewardship over a $15 billion sector. It also provides a mechanism 
for producers to direct R&D to their benefit. This partnership initiated a process that continues to 
the present day and is discussed in chapter four, in which the role of P3s in facilitating 
technology transfer is explored.  
 
In the Canadian swine sector, public austerity programs and the development of new 
technologies laid the groundwork for the creation of a producer-funded P3 between the 
Fédération des producteurs de porcs du Québec (FPPQ)—the Quebec swine producers' 
association—and the government of Quebec in 1992. The objective of the Centre de 
développement du porc du Québec (CDPQ) was to create an organization for recruiting and 
training highly specialized personnel to capitalize on the genomics revolution by supplying new 
technologies in order to remain competitive in a globalized industry. The CDPQ began 
operations with the transfer of public assets and employees and with public funds as the sole 
source of revenue. Currently, the CDPQ receives 75% of its funding from value-added services 
and a producer levy. It took fifteen years to develop the internal R&D expertise to generate the 
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value-added income. The CDPQ employs 50 people and conducts its research internally. The 
CDPQ is examined in chapter six. 
 
The introduction of the UPOV-mandated plant breeders' rights led to the creation of the 
Okanagan Plant Improvement Company (PICO) in 1992, a P3 between a specialty fruit growers' 
association and an existing publicly funded agricultural R&D center. This P3 formalized and 
commercialized an existing relationship and transferred the financial responsibility for R&D 
from the public sector to the producers. PICO depends on royalties from PBRs to support its 
operations. PICO is the sole supplier of new technologies and varieties to its industry and links 
its producers into global flows of technologies. PICO employs seven people and contracts out all 
of its R&D needs. In 2009, the Government of Canada awarded PICO the Federal Partners in 
Technology Transfer (FPTT) award for Excellence in Technology Transfer. PICO is examined in 
chapter six. 
 
In 1984, the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (SPG), a producer association, voted to implement a 
non-refundable crop levy to support R&D. In 1997, due to public cutbacks, the SPG entered into 
an exclusive R&D P3 with the University of Saskatchewan’s Crop Development Centre in order 
to replace public funding. This P3 ensures that the SPG receives exclusive, royalty-free access to 
new varieties of pulses. The SPG has 18,000 members who in aggregate contributed an average 
in 2010-13 of $11 million annually to R&D to support an export industry worth $1.8 billion 
annually. Over the past five years, the SPG has used its levy to leverage an additional $34 
million of R&D. The SPG employs fourteen people and contracts out its R&D. The role of the 
SPG in the global pulse R&D system is examined in detail in chapter three while the structure 
and function of the SPG is examined in some detail in chapters three and six. 
 
In Australia, the Grains Research and Development Corporation (GRDC) was formed by the 
federal government in 1990 as the centerpiece of a national consolidation of various publicly 
funded state-level and university-based plant breeding programs into a national P3 with a 
number of national and state producer groups. Austerity measures in combination with the 
introduction of IPRs created the need for new collaborative funding mechanisms. Additional 
impetus for the GRCD came from Monsanto, which had commercialized Bt cotton in both the 
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US and Australia, and through its monopoly position began charging a technology fee to 
Australian producers that was two times the rate charged to American producers (Lindner, 2004: 
6). Australian producers and regulators viewed the monopoly power of international life-sciences 
competitors such as Monsanto as a threat to the viability of the Australian grains industry. The 
GRDC is a unique P3 in that it is not a commodity-specific partnership; rather, it is an industry-
wide P3, supporting all commodities. Furthermore, the GRDC is arguably the largest P3 when 
measured by R&D expenditures, as its 2012 R&D expenditure was AU$121 million. Producer 
levies and IPR royalties constitute AU$89 million in revenues, while the government contributes 
AU$43 million (Alston et al., 2012: 42). The role of the GRDC in the pulse R&D sector in 
Australia is examined in chapter three. 
 
Also in Australia, the federal government developed the Cooperative Research Centers (CRCs) 
to facilitate cooperative research within the country. Formally launched in 1991, the CRC 
program was a response to declining R&D investment in Australia. A report noted that R&D as a 
percentage of GDP had been falling in Australia while rising in the rest of the OECD (Buller and 
Taylor, 1999). The CRC program spawned a large number of agricultural P3s in Australia's 
sugar, wheat, pulse and plant bio-security sectors. These include the CRC for Sugar Industry 
Innovation through Biotechnology (CRCSIIB), the Value Added Wheat CRC (VAWCRC) and 
the CRC for Molecular Plant Breeding (MRBCRC). One CRC creation, the Center for Legumes 
in a Mediterranean Area (CLIMA), a pulse crop research center funded by partnership between 
government, producers and the GRDC, is analyzed in chapter three. 
 
In Great Britain, the Pulse Crop Genetic Improvement Network (PCGIN) is a P3 involving the 
John Innes Center (JIC), the Processors and Growers’ Research Organization (PGRO), the 
National Institute of Agricultural Botany (NIAB) and numerous private breeders. The PGRO is 
funded by a voluntary levy on pulse production. This levy supports variety and agronomy R&D. 
The John Innes Center is an independent research and development institute for plant science and 
microbiology, dedicated to multi-disciplinary research with a focus on cell biology, 
biochemistry, plant genetics and molecular biology. The JIC is a part of a joint venture of 
Sainsbury Laboratory with the government, the Gatsby Charitable Foundation and the University 
of East Anglia.  
 27 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Agricultural P3s represent a new paradigm in the management and financing of agricultural 
R&D. There is no single underlying factor behind their ascent in agriculture; rather, there are a 
number of interrelated factors responsible for the transformation of agricultural R&D into a 
range of horizontal governance models. The combined effects of globalization, public austerity, 
new technology paradigms, new ideologies and evolving IPR/PBR regimes have blurred the 
boundaries between the public and private spheres of operation and created gaps in the financing 
and generation of R&D. These factors have collectively engendered collaboration in agricultural 
R&D. One result of these transformations is the growing role of producer associations in the 
financing and management of agricultural R&D through the use of P3s. P3s signal the end of the 
vertically integrated, hierarchal R&D system centered on a public-private dichotomy in a 
specific country or product line and represent a shift to a new system that is horizontally 
configured, globalized, and consists of heterogeneous organizations using complementary 
processes to form networks to sustain and accelerate R&D-based innovation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF 
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: 
A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSLATION 
SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
        
Innovation is increasingly viewed as a key determinant of economic growth. There are a number 
of divergent perspectives on innovation. One posits that the private sector, at the firm level, is the 
primary source of innovation (Arrow, 1962: 616–619; Solow, 1956: 28–30). Another firm-
centric view suggests innovation is the result of endogenously developed knowledge occurring at 
the firm level but impacting at the macroeconomic level (Krugman, 1998: 3–4; Romer, 1990: 2–
3). The institutional approach examines the effect of economies of scale and scope on developing 
systems of innovation at the local, regional or national levels (Nelson, 1988: 317–318; Porter, 
1990: 15–17). A more recent institutional perspective suggests that innovation is the result of 
interactions between university, industry and government actors or organizations at either the 
micro or macro level. This view posits that universities center knowledge generation and 
diffusion networks by developing collaborative links between the three sectors and with the 
market (Etzkowitz and Ranga, 2010: 2, 4). A universal perspective suggests that innovation 
occurs at the global level and the key to economic growth is developing an institutional 
framework that connects local capabilities to global knowledge flows, such as patents and 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), to create a value-added process (Bathelt, 2004: 9; Phillips, 
2002: 52–53). One common theme that underscores the recent collaborative-oriented 
institutional and global perspectives is the need for the utilization of public-private partnership 
(P3) organizations to forge the links, either globally or institutionally, between various 
organizations and networks to facilitate the knowledge generation and diffusion process (Bathelt, 
2004: 12; Etzkowitz and Ranga, 2010: 5). This original empirical study expands the theory, 
analysis and policy relevance of the P3 as an institution to manage collaborative research and 
development (R&D) networks and innovation systems in a globalized environment. 
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3.2 Theory 
3.2.1 P3s Defined and Contextualized 
 
From a definitional approach, a P3 refers to any collaborative engagement between public, 
private, and/or voluntary actors or organizations. No one standard model exists for P3s; rather, 
they should be viewed as a process that allocates risk and reward on an equitable basis among 
key stakeholders. A true public-private partnership (P3) must involve the sharing of authority, 
risk, responsibility, accountability and benefit. P3s are not a contracting out of government 
services, nor are they a privatization of government services as the public sector retains an active 
role in the management of P3s. There are few true legal joint-liability partnerships as this 
contradicts the requirement for government accountability regarding the use of public funds 
(Allan, 2000: 7). Therefore, the majority of P3s involve some form of collaboration between the 
public and/or private and/or voluntary sectors with varying levels of the sharing of risks and 
benefits.  
 
There are a number of factors influencing the advent of P3. From an ideological perspective, for 
the proponents of New Public Management (NPM) the P3 represents both a policy option and an 
organizational structure to reduce the size and scope of government by transferring delivery of a 
good or service to the most efficient sector. In this viewpoint the state becomes a network 
manager and procurer of goods and services at the expense of being a supplier of goods and 
services. In place of a direct relationship with the citizen, government uses financial incentives 
and collaboration with the private and voluntary sectors to provide goods and services to 
consumers (Milward and Provan, 2000: 15). From a fiscal perspective, the development of 
government austerity programs beginning in 1979 in Great Britain with the election of Margaret 
Thatcher, in 1981 in the US with the election of Ronald Reagan, and with the subsequent 
elections of the Mulroney and Howard governments in Canada and Australia, all signaled the 
end of an era of direct government intervention in the economy. And, from a social-economic 
perspective, the combined effects of globalization and technological development, especially in 
telecommunications and computers, have facilitated a “compression of time and space”, which 
has rendered the bureaucratic and hierarchical-structured state as an ineffective and inefficient 
method of program management and service delivery (Gilpin, 2001: 8).  
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3.2.2 The Network Society and the Challenge of Governance 
 
British political scientist Rod Rhodes suggests we are in an era characterized by a transformation 
away from government, with a hierarchal structured bureaucracy with a centralized decision 
making process, to governance, a distributed decision making process that operates in a network 
environment defined by collaboration that is horizontally configured (Rhodes, 1995: 1).   
 
The new governance paradigm is challenging the structure and process of government in four 
ways. First, individually, new actors, and collectively, new interest groups are demanding to be a 
part of the governing process. This desire for participation is most evident in the area of science 
and technology, particularly in genetically engineered food products. The desire by citizens to be 
a part of the decision-making process accelerates the transfer of regulatory power away from 
government and to the voluntary/civil sector and the citizen (Pal and Maxwell, 2003: 9). Second, 
the policy issues generated by science and technology exceed the technical capability of 
government to manage, giving rise to the need to procure expertise from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Third, the rise of independent research organizations, foundations and 
think tanks, further the transfer of regulatory governance to the civil sector while simultaneously 
providing the knowledge and skills to both government and citizen alike required by the advent 
of the governance paradigm (Hird, 2005: 4; Lindquist, 2006: 13–16). Fourth, the diminution of 
government has led to the development of spatial-oriented policy making conducted through 
shareholder networks (Hajer, 2003: 5–6). 
 
The state is being transformed into a developer of human capital and social capital, with an 
emphasis of using this capital to develop links between individuals and organizations to facilitate 
the formation of networks. The objective of governments in this environment is the transfer of 
state responsibilities to individuals and NGO’s through the innovative use of P3s as learning 
organizations (OECD, 2000: 3–4). Governance in the new institutional environment is focused 
on problem solving through the exchange of knowledge and resources between the public, 
private and volunteer sectors (OECD, 2000: 3–4). 
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3.2.3 Collaboration, the New Production of Knowledge and the P3 
P3s merge the expertise of the public, private and voluntary sectors to help solve intractable 
social or economic problems. In doing so, collaboration between the divergent sectors facilitates 
innovative and synergistic responses to policy problems that would not otherwise occur. 
Collaboration through P3s empowers actors who lack an institutional or political voice, enabling 
the marginalized to deal with pressing policy problems. Cooperation creates interdependencies 
between actors and organizations laying the foundation for collaborative governance (Salamon, 
2000: 17–18). 
 
One area in which the advent of collaborative governance is evident is in the production of 
knowledge. Innovation is dependent on turning the recombining of different types of knowledge 
into new ideas, markets, products or services that meet with market or societal acceptance. The 
theory and typology of knowledge is expanded in section 4.1. Two unique and separate processes 
of knowledge production have been identified (Gibbons et al., 1994: 1–3). Mode I knowledge 
production is described as a linear and institutional process that is dependent on the individual 
scientist for impetus in a discipline specific environment. Mode I production is characterized by 
the autonomy of the both research institution and the researcher and by the experimental and 
theoretical purpose of the intellectual endeavour. Mode II knowledge production occurs within 
“heterogeneously organized” networks that are problem and solution organized—transient in 
nature and horizontal in configuration. Mode II can be characterized by the reflexive nature of 
the investigation; knowledge production is a dialogic process based upon a high level of 
interaction between researcher and the research topic. The feedback loops generated by the 
reflexive process lead to the self-governing nature of Mode II knowledge production (Nowotny 
et al., 2003: 13).  
 
One method for managing collaborative research is the use of the research and development 
partnership (R&D P3). There is a large body of research on R&D partnerships, for example, 
pertaining to this research: in agricultural economics and agricultural innovation systems 
(Binenbaum et al., 2001; Hall, 2006; Hartwich et al., 2007). Despite this body of work, the 
theory of the R&D P3 remains underdeveloped, at the minimum; three complimentary but 
unique theories are needed to explain why public and private actors and institutions collaborate 
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on R&D (Hagedoorn et al., 2000: 3). The first, transaction cost economics, postulates that firms 
seek the lowest cost of contract enforcement as they operate in an environment defined by 
uncertainty over intangible assets such as knowledge and by uncertainty over cost of monitoring 
the performance of the partners, R&D partnerships are defined as a “hybrid form of organization 
between the market and the hierarchy to facilitate carrying out an activity specifically related to 
the production and dissemination of technical knowledge” (Hagedoorn et al., 2000: 3). The 
second, strategic management suggests that firms use partnerships and networks as a means of 
achieving economies of scale and scope, which are unobtainable in the absence of collaboration 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000: 3). Third, industrial organization theory posits that knowledge 
development is considered to be a public good, as the returns on investment are insufficient to 
warrant basic research and development by profit-seeking firms. However, for cost sharing and 
commercialization reasons public and private collaboration is required for the development of 
basic knowledge (Hagedoorn et al., 2000: 3). 
 
3.2.4 Innovation and Knowledge 
 
Innovation is defined not only through mere ‘invention’ but, rather, through a broader, more 
significant process of turning new information into knowledge that can produce new goods, 
services or organizations that possess long-term staying power within society or the economy 
(Phillips, 2007: 39–40). The process of innovation begins when new information is transformed 
into one of six types of knowledge. There are two types of codified knowledge, know-why and 
know-what, two types of non-codified knowledge, know-how and know-who and two types of 
relational-spatial knowledge, know-where and know-when. 
 
3.2.4.1 Codified knowledge 
Each type of knowledge can be further delineated by their unique characteristics. Know-why 
knowledge is the product of a formal and collective process that is primarily concerned with 
articulating the scientific laws of nature. Much of this work takes place in universities and other 
publicly funded research institutions. From a plant genetic resource (PGR) perspective, each type 
of knowledge also possesses specific features (Phillips, 2002: 18–19). The disciplines of applied 
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and theoretical genetics, molecular biology, biochemistry, plant physiology and genomics are in 
the domain of know-why knowledge (Phillips, 2001: 16). Know-what knowledge concerns facts 
and systematic details and procedures of both genetic crossing and the selection of desirable 
plant traits during the breeding process (Phillips, 2001: 16). Know-what knowledge is created in 
both public and private institutions and with the advent of PBRs and IPRs has become 
commoditized and integrated into increasingly sophisticated technology transfer processes.  
 
3.2.4.2 Non-Codified knowledge 
Know-how knowledge integrates the properties of know-what and know-why domains in plant 
breeding to produce new market ready varieties (Phillips, 2001). This process combines the 
knowledge developed at universities and technical schools and incorporates it with the skills 
derived from “learning by doing”. This unique combination of skill and knowledge is contained 
within private or public institutions, is difficult to codify or transfer to other organizations and 
may be encompassed in closed community or proprietary processes.
 
Know-who knowledge 
refers to the ability to identify and locate key knowledge practitioners who possess information 
critical to a given transformation process (Phillips, 2001). This type of knowledge is not codified 
and is embedded in individuals, institutions, and in networks or clusters engaged in similar 
research objectives.
 
Due to the development of information and communications technology, 
knowledge development is no longer confined to institutions but occurs in widely dispersed 
networks characterized by multiple sites of knowledge development. In this environment know-
who knowledge becomes an important component of the plant breeding process. These particular 
characteristics of knowledge development and management tend to concentrate innovative 
activity within local, regional, national, economic and functional clusters that facilitate that 
transfer of information, knowledge and people between communities and organizations of 
various institutional configurations. These characteristics are evident in research and 
development clusters such as Silicon Valley, the Boston Route 128 Corridor, North Carolina’s 
Research Triangle, Western Europe’s BioValley and Saskatoon’s biotechnology community. 
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3.2.4.3 Relational-Spatial Knowledge 
Know-where knowledge and know-when knowledge are becoming increasingly important in a 
time of globalization. Both terms originate in the analysis of traditional knowledge. Know-where 
and know-when traditional knowledge pertains to understanding where and when specific 
naturally occurring plants and animals would bloom or congregate to provide a harvest of food 
and sustenance related items to tribal cultures. Taken in a modern, globalized context, know-
where and know-when refer to an intimate understanding the location and timing of governance 
related events that are critical to any R&D process. Know-where knowledge posits that 
innovation and change often are the result of entrepreneurs who are located at the intersections 
and borders of dissimilar social networks, differentiated institutional structures and independent 
research disciplines, acting as a conduit for change by facilitating the transfer of ideas between 
these separate arenas (Campbell, 2004: 74–76). Know-when knowledge suggests innovation is 
dependent upon knowing when windows of opportunity for change open simultaneously in 
multiple arenas (state, market and volunteer sectors) presenting the prospect for change 
(Teisman, 2000: 18).  
3.3 Methodology 
 
Social network analysis (SNA) is a research tool that illuminates previously invisible relations 
between actors and institutions in a networked and centerless environment (Mead, 2001: 3). SNA 
enables a researcher to identify the relative position, function and power ranking of the 
individual actors, nodes and sub-networks in a quantifiable and graphical manner. SNA makes it 
possible to identify knowledge flows and stocks “as well as under- and over-utilized individuals 
and organizations within a given network” (Ryan, 2008: 41). As economic growth is highly 
dependent on linking into and manipulating the global flows of knowledge, SNA can identify the 
spatial coordinates of the institutions that possess the knowledge stocks and determine the 
direction of the flows of knowledge. SNA can be utilized to deconstruct the institutional 
activities that are responsible for knowledge development. There are four measures of analysis 
that are used in this study. One is related to network density; the other three are measures of 
centrality applied to individual actors. 
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Density measures the proportion of bilateral ties between actors against the maximum amount of 
ties possible. The objective is to identify and measure the ratio of interconnections within a given 
network. Density—which ranges from zero to one—is determined by dividing the number of 
actual bilateral connections into the maximum number of bilateral connections possible (Knoke 
and Kuklinski, 1982: 45–46). Equation 3.1 contains the density formula. 
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Centrality measures the relative importance of an individual actor based upon their location 
within a social network. Total degree centrality is a ratio of the amount of actual ties divided by 
the maximum amount of ties, as it determines the level of intra-network connectedness. An actor 
with a measure of zero is not connected within a network, whereas an actor with a measure of 
one indicates an actor is connected to every possible actor in the network. A higher total degree 
centrality implies a higher level of network activity (Mote, 2005: 12). Equation 3.2 contains the 
total degree centrality formula. 
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Betweenness centrality measures the level of connectedness to actors that are not well connected 
in a network. Betweenness implies a role as a “gatekeeper” and “intermediary” within a social 
network conferring a level of independence unavailable to other actors (Freeman, 1979: 10). 
Betweenness centrality measures how often an individual actor is located on the shortest path 
between other actors and sub-networks (Freeman, 1979: 10). In other words, actors with a high 
degree of betweenness exhibit a level of independence as they experience higher flows of 
information and may also receive new information sooner than other actors. A higher 
betweenness centrality measure implies a greater level of control over the flow of information 
(Freeman, 1979: 10). Equation 3.3 contains the betweenness equation, where gij represents the 
number of ties linking i and j and gij(pk) is the number of these ties that contain individual k. 
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The eigenvector measure is an indicator of power within a social network. Eigenvector measures 
the centrality of the individual actor along with the centrality of that particular actor’s 
connections (Bonacich, 1972: 2). A high eigenvector rating implies relative power in a network 
is derived from the relative importance of an actor’s connections, not the quantity of connections. 
Actors with a high eigenvector measure are regarded as powerful and influential actors within a 
social network (Borgatti and Evert, 1997: 297). An actor with a higher eigenvector ranking 
suggests greater diversity in sources of information (Borgatti and Evert, 1997: 297). Equation 3.4 
contains the eigenvector formula. λ is the largest eigenvector value of A, n is the number of 
vertices;     = 1 if vertices i and j are connected and      = 0 if they are not connected (Bonacich, 
2007: 2). 
                                         ∑                       
 
     ...............................(3.4) 
 
Table 3.1. Typology of Centrality Measures 
 
Measure Descriptor Meaning 
Total Degree Centrality (TDC) Intra-network connectivity An actor or principal with 
higher TDC is identified as a 
“hub” or “connector” within 
the network 
Betweenness-Centrality (BC) Influence An actor or principal with 
high BC is identified as a 
“broker” or “bridge” and can 
connect or disconnect groups 
within the network 
Centrality Eigenvector (CE) Power An actor or principal with 
higher CE has multiple 
connections with others with 
multiple connections 
Adapted from Ryan (2008) 
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3.4 Research Focus: Global Pulse Breeding System 
 
3.4.1 Pulse Breeding R&D  
 
The process of plant breeding in general, and pulse breeding in particular, has been permanently 
altered by three ongoing and interrelated revolutions. First, plant breeding has evolved from a 
hands–on and observational supply push process, generally conducted by public agencies, to a 
globalized and technologically driven demand pull and scientific process taking place in local, 
national and regional networks. This process is similar to the contrasts between Mode I and 
Mode II knowledge production. Second, the introduction of national and international IPR 
regimes governing plant breeding has privatized of most aspects related to plant breeding in the 
developed world and has facilitated access and benefit conflicts regarding the acquisition and use 
of technology in the developing world where IPRs are not in use. Third, due to fiscal concerns, 
the funding of plant breeding has also been privatized, forcing research centers, industry groups 
and producer organizations into new funding and R&D relationships (Alston and Pardey, 1998: 
241; Alston et al., 1998: 19–20; Brennan and Mullen, 2002: 54–55). The ongoing series of 
revolutions within plant breeding has created the “orphan” crop--neglected by both public and 
private sectors due to acreage or profitability issues. Orphan crops exist in an institutional 
vacuum, where neither the public nor private sectors are capable of supplying goods. Pulses are 
an orphan crop. Despite this, pulse crops are a vibrant and expanding export industry for Canada, 
the US and Australia, representing a highly competitive multi-billion dollar global sector. The 
global pulse breeding R&D system provides the scientific foundation for the global production 
system that exceeds US$20 billion in exports (Authors’ Calculations, 2012; FAOStat.org).  
3.4.2 Composition of Global Pulse R&D System 
 
The global pulse breeding system of 248 actors is comprised of 45 P3s, 107 government research 
centers, 83 universities and 13 private sector actors. The global system is constructed on three 
autonomous regional systems. The Export System, which is Canada, the US and Australia, 
consists of 17 P3s, 26 government agencies and 22 universities for a total of 65 actors. The 
Export System is devoted to the production of exportable pulse crops with little internal 
consumption of pulse crops. The European Union (EU) System has 27 P3s, 40 government 
agencies, 55 universities and 12 private firms involved in pulse breeding R&D.  The EU System 
 40 
is a producer, consumer and minor exporter of pulses. The Developing World System is 
constructed of 10 P3s, 41 government research centers, 17 universities and one private firm. The 
Developing World System is a producer, primary global consumer and an importer/exporter of 
pulse crops. See Table 3.2, below. Please refer to Appendix A for a complete listing of actor 
name, institutional configuration, location and network affiliation.  
Table 3.2 Production and exports of pulses, 2003–07, million tonnes 
 Production Exports 
 Volume % total Volume % total 
Export System 7,604 12% 4,292 45% 
EU System 7,241 12% 1,640 17% 
Developing World System 45,046 76% 3,570 38% 
World Total 59,892 100% 9,503 100% 
Source: FAOStat.org and Authors’ Calculations 
 
3.5 Data and Analysis 
 
The objective of this study is to identify, locate and categorize all P3s related to pulse breeding 
R&D and assess how they interact with all the other organizations. Two methods were employed 
in this search. First, an Internet search was conducted starting with known public pulse breeding 
institutions to search for pulse P3s. All publically available information such as annual reports 
was analyzed. This was augmented with emails, phone calls and interviews. The relationships 
identified between actors and institutions are formal, contractual, research or financially based. 
The second method was a key word search through the ISI Web of Knowledge database to 
identify research and financial relationships between pulse breeders, funding agencies and P3s. 
The search was conducted using the following keywords, pulse crops, legumes, dry peas, 
chickpeas, lentils, faba beans, dry beans and lupins. One caveat is in order: in ambiguous 
circumstances where it was not possible to determine if the R&D related activities were pulse 
related or not, the actor or relationship in question was not included in this study. Therefore, 
some relationships, primarily financial, may have been excluded.  
 
Individual actors are mapped and ranked in the analysis according to how many standard 
deviations their centrality measures are above the overall population mean in each of the sub-
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systems and the global network. Therefore, only institutions with a centrality measure of one 
standard deviation or more above mean are considered central actors. These actors are ranked in 
Tables 3.4, 3.6, 3.8 and 3.10 by the number of stars in the context column, with each one 
representing one standard deviation.  
 
One item warrants review. In the aggregate, there are a total of 269 individual organizations in 
the three regional networks, but only 248 in the global system, indicating 21 organizations 
appear in more than one of the three networks. Therefore, a discussion on the parameters utilized 
to determine the boundaries of the three regional networks is in order. The process of boundary 
determination in a network analysis is part science—using objective standards to define borders--
and part subjective assessment—reliant upon the researcher’s judgment to create borders that can 
withstand scrutiny by other researchers (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982: 22–23). At its core, social 
network analysis depends on “snowballing”, a process that incorporates both objective and 
subjective determinants to create functional borders (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982: 24). 
Snowballing begins with following all the linkages with known actors to identify all the relevant 
participants in a network to the point of exhaustion—running out of unknown actors.  
 
This empirical analysis used four logical methods of determining the network boundaries. The 
first centered on following the linkages on all the known pulse R&D organizations, ranging from 
universities, to P3s and government research centers. The second, extending from the first, 
analyzed the specific function of each network. As discussed below, and in Table 3.2 above, the 
three regional networks can be easily delineated by their function. The Export Network consists 
of countries that are the primary global exporters of pulses. The EU Network is a geographic 
entity that generally imports and produces pulse crops for animal feed. The Developing World 
network is the largest producer, consumer and importer of pulses for both human and animal 
consumption. The third method, discussed in Table 3.3, below, relies upon the network density 
measures. The three regional networks each have higher density measures than the global 
system. This indicates that the activities related to pulse R&D are regional and intra-network and 
not global. The fourth method relates to the 21 common organizations. There are 248 unique 
global actors, with 21 appearing in more than one regional network, approximately 9% of the 
organizations. Out of the 21 organizations, only one is a significant actor in two regional 
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networks as determined by having a centrality measure of one or more standard deviations above 
the mean for its particular network. This organization is ICARDA, a P3 that is a central actor in 
both the Developing World and Export networks. The unique position of ICARDA is discussed 
in detail in the separate analyses of each network. 
Table 3.3. The Four Pulse Innovation Networks 
 
   Number of central actors based on centrality 
measures one standard deviation or more 
above the mean 
 
Network 
 
N 
 
Density 
Total Degree 
Centrality 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
Export System 66 .108 8 6 5 
EU System 134 .040 10 2 10 
Developing World 69 .055 3 2 2 
Global System (aggregate) 248 .022 9 6 10 
 
3.6 Comparative analysis 
 
3.6.1 System Structure and the Critical Role of the P3 
 
The following analysis offers insights into the network composition and institutional 
configuration of four interconnected but unique operational R&D networks. They range in size 
from 66 to 248 actors, have varying density (.022 to .108) and a variety of individual key actors. 
All four networks share a single common feature: the critical role P3s provide to the structural 
integrity of each network as measured by the centrality rankings. Of the 19 actors with measures 
one standard deviation or more above the mean of the three measures in the Export System, 13 
(68%) are P3s, including the top ranked actor in each of the centrality rankings (see Table 3.4). 
One hundred percent of the central actors in the Developing System are P3s (9 of 9) (Table 3.8). 
One P3 is ranked number one in all three categories in the EU System (Table 3.6), but overall, 
P3s occur much less often as central actors in the EU System (18%). In the Global System (Table 
3.10), 20 out of 25 (80%) top ranked actors again, are P3s. As characterized by the three SNA 
measures, P3s are the top ranked actor in each category in each of the four networks. 
 
In each of the four networks, P3s serve as the focal point for a R&D network. The Export System 
is distinguished by the prevalence of producer-funded and governed P3s that anchor the national 
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systems of Canada and Australia and link these systems together to create a regional innovation 
system. The vulnerability assessment (below) demonstrates that by removing two key P3s a 66-
actor system fragments into an isolated Canadian network of 21 actors, an isolated and 
disconnected US system and a much-reduced Export System centered on Australia. The EU 
System is characterized by a single intergovernmental P3, GLIP, which connects almost 40 
different networks, sub-networks and isolates into a single R&D network of 134 actors. The 
Developing World System is centered on two key P3s, each centering a unique hub and spoke 
configured R&D network, which develops into a dual hub and spoke network. See Appendix A 
for a distribution of institutions in the four networks. 
3.6.2 The Export System 
 
This system consists of the major export countries of Canada, the USA and Australia along with 
the International Center for Agriculture Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) and some 
individual research centers in France, India and South Africa. Institutionally, this system is 
composed of 17 P3s (26%), 22 universities (33%) and 26 government research centers (41%). 
There is a discernable absence of private firms. As indicated in Table 3.4, the primary actors are 
the Crop Development Center/Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (CDC/SPG) partnership, the GRDC-
Grains Research and Development Center, the Center for Legumes in a Mediterranean Area 
(CLIMA) and ICARDA—all four are P3s. As earlier noted, 13 of the 19 centrally ranked actors 
in this network are P3s. The network density is .108 indicating that around 10% of the total 
potential linkages are realized.  
 
With one notable exception P3s dominate the three measures of centrality. The CDC/SPG is the 
top ranked actor according to the total degree and betweenness centrality rankings, suggesting 
this particular P3 is a highly connected gatekeeper controlling the flow of new information into 
the network and between sub-networks and isolates. Both measures suggest the CDC/SPG P3 
possesses a unique status with regards to independence and influence from and over the entire 
network. See Table 3.4 below for the three centrality rankings, the P3s are denoted by (P3). The 
GRDC and CLIMA have noteworthy total degree centrality measures indicating a higher than 
average level of intra-network activity. Five of the six top ranked eigenvector actors are 
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Australian, implying the Australian pulse R&D network is uniquely positioned as a power broker 
within the Export System. (See Figure 3.3 below.)   
Table 3.4. Export System Actors & Centrality 
 Intra-Network 
Connectivity (TDC) 
Power (EC) Influence (BC) 
CDC/SPG (P3) 0.3692*** - 0.4754*** 
GRDC  (P3) 0.3231** 1.000** 0.1353* 
CLIMA  (P3) 0.2923** 0.9049** 0.1305* 
ICARDA  (P3) 0.2462* 0.7317* 0.1171* 
Pullman-ARS 0.2000* - 0.2265** 
PBA  (P3) 0.1846* 0.7482* - 
DAFWA 0.1846* 0.7428* - 
CSIRO 0.1846* - - 
MSU - - 0.1245* 
* number of standard deviations greater than the mean  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
3.6.2.1 Sensitivity analysis 
The sensitivity analysis contained in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, below, demonstrates how dependent 
the Export System is on a small group of actors. The removal of two key actors fragments this 
regional network into two national systems, one each in Canada and Australia, and a number of 
isolates. The two critical actors are the CDC/SPG and ICARDA, both P3s. Their removal has an 
injurious effect on the composition of the network as highlighted in Table 3.5. Despite CDC/SPG 
and ICARDA representing less than 5% of the individual actors in this network, their deletion 
causes a reduction in the physical structure of the network ranging from 16% to 97% depending 
on the function. As discussed earlier, innovation, the driver of economic growth, is derived from 
linking into the global pipelines and flows of knowledge. If this is the case, then the 
disintegration of the Export System into two national systems and a number of isolates would 
inhibit knowledge production. This sensitivity analysis does confirm the results of the social 
network analysis regarding the key role of the CDC/SPG P3 and of the centralized role of the 
Australian R&D network. Canada’s pulse breeding network becomes isolated from the Export 
System with the removal of the CDC/SPG P3, while the remainder of the Export System remains 
centered on the Australian system. The resiliency of the Australian system is noteworthy. As 
 45 
Figure 3.3 demonstrates, when viewed with the nodes sized based upon the eigenvector measure, 
the Australian system appears to be so deeply embedded into the Export System that all centrally 
ranked Australian actors are connected to all the powerful actors in this system. In theory, this 
confers first mover and first adopter status, or the right of first refusal to do so, to the entire 
Australian system over ideas and technologies emanating from within or outside of the system. 
As noted the three top eigenvector actors in this regional system are the three Australian P3s, 
GRDC, CLIMA and Pulse Breeders Australia (PBA). Interestingly, this phenomenon does not 
repeat itself in the global system, where none of the three key Australian P3s are in the top five 
ranked eigenvector actors as indicated in Table 3.4. This suggests that the Australian system 
depends primarily on relations within the regional system for its R&D and technological needs. 
 
Figure 3.1 The Export System 
In Figure 3.1, the nodes are sized according to the betweenness measure and the two critical P3s 
highlighted. The Canadian System is in green, the Australian red and the balance blue. 
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Figure 3.2. The Export System minus CDC/SPG and ICARDA 
In Figure 3.2, the removal of CDC/SPG and ICARDA isolates Canada from Australia and the 
balance of the system. 
 
Figure 3.3 The Export System 
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In Figure 3.3, the nodes are sized according to the eigenvector measure, visually demonstrating 
the embedded nature of the Australian system (in red) within the Export System. 
Table 3.5. An estimate of the vulnerability of the Export System 
 With 
CDC/SPG 
and 
ICARDA 
Without CDC/SPG 
and ICARDA 
% effect of loss of 2 
central actors 
# nodes 66 64 -.3.0% 
# links 454 370 -17.4% 
Density 0.108 0.090 -16.6% 
Network centralization 0. 276 0. 202 -26.8% 
Betweenness centralization 0. 460 0. 164 -64.4% 
Closeness centralization 0. 439 0. 015 -96.5% 
Fragmentation (#components) 1 2 +100.0% 
Characteristic path length 2.6712 2.6252 -1.72% 
 Authors’ calculations 
 
3.6.2.2. P3s in the export system 
With the exception of ICARDA, all centrally ranked P3s are producer formed and governed P3s. 
ICARDA, from a structural perspective, is critical to the integrity of both the Export System and 
the Developing World System, but occupies different roles in each of the systems. In the Export 
System, ICARDA is primarily a supplier of raw, undeveloped technology, in the form of 
germplasm.
2
 All of the centrally ranked actors in this network have germplasm uptake relations 
with ICARDA, and are also suppliers of advanced breeding technologies and finished varieties to 
ICARDA, often incorporating the genetic material from ICARDA into the finished technologies.  
 
In Australia, P3s form both the structural foundation for three independent and interconnected 
pulse R&D systems and link these three systems into a national pulse innovation system. The 
first national system is formed around the GRDC and PBA, the second is formed around CLIMA 
and the third around the Center for Innovative Legume Research (CILR), an international R&D 
consortium headquartered and managed in Australia. Collectively, the result of the innovative 
use of P3s is a global R&D cluster formed around the Australian national system. 
 
                                                          
2
 Germplasm is the living tissue of a plant that contains the plants genetic information. 
 48 
The GRDC is a partnership between the Government of Australia and the 45,000 producers of 
Australia represented through the Grains Council of Australia (GCA). The CGA is responsible 
for about 50% of GRDC’s funding through a national levy program. The rationale for the 
creation of the GRDC came from the international arena.  The development of large 
multinational corporations (MNCs) with their proprietary plant breeding technologies (including 
enabling and vector technologies) inhibited the ability of Australian plant breeders to compete 
with international competitors (Lindner, 2004). Australian producers and regulators viewed the 
monopoly power of international life sciences competitors as a threat to the viability of the 
Australian grains industry. PBA was formed by the GRDC to perform two specific functions for 
the Australian pulse sector. First, to prevent intellectual property rights (IPRs) from impeding 
national technological development and second, to prevent the duplication of R&D efforts 
related to pulse breeding.    
 
A late 1980s report noted that R&D spending in Australia, as a percentage of GDP, had been 
falling, while rising in the rest of OECD countries (Buller and Taylor, 1999).  The report 
indicated that R&D spending was 50% higher in other OECD countries as compared to 
Australia. As a result of this report, the government of Australia created the Collective Research 
Centers (CRC) program for the purpose of increasing collaborative research between the public 
and private sectors in Australia. CLIMA was originally established as a pulse breeding CRC in 
1992 and has expanded into a producer managed national pulse-breeding center. The Council of 
Grain Growing Organizations (COGGO) represents producers. CLIMA is an integrated multi-
disciplinary research facility built upon four once-separate small breeding programs. 
 
The CILR was created by and is partially funded by the Australian Research Council and 
consists of CILR, a P3, and seven other partners.
3
 The objective is to create cutting edge pre-
competitive breeding technology using legumes as a base species for research.
4
 Although 
centered on Australia, CILR is a global R&D enterprise consisting of pulse research centers on 
four continents, permitting the Australian system to access to global stocks and flows of pulse 
related technologies.  
                                                          
3
 The seven partners of CILR are The John Innes Center, KDNARI in Japan, North Carolina State and four 
Australian universities. 
4
 Pulse crops are a part of the legume species. 
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The origins of the CDC/SPG P3 come from the opening of the Crop Development Centre in the 
early 1970s to develop a new crop for Saskatchewan producers who were suffering from low 
prices on wheat and barley. The Saskatchewan Pulse Growers was created in the late 1970s, and 
in 1983 became permanently involved in the direct financing of R&D with the implementation of 
legislation and a positive producer vote supporting a non-refundable production levy. Pulse 
production has increased by 36 fold since 1985 and has made Saskatchewan and Canada the 
dominant global exporter of pulse crops (SPG and FAO, 2011). Spending reductions by 
government led to the partnership being formalized in the early 1990s through a number of 
exclusive R&D agreements. As a part of the R&D agreement, the SPG is the exclusive and 
royalty free distributor of CDC pulse varieties, providing the SPG with a price and technology 
advantage (SPG, 2011). The SPG R&D portfolio is approximately CDN $25 million, with 
around 80% focused on genetic improvements. The CDC/SPG P3 uses R&D to link producer 
funded and managed research with consumer focused market outcomes in a globalized economy, 
as over 90% of Canadian pulse production is exported. The CDC/SPG P3 consists of 
approximately 18,000 producers. 
3.6.3 The EU System 
 
The EU System is the largest of the three sub-systems with 134 actors. There are 27 P3s (20%), 
40 government research centers (30%), 55 universities (41%) and 12 private sector actors (9%). 
This system is characterized by the critical role of a single P3, the Grain Legumes Integrated 
Project (GLIP), an intergovernmental P3 designed to boost EU pulse crop production. With the 
exception of GLIP, the EU system is characterized by the near absence of P3s as centrally ranked 
actors. In this system the predominant institutional type is the government agency. The EU 
System has the lowest density of the three regional networks with a measure of .040 as noted in 
Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.6. EU System Actors & Centrality 
 Intra-Network 
Connectivity (TDC) 
Power (EC) Influence (BC) 
GLIP/FP6  (P3) 0.5789******** 1.000**** 0.7112********* 
INRA-HQ 0.2331*** - 0.1656** 
CSIC 0.1654** 0.8243*** - 
John Innes  (P3) 0.1579* - - 
IFAPA 0.1278* 0.7367** - 
GenXPro 0.1203* 0.7669** - 
Rennes INRA 0.1203* 0.8016*** - 
CNRS 0.1128* - - 
Frankfurt U 0.1128* 0.6821** - 
* number of standard deviations greater than the mean  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
As indicated in Table 3.6, based upon the three centrality rankings, there is a single critical 
actor—GLIP. Interestingly, GLIP and the John Innes Center are the only two P3s that are 
centrally ranked. Overlooking GenXPro, a private firm, government agencies dominate the three 
centrality measures. INRA-HQ, INRA-Rennes, CSIC, IFAPA and CNRS are all public sector 
agencies. The EU System is further delineated by the dearth of influential actors according to the 
betweenness (BC) measurements. The only two organizations in this network with significant 
BC rankings are GLIP, and INRA-HQ, implying the existence of numerous relatively isolated 
and unconnected sub-networks and clusters within this regional system. 
3.6.3.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Figure 3.4 below, depicts the EU System. The sensitivity analysis confirms the central position 
of GLIP and of the existence of a number of relatively unconnected sub-systems and isolates. 
Removing GLIP, one out of 134 actors causes this system to fragment into a network of 94 
actors and 38 isolates (Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.4 EU System 
In Figure 3.4, the nodes are sized according to the betweenness measure. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 EU System less GLIP 
In Figure 3.5, the removal of one P3, GLIP, reduces the size of the network by 30%. 
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The removal of GLIP causes network density and number of links to drop by more than 20%, 
while the structural coherence of the network, as determined by the three network measures, is 
reduced by 60% to over 90%. See Table 3.7 below. The placement of a large number of 
government research agencies in the centrality rankings along with the presence of GLIP, an 
intergovernmental P3, indicates a large number of relatively unconnected national pulse R&D 
systems in Europe and the Mediterranean basin. In this particular case, the sensitivity analysis is 
not an abstract exercise, as the funding for GLIP does not appear to have been renewed after 
2008.  
 
Table 3.7. An Estimate of the Vulnerability of the EU System 
 With GLIP Without GLIP % effect of loss of 
GLIP 
# nodes 134 133 -.01% 
# links 708 554 -21.8% 
Density 0.040 0.031 -22.5% 
Network centralization 0.547 0.199 -63.6% 
Betweenness centralization 0.705 0.226 -68.0% 
Closeness centralization 0.601 0.011 -98.2% 
Fragmentation (#components) 1 78 +7700.0% 
Characteristic path length 2.576 2.927 +13.6% 
Authors’ calculations 
 
3.6.3.2 P3s in the EU system 
The single P3, GLIP, is an intergovernmental P3 as its primary relations are with and between 
governmental institutions of various levels and countries in Europe. GLIP was created to pursue 
a Europe-wide pulse sector development strategy by linking the disparate national R&D 
programs into a single continental effort. The primary objectives of GLIP were the development 
of breeding strategies to eliminate regional and national variances in production and yields, to 
advance the knowledge of using legumes as animal feed, to develop new genetic and post genetic 
breeding technologies to sustain long-term growth and to transfer the new technologies to the 
private sector. GLIP was not refunded in 2008 and has ceased operations. 
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3.6.4 The Developing World System 
 
There are a total of 69 actors in the Developing World System consisting of 10 P3s (14%), 41 
government agencies (59%), 17 universities (25%) and one private actor (2%). This system is 
distinguishable by its unique dual hub and spoke configured system, as the Developing World 
System is created by existence of two developmental-oriented P3s, ICARDA and International 
Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arad Tropics (ICRISAT). As noted in Table 3.3 the 
density of this network is .055, ranking in between the Export and EU Systems. 
 
As demonstrated in Table 3.8 and earlier noted P3s are the only institutional type that is a 
centrally placed actor in this network. ICARDA, ICRISAT and to a lesser degree CLAN, all P3s, 
are the only centrally ranked actors in this network. Based on all three measures, ICARDA is the 
most influential actor, being the most intra-connected and most powerful entity. See Figure 3.6 
below. Essentially, these two P3s connect the national agriculture research systems of various 
developing world counties into a regional sub-system.  
Table 3.8. Developing World System Actors & Centrality 
 Intra-Network 
Connectivity (TDC) 
Power (EC) Influence (BC) 
ICARDA  (P3) 0.6912****** 1.0000***** 0.7844***** 
ICRISAT  (P3) 0.4559*** 0.7493**** 0.3627*** 
CLAN  (P3) 0.2353* 0.4979** -- 
* number of standard deviations greater than the mean Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
3.6.4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
As visually demonstrated in Figure 3.7, the sensitivity analysis substantiates the centrality 
measurements as the removal of ICARDA, ICRISAT and CLAN causes the network to 
disintegrate into 33 isolates and nine mini-networks of at least two actors each and a total of 75 
components, in place of the one network. Table 3.9 confirms the visual analysis, as network 
composition is reduced by 67% to 99%, depending on the measurement.  
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Figure 3.6 Developing World System 
In Figure 3.6, the nodes are sized according to betweenness measure. 
 
Figure 3.7 Developing World System less ICARDA, ICRISAT and CLAN 
In Figure 3.7, eliminating the three central ranked actors, all P3s, results in the destruction of the 
regional network. 
 55 
Table 3.9. An Estimate of the Vulnerability of the Developing World System 
 With 
ICARDA, 
ICRISAT 
and CLAN 
Without ICARDA, 
ICRISAT and 
CLAN 
% effect of loss of 3 
central actors 
# nodes 69 66 -4.3% 
# links 258 76 -71.5% 
Density 0.055 0.018 -67.3% 
Network centralization 0.655 0.061 -90.7% 
Betweenness centralization 0.776 0.074 -90.5% 
Closeness centralization 0.650 0.003 -99.5% 
Fragmentation components) 1 75 +7400.0% 
Characteristic path length 2.272 1.439 -54.3% 
Authors’ calculations 
 
3.6.4.2 P3s in the developing world system 
ICARDA and ICRISAT are both a part of the Consultative Group on International Agriculture 
Research (CGIAR), a non-profit network of governments, charitable foundations, various 
international organizations and a number of private actors, formed in the early 1970s to use 
agricultural technology to reduce poverty. CGIAR has matured into large scale technology 
transfer system constructed upon P3s providing undeveloped germplasm and raw local 
knowledge to actors in the Export System in return for access to developed IPR assets such as 
breeding technologies through a multitude of project and process oriented partnerships. Research 
by the Australian Center for International Agricultural Research determined that raw germplasm 
acquired from ICARDA contributes to about $13,000,000 in productivity gains by Australian 
producers annually (ICARDA, 2004). One specific task for the CGIAR crop oriented centers is 
the accumulation and preservation of scarce plant genetic resources of the world. In all, CGIAR 
is responsible for the maintenance of over 650,000 unique germplasm samples of plants and 
flora. This is critical as none of the major export crops of the world, wheat, maize and soybeans 
for example, are native to the major exporters of the world. Using pulse crops as an example, 
lentils are from Turkey, peas and chickpeas are originally from western Asia and dry beans are 
from Central and South America. The Export System countries of Canada, the US and Australia 
depend on access to the germplasm stocks of ICARDA and ICRISAT for sources of new, but 
raw and unprocessed technologies. These dual qualities, the application of collaboratively 
developed technology to promote economic development in conjunction with the vast repository 
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of native plant and flora species uniquely position CGIAR centers such as ICARDA as key 
global actors. An expanded view would suggest that ICARDA and ICRISAT in particular and 
CGIAR in general, with their stocks of germplasm, repository of codified knowledge and global 
access to local non-codified knowledge, their capacity-building capabilities along with their 
policy-development experience, qualifies both as suppliers of international public goods (IPGs) 
(ICARDA 2009).  
 
Despite the global prominence of ICARDA and ICRISAT, both remain highly dependent on the 
flow of funds and other resources from donor organizations and countries for their survival. The 
two depend on five types of supporters. First, national governments, such as the United States, 
Australia, China, Germany and Canada, among others, or through agencies such as USAID that 
represent national governments are the primary supporters of both. A second type of donor is 
International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), such as the UN/FAO and the World Bank. A 
third mode of support is from philanthropic organizations such as the Gates and Rockefeller 
Foundations. A fourth means of support is contract research paid for by outside entities ranging 
from national governments to private sector actors. The fifth type of donor provision is through 
the exchange of scientists and researchers from donor countries and organizations that contribute 
hard to quantify hands-on skills, representing a form of non-codified technology transfer. In 
addition to the use of contributor scientists and researchers, many donors supply board members 
to both ICARDA and ICRISAT. One area of concern is the level of uncertainty associated with 
the financing of ICARDA and ICRISAT. Based upon a website review, there is a high degree of 
variability in the amount provided by each funding agency, and in the total number of funding 
partners, both on an annual basis. This is compounded by the current large deficits and the 
accumulation of unsustainable debt levels in the major donor countries of the United States and 
Great Britain, calling into question the long-term viability of their support.  
3.6.5 The Global System 
 
As previously discussed, there are 248 actors in the Global System. This includes 45 P3s (17%), 
107 government research agencies (43%), 83 universities (34%) and 13 private entities (6%). 
The Global System is depicted in Figure 3.8 below. Four critical P3s are labelled on the Global 
System. These are CDC/SPG, ICARDA, ICRISAT and GLIP. The network density of .022 (see 
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Table 3.3) is the lowest of the four networks, suggesting that the primary research activity takes 
place within the three regional networks, with exchanges of technology and information between 
key actors operating as gatekeepers between the networks. The P3s are highlighted in red for 
ease of reference. 
 
GLIP, ICARDA, CDC/SPG and ICRISAT, all P3s and INRA, a government agency, are the top 
actors in each of the three categories of centrality. In the entire Global System, 20 out of the 25 
top centrally ranked actors are P3s, suggesting their critical role in providing linkages between 
dissimilar institutions and networks. 
3.6.5.1 Global sensitivity analysis 
As before, we undertook a sensitivity analysis to confirm the role key P3s occupy. As 
demonstrated below, in Figures 3.8 and 3.9, removing four P3s—ICARDA, ICRISAT, 
CDC/SPG and GLIP—causes a disproportionate loss of network coherence. As noted in Table 
3.11 removing these four P3s (about 2% of all actors) cause network impairment ranging from 
25% to 98% depending on the measurement. Without these four key players, the system 
fragments into 60 components reducing the size of the Global System to 159 linked actors, 21 
actors in the isolated Canadian system, four mini-networks of two or more actors and over 50 
isolates.  
Table 3.10. Global System Actors & Centrality 
 Intra-Network 
Connectivity (TDC) 
Power (EC) Influence (BC) 
GLIP (P3) 0.2996******** 0.9387***** 0.3853********* 
ICARDA  (P3) 0.2591****** 1.0000***** 0.3247******* 
ICRISAT  (P3) 0.1579**** 0.5496** 0.1396*** 
INRA HQ 0.1579**** 0.8033**** 0.1547*** 
CDC/SPG  (P3) 0.1336*** 0.8641**** 0.2249***** 
John Innes  (P3) 0.1174** 0.6726*** - 
GRDC  (P3) 0.0850* 0.6230*** - 
CLIMA  (P3) 0.0810* 0.5791** - 
CSIRO 0.0810* 0.7747**** - 
* number of standard deviations greater than the mean Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 3.8 The Global System 
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Figure 3.9 The Global System less GLIP, CDC/SPG, ICARDA and ICRISAT 
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Table 3.11. An Estimate of the Vulnerability of the Developing World System 
 With 
ICARDA, 
ICRISAT, 
CDC/SPG 
and GLIP  
Without ICARDA, 
ICRISAT, CDC/SPG 
and GLIP 
% effect of loss of 4 
central actors 
# nodes 248 244 -1.6% 
# links 1392 980 -29.6% 
Density 0.022 0.016 -26.1% 
Network centralization 0. 279 0.133 -52.3% 
Betweenness centralization 0.387 0.162 -58.1% 
Closeness centralization 0.350 0.005 -98.5% 
Fragmentation (#components 
components) 
1 54 +5400.0% 
Characteristic path length 3.006 4.198 +40.1% 
Authors’ calculations 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Four primary themes stand out from this research. First, as demonstrated, P3s anchor and 
connect disparate systems of innovation into coherently organized national, regional and global 
innovation systems. In Australia and Canada, the P3 anchors the individual national systems and 
link these two systems into the Export System. In the EU, a P3 connects a plethora of individual 
national actors and national systems into a single, supra-national innovation system. In the 
Developing World System, two P3s connect a large number of isolated national research systems 
into a regional R&D network. These three, relatively autonomous regional networks are 
connected together through four key P3s, each a central actor in their respective networks, into 
the global system of pulse R&D. The regional and global structure of the global pulse R&D 
systems closely matches the Mode II form of knowledge production, which is characterized by 
problem and solution focused heterogeneously organized networks. 
 
Second, the innovative use of P3s has led to the development of a research cluster in Australia as 
demonstrated graphically and statistically by the eigenvector centrality measure in Figure 3.3. 
Three relatively autonomous networks, each with different objectives, each centered on at least 
one P3, together form a national system of innovation that is deeply embedded into the regional 
system. From a theoretical perspective, this implies that as a national system, and through well 
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connected individual actors, primarily P3s, Australia has a competitive advantage over its the 
rest of the world regarding awareness of and access to new flows of knowledge, of all forms, and 
new forms of technology. This suggests that Australia possesses first mover and first adopter 
status regarding technological innovation within the global pulse R&D system. 
 
The third theme identified is the role of the P3 as an organizational structure to manage an R&D 
intensive technology transfer process. In the Export System, the three primary P3s, CDC/SPG, 
the GRDC and CLIMA, are producer-managed and financed P3s, which came into existence in 
the institutional void created by the retrenchment of public financing of R&D activities.  The 
producer P3 is an organic, bottoms-up response to a changing economic and political 
environment. This P3 closely resembles a demand-pull R&D organization, linking the research 
to market needs. In the EU System, GLIP is an intra-governmental P3, designed to coordinate the 
research activities of the national systems of the European Union into an organized system with 
specific continental objectives. ICARDA occupies central positions in two of the networks, 
demonstrating its unique status in the global pulse R&D system. Along with ICRISAT, ICARDA 
sustains the germplasm needs of the pulse world, without which the majority of the global pulse 
system could not exist, highlighting the global dependency on ICARDA in particular and 
ICRISAT in general. In the Developing World System, ICARDA and ICRISAT have two roles: 
the supply of new cultivars and technologies to expand production, and capacity building from 
both a network/regional perspective by creating connections between countries and from within 
the individual national agriculture research systems. This research suggests more than one model 
of P3 may be necessary to achieve efficient operations.  
 
The fourth theme concerns the vulnerability of P3s on the vagaries of their partners. The P3s 
examined all are dependent on financial and in-kind contributions from a plethora of partners, 
ranging from individuals, entrepreneurs, venture capital corporations and angel investors, 
national governments, NGOs, IGOs and philanthropic organizations. Furthermore, P3s are also 
dependent on the legislative decisions of governments or their agencies. The termination of GLIP 
demonstrates the vulnerability of P3s to a change in public policy. If theory is correct regarding 
the dependence of economic innovation on capitalizing on the global flows of knowledge, the 
EU is in jeopardy of isolating itself from the global R&D community and becoming dependent 
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on narrow, uncompetitive national research programs for growth. ICARDA and ICRISAT are 
both highly dependent on financial and in-kind resources from a large donor base, adding a level 
of uncertainty to their operations. This financial uncertainty is magnified by the recent budgetary 
problems of the US and the UK, two of the largest financial donors to ICARDA. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
COLLABORATION AND THE GENERATION OF NEW KNOWLEDGE IN 
NETWORKED INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A BIBLIOMETRIC ANALYSIS   
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This article expands on previous research on the political economy of innovation in canola 
research and development (R&D). Canola is a high-value export-oriented agricultural product 
that was developed by Canadian public institutions over a period of 40 years by importing the 
original plant species and using imported technologies and imported researchers.  This long-term 
process culminated in the creation of a global market for this branded and highly differentiated 
product. In 2000, a longitudinal citation analysis, using five-year intervals, was performed on 
Canadian public institutions involved in the transformation of canola, comparing their relative 
citation rates to a global average of 1.0 (Phillips and Khatchatourians, 2001). This research 
demonstrated that changes in the relative citation rates reflected changes in the industrial 
organization of canola R&D. Specifically, the privatization of a process once dominated by 
public institutions led to lower relative citation rates, due to the need for confidentiality by the 
private sector. A follow-on study, conducted 10 years later, again in five-year intervals, 
confirmed the bias towards lower citation rates from the privatization of canola innovation. 
Interestingly, in the second five-year interval, the relative citation rates of public sector research 
grew by 60%. This article focuses on the factors that caused this increase. The descriptive 
statistics indicate three variables behind the increase in relative citation rates: collaborative 
funding of public R&D, the use of hybrid organizations to fund and manage the innovation 
process, and the use of innovative public funding tools that facilitate collaboration in funding 
public R&D. To isolate the variables responsible for the 60% increase in relative citation rates, a 
regression model was developed to work with the unique nature of citation data. 
 
The changes in the industrial organization of canola R&D closely mirror the Triple Helix Models 
of innovation. The Triple Helix Models of innovation have evolved over time from Triple Helix 
I, where the state dominates the innovation process, to the Triple Helix II, where the market 
reigns supreme, to the Triple Helix III, where innovation is dependent on the development of 
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hybrid organizations and interactions between the public, private and academic spheres to create 
new knowledge to drive the innovation process. The Triple Helix Models of innovation provide 
the analytic framework for this case study. Building from Triple Helix theories, this empirical 
analysis seeks to determine if innovation is a path-dependent process, one dependent on the 
historic presence of the state and market, or if innovation can occur in the absence of evolution.  
 
There are seven sections to this article. The next section examines the Triple Helix Models of 
innovation to develop a framework for understanding the evolution of canola R&D. The 
methodology is explored in section 4.3, which links the theory and process of citation analysis 
with a regression model specific to this analysis. Section 4.4 contains the findings and 
interpretations of the results of this paper. Section 4.5 discusses the conclusions of this paper. 
Section 4.6 focuses on the policy implications of the findings of this research. Finally, section 
4.7 reviews the directions for further research. 
 
4.2 Theory 
4.2.1 Triple Helix of Innovation 
 
Joseph Schumpeter is generally credited for being the first person to define and quantify 
innovation as a process of economic growth, as driven by the recombination of existing ideas and 
factors that leads to increasing incomes (Schumpeter, 1939: 3). The increases in income are a 
result of new technologies, new markets, or sources of supply, from improvements to production 
systems and from the creation of new organizational structures (Schumpeter, 1939: 59). 
According to Schumpeter, innovation drives an evolutionary process of technologically oriented 
economic growth and change that is both disruptive and discontinuous, by simultaneously 
creating new opportunities for growth while spelling economic death for older methods of 
production. One method of understanding and contextualizing innovation is the Triple Helix 
Model, which posits that innovation is the result of interactions between three independent 
institutional spheres: government, university, and industry. The Triple Helix is a model for 
developing and applying knowledge to engender innovation (Viale and Etzkowitz, 2010: 3). 
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Three unique configurations of the Triple Helix Model are possible, depending on the hierarchy 
and structure of relations between the three institutional spheres. 
 
In Triple Helix I, also referred to as the Statist Regime, the state is the dominant sphere 
occupying a “commanding heights” position over the institutional domains of both university 
and industry. In the Statist Regime, there are clearly defined boundaries among the public, 
private and academic domains, with interactions between the spheres controlled and mediated by 
the state in a linear and institutional process through formal organizations, such as technology 
transfer offices and contracts (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1998: 3–4). From a historical 
perspective, the Statist Regime was the system best characterized by the former Soviet Union, 
where innovation and relations between the spheres was entirely dependent on the state. This 
model also characterized the military-dominated system of innovation in Cold War USA, where 
large-scale national security–oriented projects dominated the highly structured and regimented 
R&D relations between the three spheres in a hierarchal system with the state determining the 
rules of the game (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000: 2–3). 
 
The advent of communications technology coupled with growing globalization represents the 
force driving the evolution from Triple Helix I to Triple Helix II, where industry, enabled by 
technological innovation, is the dominant sphere that indirectly drives growth. This is also 
known as the laissez-faire regime, where the spheres are driven by market forces, operate 
independently of each other, and where each sphere has specific and unique functions in the 
R&D process. This regime is characterized by the relative absence of overlap between the three 
institutions; relations are institutionalized and formal, occurring in a synchronized and linear 
process. Interactions between the spheres are limited to R&D activities that did not challenge the 
boundaries or move beyond one-to-one activities between the different institutions, with these 
relationships taking place through intermediaries such as specific technology transfer 
organizations, or through arms-length market-oriented transactions (Etzkowitz, 2008: 16–18). 
Knowledge generally flowed in a direct, linear process from source to use (Leydesdorff and 
Etzkowitz, 1998: 3–4). 
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Unlike the first two models, the Triple Helix III Model is characterized by interdependent 
relations between the spheres. In this model, the three institutional domains overlap, creating 
new spaces and methods of collaboration for developing new knowledge (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000: 4–5). In this model, the formal delineation between the spheres disappears 
and each of the institutional domains takes on the attributes and functions of the other domains, 
thus creating networks and new organizational structures to manage the non-linear and spiral 
flows of new knowledge that transcend the boundaries of the Triple Helix I and II Models. This 
model is also known as the balanced model, reflecting the interdependencies generated through 
the spherical overlaps of the knowledge-based system. Knowledge and communication 
continually shape and re-shape the physical configuration of the innovation networks and spawn 
the novel organizational structures required for collaborative R&D efforts (Etzkowitz and Ranga, 
2010: 5). Relations in this model are reciprocal, based on a culture of institutional 
entrepreneurship driven by the social nature of knowledge development (Etzkowitz, 2008: 18–
23). The complexities of developing science-based knowledge in this model result in the 
development and use of specialized, organically configured hybrid organizations that incorporate 
the activities of each sphere, including financing, technology transfer, and commercialization. 
The hybrid organization can be conceptualized as a structure that transcends the boundaries 
between the three spheres and allows the transfer of ideas to support the capitalization of 
knowledge “through collaboration” to enable innovation (Viale, 2010: 32, 41–42). In agricultural 
biotechnology, the creation of new knowledge is a complex process that depends on face-to-face 
endeavors grounded in trust among actors drawn from the three spheres; hybrid organizations 
provide the institutional and organizational proximity required for personal interactions (Viale, 
2010: 66–68). 
  
The production of new knowledge, the prerequisite for innovation, has undergone a similar 
transformation from a linear, vertical, and mono-institutionalized process to a spiraled, 
horizontal, and collaborative process. Mode I knowledge production is analogous to Triple Helix 
Models I and II, as this process is characterized by the hegemonic nature of knowledge being 
developed by individuals working within autonomous institutions focused on theoretical pursuits 
(Gibbons et al., 1994). The Mode II system of knowledge production shares the attributes of the 
Triple Helix III configuration, as the development of new knowledge is a collaborative venture 
 72 
occurring in heterogeneously configured networks. Mode II knowledge production is trans-
disciplinary and occurs within the context of an application directed to developing creative and 
technological solutions to intractable problems (Nowontny et al., 2003: 8–9). 
 
The evolutionary nature of the three Triple Helix Models and the transformation of the 
production of knowledge closely mirror the ongoing revolution in governance, where organically 
developed and self-governing networks appear to be replacing the vertically organized and 
hierarchical state as a means of social and economic organization. One perspective suggests that 
the advent of globalization, pluralism, and technological innovation are creating a new space—
an institutional void—that is beyond the reach of the state (Hajer, 2003: 1–4).  This has rendered 
the centralized state an archaic structure incapable of managing horizontally configured 
governance network (Weiss, 2000: 6–12). This new model of networked governance, as opposed 
to the vertical governing model dominated by the state, represents a transformation away from 
centralized government to distributed governance, which is characterized by interdependence, 
the multiplicity of new, hard-to-categorize actors and indistinct boundaries between the public, 
private, and academic spheres (Rhodes, 1995: 1). 
 
The arrival of self-organizing networks has facilitated the growth in the use of public-private 
partnerships (P3s) to provide a flexible and developing organizational structure capable of 
facilitating collaboration. One area where P3s have emerged is in the management of national 
and international agricultural R&D innovation networks. Agricultural P3s function as innovation 
brokers and intermediaries as they link the heterogeneously configured actors into coherent 
systems to develop and commercialize transformative agricultural technologies (Hall et al., 2010: 
25–27; Klerkx et al., 2009: 2–4). One perspective suggests that agricultural P3s provide a 
structural means of linking top-down, technology-push innovation systems with bottom-up 
demand-pull innovation systems by creating feedback loops and horizontal linkages that drive 
the evolving and self-organizing innovation process (Viale and Etzkowitz, 2010: 13–14). P3s 
have become the focal point for agricultural innovation systems by linking national, regional, 
and international sub-networks into larger systems designed to create efficiencies through 
economies of scale and scope (Boland et al., 2010: 9–14). By linking different systems and 
actors, P3s can control the innovation process by coordinating the flow of funds, knowledge, and 
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technology. Agricultural P3s accelerate the innovation process by exploiting the comparative 
advantage of each partner through pluralistic funding measures, collaborative problem solving, 
and institutional synergies (Hall et al, 200: 3–4). 
4.2.2 Research Focus: The Political Economy of Canola R&D 
 
The Triple Helix Model of innovation provides a framework of analysis for a case study on the 
development of canola, which, from an historical perspective, closely mirrors the evolutionary 
nature of the structure of the three Triple Helix Models, the transformation in knowledge 
production, and the transition to self-organizing networks. 
 
Canola is a Canadian innovation that transformed rapeseed into a globally recognized product 
that provides the world’s third largest source of edible oil. Historically, rapeseed has been used 
as cooking oil, industrial lubricant, and animal feed. However, due to high levels of erucic acid 
(linked to heart problems) and glucosinolates, which lowers the animal feed value, rapeseed 
faced market limitations that prevented large-scale cultivation. After importing the raw plant 
species from Poland, numerous technical innovations performed at public Canadian agencies 
transformed rapeseed into a low erucic acid and low glucosinolates product, trademarked as 
canola by Canadian trade associations, thus creating a global market for this transformed 
rapeseed product (Phillips, 2007: 36–37). As a part of the transformative process, new breeding 
technologies and agronomic traits were developed using imported biotechnology tools, creating 
the world’s first transgenic crop (Smyth and Phillips, 2001: 2–3). From a Canadian perspective, 
canola is often referred to as a “Cinderella” crop, as it created new export markets for producers 
facing declining prices and profits in existing crops. Due to first mover advantages derived from 
public investments that created a regional innovation cluster providing R&D economies of scale 
and scope, Canada is the world’s leading exporter of canola and is a world leading entrepôt for 
agricultural R&D and innovation as measured by the number of scientists employed, by the 
number of technical innovations, and by the flows of codified and non-codified knowledge 
(Phillips and Ryan, 2007: 8–12). 
 
From the 1940s to the mid-1980s, innovation in canola was primarily a public venture occurring 
across public research agencies and universities in Canada. During this formative period, the 
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primary actor in the funding and management of R&D activities was Agriculture and Agri-food 
Canada (AAFC), the dominant public agricultural agency in Canada. The era was characterized 
by an unsophisticated, linear and sequential system of innovation dominated by the public sector, 
and AAFC in particular (Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001: 65–72). The introduction of 
intellectual property rights regimes, such as plant breeders’ rights, led to the beginning of the 
privatization of canola innovation, particularly down-stream varietal development, in a linear but 
non-sequential process with the nascent use of feedback loops. Due to the complexities and the 
financial risks and costs associated with developing a transformative transgenic crop, P3s were 
created to provide producers with control over the innovation process. This engendered the 
creation of horizontal linkages between the public, private, and producer spheres, replacing the 
linear innovation system with a networked system characterized by collaboration and feedback 
loops that incorporated the attributes of both the technology-push and demand-pull systems 
(Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001: 21). The changes in the structure and process of canola 
innovation were a part of a larger trend in agricultural R&D in Canada where the public sector, 
due to the advent of the knowledge economy, austerity and globalization, began developing 
partnerships with industry and producer organizations in a long-term process of transferring the 
responsibility for managing and financing innovation (Carew, 2001: 3, 11).  
 
As a part of a study on the political economy of canola, a longitudinal citation analysis was 
performed on the Canadian public institutions involved with canola innovation, comparing their 
relative citation rates on peer-reviewed and published canola articles to a global average of 1.0 
from 1981–1996 in five-year intervals. In this 15-year period, based upon quantity, Canada was 
the leading publisher of peer-reviewed canola papers, with the AAFC being the largest source of 
papers in Canada and globally. In this 15-year segment, AAFC was the primary funder and 
provider of canola R&D and innovation as measured by the number of scientists in canola 
research and the percentage of acreage using AAFC canola varieties. During this era, as explored 
in more detail in section 4.4, the relative AAFC citation rates, compared to the global average of 
1.0, ranged from .84 during the 1981–85 interval, 1.22 in the 1986–90 interval, and .93 during 
the 1991–96 interval. Interestingly, during this 15-year period, AAFC collaborated with other 
public and private organizations on 21% of its papers, resulting in a slightly lower citation rate, 
challenging the notion that collaborative R&D should improve the quality of the output  (Phillips 
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and Khachatourians, 2001: 87). As noted above, this era was punctuated by the transition of 
canola R&D from a public-dominated venture to the large expansion of private activity in 
response to the implementation of intellectual property rights beginning in the late 1980s. By 
1995, more than 75% of the new canola varieties were developed and commercialized by private 
corporations. As a part of the privatization of canola R&D and due to public austerity measures, 
AAFC began fee-for-service R&D activities with the private sector. At that time, it was predicted 
that due to the private sector requirement for confidentiality and non-disclosure, AAFC relative 
citation rates would decline precipitously (Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001: 86–87). 
 
A follow-on analysis was recently conducted on AAFC citation rates over two intervals, 
spanning 1997–2002 and 2003–2007. As noted in Table 4.1 below, in the first interval, AAFC 
citation rates declined to .66, confirming the earlier hypothesis. However, AAFC relative citation 
rates increased over 60% in the 2003–2007 interval to 1.11. The descriptive statistics suggest that 
changes to the structure and process of the funding of AAFC canola papers could be the cause of 
the improvement in the relative citation rates. Specifically, three items appear to have influenced 
this increase: the role of collaborative funding, the use of producer-funded P3s, and the use of 
innovative public financing mechanisms that engendered public–private R&D collaborations.  
 
Table 4.1. AAFC Peer-Reviewed Canola Paper Citation Rates 
Period of Analysis 
Relative Citation Rate Based on Global 
Average of 1.0 
1981-1985 0.84 
1986-1990 1.22 
1991-1996 0.93 
1997-2002 0.66 
2003-2007 1.11 
4.2.3 Research Question 
 
The remainder of this article, using the methodology described in section 4.3 below, examines 
how these three factors influenced the 60% increase in relative AAFC citation rates. In doing so, 
this study uses the Triple Helix framework to determine if innovation systems are evolutionary, 
meaning whether a system depends on developing a state-dominated Triple Helix I Model and 
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progress into the market-dominated Triple Helix II Model as a means of creating a knowledge-
based economic system. This case study explicitly questions whether innovation is path-
dependent (Leydesdorff, 2012: 12). The ultimate objective of this paper is to explore how 
technology-oriented agricultural innovation systems that exhibit attributes associated with the 
evolutionary perspective of the three Triple Helix Models can be exported to the developing 
world. 
4.3 Methodology 
 
Citation analysis is the scientific and quantifiable measurement of citation data from peer-
reviewed publications. Citation analysis introduces objectivity to the evaluation of research by 
comparing relative rates against absolute counts, such as global averages, to determine emerging 
trends in the development and dissemination of new knowledge (Nederhof, 2006: 85). The use of 
relative counts allows for comparing individuals, institutions, and countries to global averages to 
document and measure the flow of knowledge. A highly cited paper indicates that a relatively 
large number of other papers have found utility in that particular research (Garfield, 1979: 5). In 
addition to comparing like to like and identifying emerging trends in the flow of knowledge, 
citation analysis permits a deeper understanding of the processes that govern the generation of 
knowledge, providing the basis for generating better informed decisions over the allocation of 
scarce resource (Pendlebury, 2008: 7). In sum, citation analysis provides benchmarking 
capability, and the mapping of knowledge facilitates the identification of trends that otherwise 
would not be observable. 
 
This paper utilizes the same data collection method as the original research; a keyword search 
through the ISI Web of Science uses canola, rapeseed, brassica rapa, brassica napus, and brassica 
campestris as the keywords. In the 1997–2002 interval, there were 4,692 peer-reviewed canola 
articles published worldwide with an average citation rate of 14.02 per paper. In this period, 
AAFC papers had an average citation rate of 9.27, representing a 0.66 relative rate. In the 2003–
2007 timeframe, there were 4,712 papers published with a global citation rate of 3.75. The 
AAFC papers published in the period were cited an average of 4.16 times per paper for a relative 
citation rate of 1.11, representing a 60% increase. 
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The highly skewed distribution of the citation data presents challenges to research that need to be 
addressed. There are two factors influencing the distribution of citation data. First, the high 
prevalence of papers without citations skews the date in one direction. Second, there are a small 
number of papers with extreme measurements, also known as outliers, skewed in the opposite 
direction in a process referred to as “over-dispersion,” creating a situation where the conditional 
data variance exceeds the conditional mean (Allison and Waterman, 2002: 6). The skewed 
distribution phenomenon is common to citation data analysis (Pendlebury, 2008: 6). 
 
A fixed-effects negative binomial regression model was utilized to predict the likelihood of the 
occurrence of a specific variable against an estimated base-line value. This model creates a 
dummy variable to standardize the effects of the over-dispersion of the data permitting the 
estimation of the conditional probability of a specific event against a reference value or group 
(Allison and Waterman, 2002: 2, 17).  A logarithmic likelihood count model determines the 
probability of occurrence (UCLA, 2007: 5). The analysis was conducted using Stata Statistical 
Software version 11.2 (Stata, 2012).  The output is measured in incident-rate ratios (IRR) against 
the estimated base-line value (Stata, 2009). In this analysis, the base-line value is an AAFC peer-
reviewed canola paper published in the absence of collaboration, in the absence of funding from 
a producer P3, and in the absence of public funding mechanisms. Therefore, each explanatory 
variable in question is compared to this non-collaborative paper by estimating the likelihood that 
each variable, in the absence of the other variables, will increase the incidence of a canola paper 
being cited by another peer-reviewed canola paper.
5
 
 
4.4 Analysis 
 
As discussed, there are three variables that appear to have influenced the 60% increase in citation 
rates between the two intervals in question. The descriptive statistics indicate that collaborative 
funding, meaning more than one funder per AAFC canola paper, the use of producer P3s in 
funding AAFC canola research, and the use of the Matching Investment Initiative (MII), a public 
                                                          
5
 Please see Appendix “B” for complete formula. 
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funding mechanism designed to engender collaboration, appear to have contributed to the 
increase in AAFC relative citation rates.  
 
First, as noted in Table 4.2, below, in the 1997–2002 interval the use of collaborative funding did 
not lead to a marked increase in relative citation rates. However, in 2003–2007, there is a marked 
increase in citation rates associated with an increase in funding partners. The increase in citation 
rates is most evident with three funders, in which case the AAFC citation rate is 78% higher than 
the global average and almost twice the citation rate of three funders in the 1997–2002 period. 
The use of two funders generates a 1.26 relative citation rate, about a 60% increase from the 
previous era. The use of four or more funders leads to a 1.42 relative rate, which is consistent 
with the 1997–2002 data. However, this was based upon 10 papers, suggesting the small sample 
size calls into question the validity of the 1997–2002 citation rate.  
 
Table 4.2. Collaborative Funding Descriptive Statistical Comparison 
 
  1997–2002 2003–2007 
Number of Funders 
Relative Citation 
Rate 
N 
Relative Citation 
Rate 
N 
One Funder 0.65 72 0.70 65 
Two Funders 0.74 47 1.26 59 
Three Funders 0.94 26 1.78 44 
Four or More Funders 1.42 10 1.48 37 
 
Second, as noted in Table 4.3, below, in the 1997–2002 interval producer P3s were not an 
important factor in the financing of AAFC canola papers as signified by the small number of 
papers and a relative citation rate below the global average of 1.0. This changed in the 2003–
2007 era as the number of papers financed by producer P3s expanded from 15 to 62, with a 
relative citation rate of 1.61, almost doubling the citation rate from the previous interval. A 
number of factors have influenced the rise in the use of producer P3s for financing AAFC canola 
papers. Producer P3s first appeared in the 1970s and they were instrumental in the financing and 
managing of the R&D innovation process that transformed rapeseed into low erucic acid and low 
glucosinolate canola, creating the product that opened new international markets for this 
branded, trademarked, and differentiated product. This process marked the beginning of P3s 
venturing into the management of the canola innovation process through the financing and 
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coordinating of R&D activities taking place in AAFC and Canadian university laboratories. 
During this period, a multitude of producer associations began using crop levies to finance 
canola R&D and to help shape government agriculture policy to accelerate the development of 
this sector. Government austerity programs created a requirement for new sources for the 
financing of canola R&D, a process that began in the early 1990s and gave rise to a number of 
producer P3s devoted to the management of the R&D process. The introduction of intellectual 
property rights, beginning in the early 1990s, opened an institutional space for the private sector 
to dominate the downstream R&D process, primarily in the development of breeding 
technologies and varieties. The privatization of the downstream R&D process resulted in a 
number of technology needs of producers going unfulfilled, something the levy-financed 
producer P3s have addressed. This process, beginning in the 1990s and reaching fruition in the 
2003–2007 interval, marked the end of AAFC as the dominant actor in canola innovation and the 
beginning of the AAFC as support organization to both the private sector and producer P3s. Last, 
as a part of the funding of AAFC canola papers, many producer P3s require the publication of a 
peer-reviewed research article, creating a process conducive to knowledge development and 
dissemination. 
 
Table 4.3. Producer P3s and MII Descriptive Statistical Comparison 
  1997–2002 2003–2007 
  Papers 
Relative Citation 
Rate 
Papers 
Relative Citation 
Rate 
Producer P3s 15 0.84 62 1.61 
MII 11 0.92 52 1.66 
Both 2 1.6 36 1.78 
 
Third, in the context of Table 4.3, above, one can see that the use of the MII, similar to the use of 
producer P3s expanded in both quantity of papers and relative citation rates. Specifically, in 
1997–2002, the MII was utilized on 11 papers, which resulted in an average slightly below the 
global average of 1.0. In 2003–2007 the MII was used to finance 52 AAFC papers, resulting in a 
1.66 relative citation rate and representing about an 80% increase over the previous period. The 
MII was an AAFC funding mechanism designed to link AAFC research capabilities with 
industry needs in a process that was intended to keep AAFC scientific capabilities relevant and 
to compensate for the reduction in public spending (BearingPoint, 2004: 4–5). The MII is a tool 
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that permits the AAFC to exert influence over agri-food R&D activities in an operating 
environment characterized by austerity and privatization. AAFC began using the MII in the mid-
1990s. 
 
One last explanatory variable of interest is the simultaneous use of producer-financed P3s and 
the MII in the financing of AAFC canola papers. As noted in Table 4.3, above, only two AAFC 
papers were financed by both producer P3s and the MII in the first interval. This changed 
dramatically in the 2003–2007 period as 36 papers were financed by both, resulting in a 1.78 
relative citation rate.  
 
Therefore, there are six variables of interest to this analysis: two funders, three funders, four or 
more funders, producer P3s, the MII, and the use of both the producer P3 and MII in financing 
AAFC canola papers. As discussed in section 4.3, each variable is being compared directly to 
AAFC papers that did not use collaborative funding, producer P3s, or the MII. Put simply, this 
investigation seeks to determine, through a regression analysis, the impact of each variable on 
the increase in citation rates by determining the likelihood of a canola paper being cited through 
the use of each variable, compared to a canola paper without the variable in question.  
 
In Table 4.4, below, the regression analysis indicates two statistically significant variables, both 
related to the number of funders. In 2003–2007, using three funders on an AAFC canola paper 
resulted in 2.3x increased chance of being cited as opposed to a non-collaborative paper at a 95% 
confidence level. Using four or more funders resulted in a 2.0x increased chance of being cited, 
although it should be noted both the Z and P values indicate that the results are ambiguous as 
each value is on the margins of the significance interval. This suggests that the benefit from 
collaboration, in this analysis, is maximized at three partners with declining returns in evidence 
at four or more funders, implying limitations on the returns from collaboration.  
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Table 4.4. Regression Results 
Variable IRR
6
 STD Error Z P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
2 Funders 1.76 0.665 1.49   0.136 0.837     3.693 
3 Funders 2.36 0.812 2.50  0.012* 1.203     4.634 
4 or more Funders 2.00 0.700 1.98  0.048* 1.006     3.975 
MII 1.10 0.536 0.19   0.847 0.422     2.860 
Producer P3 1.03 0.346 0.08   0.933 0.531     1.990 
Both MII and P3 1.14 0.327 0.47   0.637 0.653     2.005 
/lnalpha 0.63 0.143 
  
0.349     0.913 
Alpha 1.88 0.270 
  
1.418     2.493 
* Denotes Statistically Significant Result 
 
Building from theory and from this analysis, there are two areas that warrant further research: the 
role of enablers, plus the role of P3s and other hard-to-define organizational structures that 
facilitate collaboration. While neither the MII, as an enabler, nor the producer P3s, as 
collaborative structures, were statistically significant factors in the increasing citation rates, it is 
important not to underestimate their role in creating a process conducive to collaboration. 
Innovation in the canola sector has migrated to a new space and process defined by collaboration 
and the presence of novel organizational structures such as P3s. 
 
One important issue is whether agricultural science and technology systems from the developed 
world, such as Canada’s canola innovation system, can be exported to the developing world. The 
answer is a qualified yes. The Canadian canola story presents a model for emulation. Canada’s 
agricultural sector is small compared to its competitors in the United States and the European 
Union, as Canada lacks many of the economies of scale to compete effectively. Therefore, 
Canada must pursue innovative strategies in identifying and developing novel crops such as 
canola to remain a factor in global markets. The development of canola provides an institutional 
model for the developing world, as interconnectedness with global knowledge flows and global 
markets provides the means for agriculturally based economic growth in a process known as 
techno-leapfrogging (Gilpin, 2001: 139–140). This process enables lesser-developed economies 
                                                          
6
 IRR=Incident rate ratios, this number represents the likelihood of an AAFC paper being cited compared to the non-
collaborative, baseline AAFC canola paper. 
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to leverage the technological assets of developed economies to accelerate economic growth and 
development.   
 
Expanding from this research, collaboration in P3s appears to be an emerging organizational 
structure and process for identifying, developing, and transferring relevant technologies from the 
developed world to the developing world for agricultural economic growth. An online database 
compiled by the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture has identified 203 agricultural 
P3s in the developing world.  A total of 122 of these P3s have been in operation less than five 
years, and another 62 have been in operation for less than 10 years, suggesting that agricultural 
P3s in the developing world are a recent and growing phenomenon. 
 
Recent research into the growing use of agricultural P3s in the developing world suggests that 
P3s are a revolutionary structure capable of operating in environments that are beyond the 
capabilities of either the state or the market. Specifically, it has been demonstrated that 
agricultural P3s in the developing world provide a structure and process that facilitate the 
development of local governance capabilities and social capital that can compensate for the 
absence of a state or a rule-based, transparent economy with functioning markets (Poulton and 
MaCartney, 2012: 2–3). Because P3s facilitate both trust and transparency, they can work to 
generate higher levels of technology transfer between the developed and developing worlds, 
resulting in yield gains, lower costs for small farmers, and increasing farm incomes (Hartwich et 
al., 2007: 55–61). Developing world P3s specialize in “orphan crops”—so named because they 
are neglected by both the public and private sectors— in an effort to create an institutional space 
dedicated to sustenance crops such as millet, cassava, and sorghum by merging public and 
private technologies and capabilities to develop new crops for the “bottom billion” of the world 
(CropLife International, 2009).  
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This empirical analysis extends the knowledge about the role of collaboration in generating 
higher rates of knowledge development and transfer. Four items warrant comment. First, the 
evolution of canola closely emulates the evolutionary nature of the three Triple Helix Models as 
measured by the citation data. The changes in the structure of the financing and management of 
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the canola R&D process progressing from state to market to collaboration mirrors theory. This 
suggests that collaboration and communication are the primary drivers of innovation in a 
knowledge economy, which in turn supports the view that collaboration has replaced the linear 
systems characterized by institutional hegemony as the primary driver of innovation. Second, the 
critical role of collaboration in this study suggests that innovation is not path-dependent, but 
rather is based on emerging qualities derived from interdependencies that create economies of 
scale that are difficult to measure and evaluate. This analysis suggests that pluralistic funding 
measures, collaborative problem solving, and institutional synergies can lead to a process of 
techno-leapfrogging that can accelerate technological-driven agricultural development. Third, the 
recent growth in the use of agricultural P3s in the developing world indicates that collaboration 
is an emerging process. Fourth, this model suggests that there may be certain physical limits to 
collaboration, as the returns were maximized at three partners as the addition of a fourth partner 
led to a lower return from collaboration indicating diminishing returns. 
4.6 Policy Implications 
 
Theory and this empirical analysis indicate that innovation is driven by economies of scale 
developed from interdependencies created by collaboration. This suggests a recasting of the 
analysis, moving away from vertical processes characterized by the dominant position of a 
particular institutional sphere, to a horizontal process characterized by the absence of hierarchy. 
Policy needs to reflect this transformation, as governments can influence but not directly control 
the processes that govern the generation of new knowledge. Therefore, policy needs to be 
directed to creating tools, processes, and organizations that enable collaboration. The public 
sector needs to develop tools that permit the leveraging of public research assets with the needs 
and capabilities of other sectors to create interdependencies and generate economies of scale. 
Additionally, policies must be developed to permit the lessons of multi-sectoral collaboration to 
be absorbed, analyzed, and transferred; there is a need for learning communities and learning 
organizations to develop the economies of scale that underscore innovation. Government policies 
should reflect the need for trust and transparency in both the development and implementation of 
policies but also the need for tools and organizations that engender trust and transparency to 
provide a framework that is conducive to collaborative ventures. 
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4.7 Directions for Further Research 
 
The transformation from linear and sequential innovation systems to non-linear, non-sequential 
and spiral-configured innovation networks that are shaped and re-shaped by interactions 
challenges research policy. The Triple Helix Models of innovation offer one perspective on this 
process and provide a framework for analysis. Citation analysis provides an established scientific 
method of examining the flows of knowledge as measured by the number of times an individual 
or institution has referenced the work of another entity, indicating the transmission of 
knowledge. The methodology developed in this analysis links theory to practice by creating a 
model that uses count-data to identify and isolate the variables that underscore this 
transformative process. By doing so, it is possible to identify novel processes and trends in the 
production of new knowledge. In this particular case study, collaboration appears to be the new 
institutional environment that drives innovation in canola research. This leads to two directions 
for further research. First, from a methodological perspective, this model adds another tool to 
help visualize the flows of knowledge, illuminating previously invisible processes and 
relationships. This fixed-effects negative binomial model needs to be tested on more cases to 
validate whether it can provide a new method for evaluating the impact of research. Second, 
from a theoretical perspective, if collaboration is the driver of innovation, what facilitates 
collaboration? Does the impetus for collaboration occur in individuals or in organizations, or 
does the institutional environment provide the catalyst for collaboration? 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
A TYPOLOGY OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGRICULTURAL 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS COMMON TO THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD BIO-ECONOMY 
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
Public–private partnerships (P3s) in agriculture are frequently designed and used to alleviate 
hunger and poverty in the developing world. But there has been little investigation of how they 
emerge, function and perform. This paper seeks to remedy that.  
 
The term public–private partnership (P3) refers to any collaborative engagements between 
public, private, and not-for-profit actors or institutions (Kernaghan, 1993: 57–60). P3s allow for 
the division of labour and authority and a sharing of human and financial resources under a 
single organizational structure in the pursuit of common goals and outcomes (Vieira and 
Hartwich, 2002: 30–31). The pooling of public and private resources in a P3 structure adds value 
to any given process by exploiting the comparative advantage of each partner (Van de Meer, 
2002: 123–137). Specifically, P3s facilitate collaboration between heterogeneous partners by 
developing trust, which engenders the creation of interdependencies and the formation of 
networks of shared interests, which together lower the transaction costs of collaboration 
(McQuaid, 2000: 9–11).  
 
For the purposes of this analysis, we distinguish two main categories of P3s: R&D P3 and the 
value-chain P3. The R&D P3 is focused on developing upstream breeding technologies to 
develop higher-yielding varieties through enhanced abiotic and biotic stress resistance 
(Boettiger, 2011). The objective of R&D P3s is to facilitate the transfer of private sector 
technology to developing world countries in order to compensate for their lack of scientific 
capacity (Pray, 2001: 2–7). This P3 exists as a technology transfer mechanism, linking private 
sector assets with developing world technology needs. The R&D P3 is a structure that protects 
the private sector’s IP investments by creating and implementing a regulatory regime that uses IP 
tools such as plant variety protection and patents to facilitate R&D-based technological 
innovation. This P3 provides both an incentive for innovation and a means to attract investment 
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by offering a structure and process that captures the benefits of the value-added R&D process 
(Kock, 2011).  
 
Conversely, the purpose of the value-chain P3 is to link local developing world farmers into 
global distribution systems for both inputs and outputs (Boettiger, 2011). Linking into the global 
agricultural systems enhances food security in the developing world by accelerating the rate of 
knowledge absorption and accumulation, which increases local innovation capabilities allowing 
for agricultural-based economic growth as a means to eliminate poverty (Pardey and Beintema, 
2001: 23). The value-chain P3 seeks to create local networks as a means of developing the 
capacity to export commodities to developed world markets. Essentially, the value-chain P3 
organizes the “bottom billion” into local and regional value and supply chains in a process of 
integration into the global economy. Due to the lack of efficient markets and stable political 
systems, the value-chain P3 develops local capabilities to provide end-users with assurances of 
product quality and safety, compensating for the lack of economic and political transparency 
(Poulton and MaCartney, 2012: 2–3). Additionally, value-chain P3s develop local governance 
capacities to facilitate the creation of rules-based and transparent supply-and-demand markets. 
 
There are four objectives to this chapter. First, the paper provides information on the 
characteristics of P3s not otherwise available in the public domain in order to provide a practical 
perspective on what is required to create and operationalize these organizational structures. 
Second, it illuminates the incentives, constraints, enablers, and hidden costs associated with 
creating and managing agricultural P3s in the developing world. Third, it seeks to determine the 
characteristics that separate upstream research and development (R&D) P3s from downstream 
value-chain P3s. Finally, this chapter compares and contrasts the findings of this work to 
previous research on this subject, offering an array of insights for policy makers.  
5.2  Methodology 
 
The evidence presented was gathered through interviews with people directly involved in various 
P3s. A total of 90 individuals working with 67 P3s were contacted for interviews. Based on the 
responses, 20 individuals affiliated with 9 P3s—involving 10 private sector and 8 public sector 
organizations—were interviewed for this research paper, representing a small sample size. 
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Therefore, the content of this paper reflects a small subset of opinions and viewpoints of experts 
and practitioners actively involved with agricultural P3s in the developing world. While this 
provides an insider’s perspectives on the challenges and opportunities associated with 
agricultural P3s, one cannot use them to infer broader opinions or applications.  
 
To facilitate open and free discussion, the interviewees and their organizations were promised 
confidentiality, such that their statements could not be traced back to them or their respective 
organization. This contributed to determining the format of this paper; in place of a number of 
discrete case studies, this paper focuses on the big picture in order to recognize patterns that 
occur in multiple P3s.  
 
The survey results were analyzed in the context of a number of key issues. Each P3 was assessed 
and grounded in the theory of knowledge development and innovation and of collaborative 
governance. Second, the incentives, constraints, and enablers of P3s (based on a literature 
review) were analyzed to illuminate the hidden characteristics of P3s. A summary analysis 
section is then structured around six interview questions that probe the nature of the incentives, 
constraints, and enablers of agricultural P3s: (1) What are the incentives to join a P3? (2) What 
are the constraints to joining a P3? (3) How have P3s overcome these constraints? (4) What are 
the key enablers of P3s? (5) What are the hidden costs associated with working with P3s? (6) 
What is the most important lesson you can offer on P3s?  
 
5.3  Theory 
 
One method of contextualizing the advent of the P3 is to examine the differences between the 
vertical concept of governing through the state and the horizontal concept of governance through 
heterogeneous networks. Specifically, it has been hypothesized that the culmination of neo-
liberalism, austerity, the advent of the internet, and globalization has rendered the state-
dominated mode of governing through laws and hierarchy impotent and has replaced it with a 
new model of governance (Weiss, 2000: 6–12). This new model of governance should not be 
viewed as a revision of the existing system of governing, but as a new system of “self-organizing 
networks,” or governing in the absence of a central authority (Rhodes, 1995: 1). Therefore, 
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governance is not synonymous with governing, but rather represents a radical departure from 
historic processes associated with centralized government. We are in an era defined by the 
emergence of distributed governance involving interdependence, new non-state actors, and 
obfuscated boundaries between previously clearly delineated sectors (Rhodes, 1995: 1). 
Collaborative governance depends on the use of problem-focused P3s that facilitate the exchange 
of knowledge between the public, private, and voluntary sectors (OECD, 2000: p. 3–4). 
  
One area where collaborative governance has become an emergent process is in the production 
of new knowledge. It has been hypothesized that there are two forms of knowledge development, 
one vertical, known as Mode I, and one horizontal, Mode II (Gibbons et al., 1994). Mode I 
knowledge development is a vertically oriented process dependent upon the development of 
theoretical knowledge in autonomous and isolated institutions (Gibbons et al., 1994). Mode I 
knowledge development is synonymous with Rhodes’s definition of hierarchal governing. Mode 
II knowledge is horizontal and problem focused, occurring in “heterogeneously organized” 
networks characterized by the dialogic nature of the process, one that is dependent on a high 
level of interaction between the members of the problem- and solution-focused network 
(Gibbons et al., 1994). The feedback loops created by the perpetual network interactions 
facilitates the governance-oriented nature of Mode II knowledge development (Nowotny et al., 
2003: 8–12).  
 
Economic growth is dependent on innovation—a process of recombining existing knowledge 
into new forms of knowledge to generate new wealth-creating economic processes. Joseph 
Schumpeter is credited with defining innovation as the introduction of a new good or the 
enhancement of an existing good, a new method of production, the creation of a new market, the 
discovery and exploitation of a new supply of input materials, or the creation of a new 
organizational structure (Schumpeter, 1939: 59–61). Schumpeter’s definition of innovation 
reflects a process where something new is created or adopted from an existing stock of 
knowledge. This provides a foundation for an analysis of the competing paradigms that attempt 
to explain the processes that govern innovation. This perspective looks at the three Ps of 
innovation: “special people” performing “special processes” located in “special places” 
(Leadbeater, 2005; Phillips et al., 2012: 215). 
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The “special people” innovation paradigm suggests that economic growth is dependent upon 
creative people seeking to be on the leading edge of technological, social, and organizational 
change (Florida, 2002: 1–3). This perspective suggests human and social capital underscore 
economic growth. Florida’s three Ts—technology, trust, and tolerance—facilitate innovative re-
combinations of existing knowledge into new ideas. Related to this concept is the role of social 
and policy entrepreneurs, who, through their efforts and locations within private and public 
organizations, identify and implement new ideas that drive the innovation process (Campbell, 
2004: 74–76; Faminow et al., 2009: 3). These individuals use their ability to negotiate and 
transcend the boundaries between state, business, and society to become agents of change and 
influence by positioning themselves to recognize new opportunities and having both the will and 
the capacity to mobilize change within institutions and networks. In international development 
organizations, social entrepreneurs are characterized by their ability to identify and/or create 
technological solutions to poverty; they possess the requisite ability to create networks to 
influence positive change (Faminow et al., 2009: 3–5).  
 
The second perspective on innovation, the special processes, is also referred to as the innovation 
systems paradigm. The special processes approach posits that interdependencies between 
networks of firms, governments, and learning institutions generate economies of scope that 
engender innovation. This view hypothesizes that universities center knowledge development 
networks by forging links with and between government and industry (Etzkowitz and Ranga, 
2009). The innovation systems theory proposes that collaboration creates the interdependencies 
between institutions that foster innovation. A related perspective suggests that innovation is now 
global and that the key to innovation-driven economic growth is developing an institutional 
capacity to connect local and regional capabilities to global flows of knowledge, which occur in 
the form of advanced technology protected by intellectual property rights (Bathelt, 2004: 31–33; 
Phillips, 2002). The innovation and global innovation systems viewpoints acknowledge the need 
for a new hybrid form of organization to link the heterogeneous partners into functioning 
innovation systems (Bathelt, 2004: 33; Etzkowitz and Ranga, 2009: 4). 
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The special places theory of innovation is based on development of clusters of firms and 
industries that lead to the development of national and regional economies of scale (Porter, 1990: 
17). Clusters depend on four interrelated factors in order to develop a comparative advantage that 
generates economies of scale. The first factor is the competitive structure of a cluster that forces 
industries to innovate or perish. The second factor is a strong consumer market that provides the 
conditions necessary for creating competition. The third factor is the existence of supporting 
industries to create upstream and downstream value chains to drive the innovation process. The 
fourth factor is the recognition that special places are dependent on thick labour markets, highly 
developed infrastructure, and deep and established capital markets for sustained investments. 
Special places develop economies of scale by continued competition and by developing 
interdependencies between markets, and supporting industries and labour markets. 
 
The above analysis provides a framework for contextualizing the role of P3s in creating and 
managing effective agricultural research and development (R&D) innovation systems that 
attempt to organize researchers, organizations, and farmers into networks that create and transfer 
new forms of knowledge-based technology to facilitate agriculturally driven economic growth. 
P3s have become central actors in managing R&D agricultural innovation systems. P3s use 
voice, trust, and reciprocity as methods of engendering collaboration. They take on the role of an 
intermediary by coordinating the financial, R&D, and governance activities between the public, 
private, and voluntary sectors (Hall, 2006: 3–7). This improves the efficacy of R&D by 
facilitating a more efficient rate of technology transfer, which leads to higher yields and lower 
input costs for producers (Hartwich et al., 2007: 55–61). The trust, transparency, and 
accountability developed by the horizontally configured P3 generate the higher knowledge and 
technology absorption rates (Spielman & von Grebmer, 2004: 16–38). As P3s center agricultural 
R&D innovation systems, they provide an institutional structure for managing the introduction of 
transformative agricultural technologies (Hall et al., 2010: 25–27). This suggests that P3s are 
“innovation brokers” because they create linkages between developers and users of technology 
and provide the physical nucleus of heterogeneous configured networks (Klerkx et al., 2009: 2–
4). Essentially, P3s have become the focal point for coordinating the financing, development, 
and diffusion of new knowledge required for agricultural technological innovation. As 
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innovation brokers in agricultural R&D systems, P3s facilitate technological innovation by 
synchronizing the activities of the public, private, and voluntary sectors.  
 
For their formation and for the achievement of successful and enduring operations, agricultural 
P3s depend on a number of interrelated factors. One method of contextualizing the formation of 
P3s is analyzing the incentives that motivate organizations, public and private, to form P3s. 
Private sector organizations join P3s to collaborate with the public sector to gain access to raw 
and undeveloped germplasm stocks and to local and regional knowledge systems developed by 
the public sector (Byerlee and Fischer, 2002: 8). This suggests that the private sector joins P3s as 
a means of developing new markets in the developing world by accessing networks (and their 
resources) created by public sector institutions (Byerlee and Fischer, 2002: 8–10). Additionally, 
the private sector lacks detailed knowledge of “orphan crops,” such as millet, cassava, and 
sorghum, so engaging in P3s provides private sector firms with access to public experience and 
technology to help broaden their technical and scientific knowledge of those crops that provide 
sustenance for over one billion people (CropLife International, 2009).  
 
Similarly, the public sector’s motives for joining P3s mirror those of the private sector: the 
public sector seeks access to the seed development and distribution systems of the private sector 
in order to access cutting-edge breeding technologies and private funds (Spielman and von 
Grebmer, 2004: 17–18). Essentially, the public and private sectors require the technological and 
knowledge assets of their counterparts, a reflection of the incapacity of either sector to work 
alone in developing innovative technological solutions to poverty in the developing world. 
 
Despite the many incentives to facilitate the creation of P3s, there are a number of constraints 
that impede collaboration. One main concern is the potential for the misuse and abuse of 
proprietary technologies by both the public and private sector in a P3. Specifically, the private 
sector may attempt to use public-domain technologies for private gain; additionally, privately 
held intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the form of breeding technologies and finished 
varieties can be transferred, accidently or intentionally, to competitors or farmer groups, both of 
which can inflict harm to a firm’s bottom line by threatening its market position (Spielman et al., 
2007: 49–54). A second concerns the inability of the global IPR regimes to prevent the 
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unintended and illicit transfer of proprietary technologies and knowledge between organizations 
and countries; this inability inhibits collaborative ventures (von Braun, 2007: 11). A third 
constraint inhibiting the development of P3s is a dearth of experience among potential partners in 
developing and implementing P3s, suggesting P3s require a specific skill set that can only be 
derived through experience (Hartwich et al., 2007: 46–47). A fourth constraint is the hidden 
costs of collaboration related to the time and resources required to establish trust and eliminate 
competition for the limited resources within the P3 (Hall, 2006: 14–15). Finally, developing and 
implementing successful P3s can be impeded by the focus on short-term and medium-term 
results, which are generally measured by return on investment (Ferroni, 2010). The constraints 
identified are compounded by the lack of examples of successful P3s in agricultural 
development. 
 
A number of enablers have been identified in the literature that work to counterbalance the 
incentives and constraints of developing P3s. First, a stable macro-political economic 
environment has been identified as a prerequisite for multi-sector collaboration in agricultural 
R&D in the developing world (World Bank, 2008). The second and probably most prominent 
enabler is access to sustained financing to provide the time and resources necessary to develop 
the relationships and the structure necessary for the long-term viability of a P3 (Warner and 
Kahan, 2008). A third related key enabler is effective design of the P3; ultimately P3s need to be 
capable of attracting private sector financing, suggesting that P3s need to be able to be profitable 
at some point (Warner and Kahn, 2008). A fourth enabler is to employ third-party entities to act 
as brokers between the partners to help them develop a set of goals and a plan to attain those 
goals in order to prevent conflict between the partners from interfering with the objectives of the 
P3 (Hall, 2006: 14). Fifth, many P3s employ specialized non-profit international organizations, 
such as the International Organization for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotechnology Applications 
(ISAAA), to link the technology needs of developing countries with the technology and 
germplasm stocks of public and private organizations in the developed world (ISAAA, 2012). In 
addition to ISAAA, the Public Sector Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA) 
and Cambia perform a similar function by providing access to agricultural technology and 
organizational assistance to developing-world entities seeking to build up the capacity to use the 
technology. These organizations can provide an array of facilitating services, including 
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workshops on IP management, commercialization strategies, and forming public–private 
partnerships.  
5.4 Summary and Analysis of the Responses to the Questions 
 
This section summarizes the specific evidence and impressions drawn from the interviews with 
P3 actors.  
5.4.1  The Incentives to Join or Form a P3 
 
A number of themes emerged in response to questions about why private or public actors would 
engage in a partnership. First, many developed world private corporations have policies and/or 
cultures of “goodwill” towards development projects in the developing world. Sometimes this 
can be the result of a specific board directive, or a corporate policy that mandates or encourages 
employees and divisions to engage in charitable activity. It was suggested in the interviews that 
adopting a culture of goodwill means that corporations receive many benefits from these 
activities, including, but not limited to, happy employees, enhanced public image, and new 
relationships in the developing world, indicating that there are multiple factors driving what 
otherwise looks like simple corporate charity. In many cases, P3s have been created due to the 
personal initiative of individual employees who recognized opportunities where commercially 
developed technologies could be transferred to subsistence crops without compromising the 
market positions of their employers. It was suggested by a number of respondents that Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) has also become a motivating factor for corporations to engage in 
developing world agricultural P3s, as many of the large agri-food companies are publicly traded 
and depend on the investment community for their financial well-being. There are now systems 
in place, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, that track the CSR activities of companies, 
and this type of monitoring provides an incentive for action, as their investors, in response to 
public pressure, now require a positive public image as a condition of continued investing. 
 
Similarly, philanthropic activities in developing world P3s garner positive press and social media 
releases. It was noted by more than one individual that by donating technology and money, and 
by lending employees to developing world P3s, corporations create an image of supporting 
sustainable agriculture, something that is becoming a long-term consumer trend regarding food 
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product choices. More than one interviewee suggested that the market position of corporations 
depends on supporting sustainable agriculture just as much as on price and quality, which 
indicates a response to long-term consumer trends favouring sustainability and equitable 
development. Additionally, there is a powerful “feel good” logic governing the incentives that 
drive private sector companies to engage in developing world P3s.  Again, a number of 
respondents, all drawn from the private sector, commented that this makes employees feel good 
about their jobs and themselves, and therefore enhances employee morale. 
 
A second theme was that corporate actors perceived commercial incentives to join P3s. The 
developing world represents the new frontier as both a consumer market and a commodity 
supplier. Multiple private-sector interviewees indicated that engaging in P3s permits companies 
to develop local capabilities in the developing world by organizing farmers into coherent value 
chains, essentially incorporating the developing world into the global agricultural economy. This 
also allows corporations to access local knowledge and resources for their long-term strategic 
needs. Respondents from R&D P3s indicated that learning about and acquiring local plant 
species was a powerful incentive for collaborating in P3s, as the genetic material contained in 
plants can be a scientific asset and may hold commercial potential for expanding developing 
world markets. Interviewees from value-chain P3s indicated that they require local knowledge as 
a means of learning how to work with the “bottom billion,” as the developing world represents 
the new markets for both customers and suppliers, and, therefore, the major global source of 
growth. Furthermore, given the insights these partnerships offer on local and regional operating 
conditions, both political and knowledge-oriented, engaging in P3s also reduces the risk of 
investing into new countries and products. 
 
One common underlying theme is that the developing world has become strategically important 
to the long-term aspirations of corporations involved in the agri-food sector, and P3s are the best 
means of opening up this new economic space by providing a structure to learn how to work 
with the developing world. It was suggested by more than one informant that P3s, due to their 
collaborative structure, provided a means of creating coherent networks where there was a 
discernible absence of economic and political stability. It was noted that forming developing-
world P3s gives companies access to the networks that have been established by national and 
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international aid agencies such as The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ)), International Development Centre 
(IDRC), and USAID, in this way speeding up the learning process by leveraging public 
knowledge with private sector assets. 
 
Third, multiple informants from the public sector indicated that the public sector joins P3s to 
gain access to private technologies, especially new technologies such as Bt and herbicide tolerant 
varieties. By collaborating with the private sector, the public sector can gain a deep 
understanding of what knowledge and technologies the private sector has. This, in turn, permits 
both public and private entities to create a scientific division of labour to tackle various disease-
related crop problems in the developing world. This leads to an acceleration of research 
programs, getting new technologies into the hands of developing world farmers more quickly 
and efficiently. It was noted by numerous public-sector respondents that most P3s exist because 
neither the private nor the public sector possesses the requisite capabilities to respond to the 
technological needs of developing world farmers. In the developing world, the public sector 
needs the expertise of the private sector to set up regulatory systems, as corporations have a 
plethora of experience in establishing standards for the introduction of new technologies, 
especially biotechnology. Their expertise and experience covers the spectrum of dealing with 
new technologies, including regulatory and biosafety technologies, all critical to the successful 
introduction of the new plant varieties.  
 
Although the public sector is adept at developing new technologies, especially for subsistence 
crops, it lacks the experience of the private sector in bringing new technologies to the market, or, 
in the case of the developing world, to the local farmer. One respondent noted that the process of 
successfully launching a new product, both GM and non-GM, takes years, usually more than a 
decade. This person noted that the greatest indicator of success of P3s in the developing world 
was having experience with previous failures in product development and launches, something 
the private sector has experience with. 
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5.4.2  Constraints in Joining or Forming a P3 
 
From the private sector perspective, there are three major constraints to joining or forming a P3 
in the developing world. The first major impediment concerns intellectual property rights (IPRs). 
From the perspective of an R&D P3, corporations are heavily invested in IPRs, the right to 
specific genetic traits as an example, and P3s can threaten these investments by permitting the 
intellectual property (IP), in the form of food, to be exported from the host country or region in 
the P3 to the developed world markets, threatening their market position and profits. The second 
major impediment blocking private sector partners from joining P3s pertains to control issues: 
who is in charge of the P3? P3s depend on multiple steering committees, which obfuscate the 
chain of command and leadership functions. Many P3s answer to not-for-profit donors or 
development agencies, not to the private sector. Put simply, it was suggested by a number of 
informants that the private sector does not always understand how P3s operate. The private 
sector engages in many contracts and bi-lateral agreements with P3s, but these are often 
accomplished on a project–by-project basis, meaning the experience usually is not transferred to 
the operating standards of an organization. This point was addressed by multiple respondents 
who suggested that a lot of the private sector experience in dealing with P3s is embedded within 
individuals, not the corporation. The third constraint identified from the interviews relates to 
cultural differences between organizations. These cultural differences can be related to public vs. 
private operating standards. The public sector is often oriented towards activities defined in a 
contract, and the private sector is usually focused on results, with the activities dependent upon 
acceptable outcomes that are generally measured in commercial terms. It was suggested by a 
number of informants that the process and activities change repeatedly in order to achieve the 
desired outcomes. Cultural differences, including language and norms, can also be understood as 
differences between developing and developed worlds. 
 
Respondents from the public sector identified four major constraints to joining a P3. First, 
according to many interviewees, there are a limited number of researchers and scientists trained 
and focused on crop-based R&D P3s in the developing world. This limited research capacity 
limits the number of projects in which the scientists can engage at any given time. One issue that 
came up repeatedly was that each project requires an inordinate amount of administrative 
attention, which further dilutes the limited amount of qualified people to work with R&D P3s. 
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Second, it was noted in multiple interviews that it is difficult for public sector institutions and 
not-for-profit research centers to identify relevant technologies and identify genuine and honest 
private sector partners. This difficulty is compounded by public scrutiny of private sector 
motives for engaging in P3s, suggesting that negative perceptions of the large agro-biotech firms 
by the public sector may prevent the development of effective P3s. Third, public and not-for-
profit institutions are constrained by a lack of funding. Fourth, multiple respondents indicated 
that many public institutions lack experience in dealing with private sector partners, similar to 
the issues raised with the private sector in the above paragraph.  
5.4.3 How Have P3s Overcome the Constraints?  
 
Interviewees identified five methods for overcoming the constraints to building effective P3s in 
the developing world. First, start simple by focusing on building relationships with the partners. 
A number of individuals stated that the P3 is best constructed by building friendships through 
face-to-face interactions; this builds trust and develops the basis for long-term relationships. The 
objective of developing relationships is to prove the process works. It was advised to start simple 
and leave the formal agreements and lawyers to the last stage of developing a P3, after the 
objectives, process, division of labour, and financing arrangements have been agreed upon.  
 
Second, the most important aspect to build successful P3s is to employ P3 experts from 
developmental agencies and/or donor agencies who have experience with establishing 
developing world P3s; this is to say, experience matters. P3 experts act as translators to bridge 
the differences between public and private sector standards, and they help overcome cultural 
differences between the developing world and the developed world partners. One item of 
significance did stand out. None of the informants from R&D P3s suggested a requirement for 
P3 experts. This was an item of significance only from interviews with respondents who work 
with value-chain P3s, again suggesting there are large differences between the two types of P3s 
related to the experience and expertise required to start operations.  
 
Third, remain focused on the ultimate objective: increasing the incomes and health of developing 
world farmers through agriculture. This objective is best accomplished by focusing on mission-
critical items starting at the highest level of the structure of the P3. Fourth, due diligence matters; 
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it is prudent to research the technologies involved, as well as the potential partners and their 
means and motives. Fifth, a majority of the people interviewed suggested that personal 
commitment matters, as this can overcome problems associated with complexity and culture.  
5.4.4 The Hidden Costs Associated with Working with P3s 
 
Respondents identified six hidden costs associated with P3s. First is the hidden cost of time. P3s 
depend on a many meetings as part of the consensus-building process. It takes an enormous 
amount of time to connect the various partners and systems into a single organizational format. 
This entails merging public- and private-sector personnel and possibly divisions into a P3, which 
includes members from a varying number of developing world countries, each with their unique 
cultures, languages, and organizational idiosyncrasies. The majority of the P3s analyzed 
contained a minimum of three partners, with many having up to fifteen partners drawn from the 
public and private sectors and a multitude of countries. It was noted by many interviewees that 
this complexity engendered an unpredictable, difficult-to-forecast, and time-consuming process 
of getting to understand the dynamics of the partners in the P3. It was noted by multiple 
respondents that prior to joining a P3, it was impossible to predict with any accuracy the amount 
of time an organization would need to devote to the partnership.  
 
Compounding this problem is the issue of accounting for the opportunity cost of the time 
devoted to building a P3, as this does not show up on a balance sheet. This is a critical hidden 
cost for both the public and private sectors, something that was repeatedly discussed by the 
majority of the interviewees. This matter is intensified by the fact that the major donor agencies, 
both public and not for profit, do not permit the recovery of in-kind contributions, an issue that 
expands on one of the major constraints discussed in question number two.  
 
The second hidden cost, related to the hidden cost of time, is the amount of intercontinental 
travel required for building an effective P3. As noted, P3s depend on committee meetings for 
their survival and success; therefore, travel becomes a hidden and unpredictable cost. Not only is 
travel required to build a successful P3, the amount of travel increases when it comes to field 
trials of new crop varieties in the developing world. The larger the geographic footprint of the 
P3, meaning the greater the number of country partners, the larger and more unpredictable the 
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travel costs are for field trials, a necessary component of any successful crop-based R&D P3. It 
was noted in the interviews that there is little financial room for trial and error in the process 
leading up to and including field trials. 
 
The third hidden cost, which is related to the uncertainties associated with time and travel, is the 
poorly understood problem of complexity with P3s. As P3s develop, their structures and 
processes change, frequently through the addition of new partners, and these changes lead to new 
objectives and missions as new partners bring in new ideas and new opportunities. These 
elements of change both add to the complexity of the P3 and can cause mission drift, making it 
easy to lose focus on the strategic objectives of the original partnership. This in turn adds to the 
cost of the P3.  
 
The fourth hidden costs are related to financial reporting, writing grant proposals, and the never-
ending process of acquiring funding. The reporting and documentation requirements vary 
depending on the structure of the P3. However, it was noted by a number of informants that each 
type of partner has unique reporting requirements, creating documentation challenges for the 
constituent partners. Public sector donor agencies, such as GIZ, USAID, and IDRC, and not-for-
profit centers, such as The Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, have unique 
reporting requirements that necessitate the need for complex and expensive documentation 
systems and in turn present expensive challenges for the P3 and its partners. It was noted by 
more than one private sector partner that the level of specificity created expensive burdens that 
added unforeseen costs that are hard to justify. Again, the donors do not permit the billing for 
such indirect costs.  
 
It was noted that larger private sector partners have R&D budgets measured in the nine- or ten-
figure range, absolutely dwarfing the size of grants from the donors. Despite this, their financial 
accounting systems need to be revised to accommodate the donor and P3 requirements, 
something noted in the constraints section. Many interviewees also commented on the high 
transaction costs associated with P3s. This was related to both the reporting needs and to the time 
and energy spent looking for funding. Additionally, most private sector partners lack experience 
with writing grant proposals. There were also hidden costs associated with the verification of 
 103 
results from developing world accounting systems as donors and private sector partners noted 
that most developing world partners are not up to accepted accounting practices in the developed 
world. 
 
The fifth hidden costs are the vagaries associated with managing IPRs. The majority of crop-
based R&D P3s depend on technologies from private corporations, public agencies, universities, 
and even individuals. As there is no global IPR regime, freedom-to-operate (FTO) issues are a 
hidden cost that is difficult to predict in advance. Generally, FTO searches involve the use of 
private attorneys and require IPR searches in multiple jurisdictions. In one P3, a total of 43 IPRs 
were required, taking years of effort and expense. It was identified that the “golden rice” project 
is a great example of how FTO issues can dictate the pace and outcome of P3s. This remains an 
impediment to developing R&D P3s for the developing world, as it takes time and money to hunt 
down legal access to required technologies. This is a hidden cost that is unique to the R&D P3. 
 
The sixth and final hidden cost is the lack of infrastructure in the developing world. In many 
cases with R&D P3s, it was necessary to construct roads, build laboratories, buy scientific 
equipment, and train scientists and technicians to fulfill the objectives of the R&D P3. The 
individuals interviewed from value-chain P3s noted that accurately forecasting infrastructure 
needs was even more complicated and therefore harder to predict. It was suggested that with 
value-chain P3s, the profit margins of the export commodity are low to begin with, so scale is 
important. However, to be successful, it is best to start small and develop a working model 
before trying to achieve scale operations.  
 
In value-chain P3s, both traceability and transparency are required by consumers in developed 
world markets. So value-chain P3s must engage with and/or build civil society capacity to 
achieve transparency and traceability. This requires people on the ground developing educational 
outreach programs to reach as many farmers as possible, as soon as possible. The interviewees 
stated that this is a large expense that is difficult to predict accurately. In one way, the value-
chain P3 faces a financial and organizational hurdle at the beginning of operations that a R&D 
P3 faces only after the successful development of a plant variety. The value-chain P3 must 
develop a network at the beginning of operations in order to reach as many farmers as possible.  
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This problem is compounded for value-chain P3s that are focused on tree-based commodities, 
such as coffee and nuts. These trees can take years to mature before they are ready for 
production. These issues were brought up by a number of informants. Furthermore, they noted 
that it is difficult to justify large-scale expenditures because most expenses are related to 
education, capacity development, and creating farmer organizations, none of which leads to 
quick returns on investment. This was a problem area mentioned by several people involved with 
value-chain P3s: to achieve scale, the value-chain P3s require large scale investments, but donor 
agencies require tangible results in order to continue funding. This creates a measurement 
problem.  
 
One respondent stated that one way to receive future funding is to bring funders on location to 
demonstrate what their funds had created. It was further noted that many value-chain P3s operate 
in more than one country. This requires developing governance systems with multiple 
governments, which adds both cost and complexity to the process. One informant indicated that 
operating in multiple countries aided transparency because it forced other governments and 
organizations to conform to outside standards of operation. However, this added to both the cost 
and complexity of developing the value-chain P3. It is difficult to predict and forecast what 
infrastructure and capacity needs will be required until the P3 has developed. As noted above, 
most P3s have a significant gestation period where the objectives mature as the P3 grows and 
develops, adding to both the uncertainty and complexity of developing world P3s. 
5.4.5 The Key Enablers of P3s  
 
The first and most prominent enabler identified by respondents was the role of specific people in 
the creation and success of P3s. In one case study, an R&D P3 was the result of a single 
individual’s efforts spanning almost three decades, from their university years through their 
professional career. This individual, while working for a not-for-profit, developed the initial 
technology, recognized the need for further technological development, and initiated a long-term 
relationship with a private sector partner. Furthermore, over the span of three decades, this 
person arranged for funding from almost every possible large-scale donor, including national 
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governments, the private sector, and, most recently, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
This project is in process.  
 
Each P3 analyzed for this paper was the result of the personal initiative of an individual, without 
whom these P3s would not currently exist. In two cases, individuals in the private sector 
recognized that a technology owned by their employers had the capability to resolve a crop-
based disease or nutritional problem in the developing world. They launched what can be best 
described as a crusade to transfer the identified technology to solve a crop-related problem; the 
P3 in these cases is a direct result of acquiring partners to develop the technology and finance the 
process of building the capacity in the developing country to get the technology in the hands of 
farmers. Another P3—a value-chain P3 in multiple countries—was the result of a P3 expert from 
a national development organization recognizing a non-obvious commercial opportunity for 
farmers. This P3 was entirely dependent on the product, process, and industry knowledge of this 
person who understood industrial profit margins and had a deep knowledge of how to create a 
value-chain P3. Again, without the personal zeal of one person, this large-scale P3 would not 
exist.  
 
In other case studies, public researchers recognized the limitations of their programs and began 
building relationships with the private sector and with donor agencies to bring their technology 
to the farmers. In each case, the actions of the key individuals formed the basis for a compelling 
story of initiative, effort, and belief to solve the hunger and poverty problems. It also exposes 
how dependent these P3s are on these particular individuals; without their efforts, it is 
questionable whether these particular P3s would have ever formed. It must be emphasized that 
these efforts took place over a period of decades, essentially over the professional careers of 
these individuals. In two cases, the P3 was a result of one individual handing the “file” to a new 
employee who then took the project over. In one case, the developer of a technology-based P3 
has remained in their position to continue working and nurturing the P3. Therefore, based upon 
the case studies and interviews for this paper, the key enablers are people who see possibilities 
that are not always obvious. 
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A second enabler identified by respondents is funding and expertise from donor and national 
development agencies. Without funding or P3 expertise, most P3s will not get off the ground. 
They are simply too expensive and too complex to be organic or driven by demand from farmers 
or farmer cooperatives in the developing world. They require outside assistance in the form of 
money, technology, P3 expertise, product knowledge, and, most importantly, the ability to 
develop networks around the P3. P3s should be best understood as linking organizations that 
connect special people, special places, and special processes to develop technologically and 
market-based solutions to hunger and poverty in the developing world. In each case study, the P3 
was the nucleus for developing world-based national or regional value chain, or the focal point 
for a global network of individuals and institutions dedicated to working with agriculture 
development in the developing world.  
 
In this analysis, all the global institutions dedicated to agricultural development in the developing 
world were identified as key enablers. These include Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable 
Agriculture (SFSA), IDRC, GIZ, USAID, MonsantoFund, The Rockefeller Foundation, and the 
Howard G. Buffett Foundation, among others. Each organization brought funding and expertise, 
ranging from scientific to institutional knowledge of crop-based development in the developing 
world. Based on the interviews, one organization did stand out: The Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, a recent addition as of 2007. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) was 
identified in a number of case studies as being the difference between failure and continuance of 
operations. The BMGF added billions in funding in the aggregate to agricultural development. 
Additionally, the Foundation has hired a staff of development experts that brought a wealth of 
knowledge to crop-based R&D and value-chain P3s, including, but not limited to, eliminating or 
reducing FTO issues around plant and process-based technologies. Essentially, the BMGF, due 
to the scale of its operations, has clarified global rules or norms on freedom to operate issues, 
making it easier for P3s to effectively engage the public sector, including universities, and the 
private sector on technology matters. 
 
A third key enabler identified in the interviews was an institutional willingness to experiment by 
operating outside of their comfort zones. This is related to the first enabler, people. 
Organizations, both public and private, must be willing to allow employees both to devote time 
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to personal projects on institutional time and to use institutional resources. P3s are an evolving 
concept built around collaboration. The focus on the role of individuals in the creation of both 
R&D and value-chain P3s challenges the literature, as it is not an item that has received much 
attention; essentially, the literature is silent in this regard. This suggests that P3s are not an 
institutional response to the challenges of alleviating developing world poverty through 
agriculture, but rather the result of people recognizing the limitations of the current industrial 
organization of the global agricultural and developmental structure. In one aspect, the 
combination of people, places, and processes closely matches the theory of innovation outlined 
in the introduction. This suggests that individual entrepreneurs in both the public and private 
spheres are the driving force behind the development of P3s in agricultural development in the 
developing world. This warrants further research. 
5.4.6  The Most Important Lessons Learned by Practitioners of P3s 
 
It was suggested by the majority of respondents that the problems with food insecurity and 
poverty are beyond the capabilities of the public and private sectors acting alone; therefore, P3s 
are the only viable means of creating sustainable technological solutions using agriculture to 
eliminate poverty. P3s are a growing phenomenon and represent a new organizational model of 
collaboration built upon personal relationships. P3s depend on commitment and leadership from 
their partners. Many respondents indicated that, where feasible, P3s are most efficiently 
constructed by people with experience in developing P3s; these people understand local 
conditions, the methods of acquiring funding, and how to effectively engage the private sector. It 
was noted by more than one interviewee that successful P3s are driven by commercially viable 
goals. Under optimal conditions, P3s create value chains that connect developing world farmers 
or farmer cooperatives with global agricultural markets.  
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5.5 Analysis 
 
This section summarizes the specific evidence and impressions drawn from the interviews with 
P3 actors.  
 
The first lesson is that P3s result from building relationships and networks between individuals 
and organizations. As noted in the theory section, P3s depend on people and personal 
relationships. Trust, communication, and face-to-face relationships have been identified as the 
key drivers of P3 creation. All of the P3s analyzed for this paper were formed based upon the 
zeal and initiative of specific individuals, not as a result of policy or institutional parameters. 
Relationships that form the bonds of a P3 also permit the P3 to develop the capability to become 
the nuclei or node that constitutes the center or origins, depending on type of P3—R&D or 
value-chain—of heterogeneously configured networks.  
 
All the P3s studied are, in one form or another, the glue that holds together networks of 
dissimilar organizations. This suggests P3s engender the development of horizontally configured 
networks of organizations with shared interests in delivering technological solutions to small-
scale farmers. The technological solutions are a result of the exchange of ideas and creation of 
new knowledge through the networks of individuals and organizations linked together by the P3. 
To deliver the innovative technological solutions to developing world farmers, both R&D and 
value-chain P3s must develop the capacity to effect change. This includes developing the 
physical, scientific, and governance capacity to permit small-scale farmers to absorb the 
technology and link to global networks, but it also refers to developing the internal capacity to 
perform these quite varied and complex tasks.  
 
The second lesson relates to complexity. As P3s are an evolving phenomenon, there are no hard 
and fast rules governing their development, and there is a discernible dearth of models to 
emulate. The P3s discussed by the respondents interviewed for this paper were created to address 
serious global problems of hunger and poverty in the developing world that, to date, are beyond 
the ability of either the public or private sectors’ ability to solve. Complex problems require 
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complex responses. As P3s are new structures that are not modelled on either public or private 
organizations, they present unique challenges.  
 
It is difficult to overstate the complexities associated with the dynamics of building relationships 
with multiple dissimilar partners. One informant stated P3s are like being in a marriage involving 
at least three unique partners; put another way, this is uncharted territory. The informant noted 
that the key to a successful marriage is a long courtship. This means that building P3s is 
expensive and time-consuming, yet holds great promise. Borrowing a phrase from Donald 
Rumsfeld, P3 developers should beware of the “unknown unknowns,” which are plentiful within 
P3s. Despite the best efforts of planners and forecasters, respondents noted the difficulty in 
determining with any accuracy the hidden variables that will add to the complexity of 
establishing and maintaining a successful P3. These hidden variables include, costs, reporting 
issues, how the structure and process of the P3 may evolve with additional partners and new 
missions, and the trial and error process of developing new technologies, including the expenses 
of managing issues surrounding IPRs. 
 
Despite the above-described challenges, practical solutions to developing and implementing 
successful P3s have been developed. First, there are experts embedded in a multitude of national, 
donor, and international organizations and agencies that are familiar with the vagaries of P3s. 
Organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, GIZ, USAID, to name a few, 
possess a vast amount of knowledge and experience with creating and managing P3s. As 
discussed, many P3s would not exist if not for the activities of P3 experts who bridge the 
differences between the public and private sectors, and understand the dynamics of acquiring 
funding from the multitude of funding agencies. Secondly, a clear understanding of the 
incentives may also present a clear picture of potential constraints to successful operations. 
Understanding the motivations of all parties that seek involvement with P3 is critical: what does 
the P3 offer that is unobtainable in the absence of collaboration? Third, structure matters. 
Developing a plan with clear timelines and specific responsibilities, all directed to targeted 
outcomes, is highly encouraged. Those working on plans and timelines must do so with the 
understanding that achieving sustainable operations will take years of effort and funding and will 
require the support of P3 experts and organizational commitment. 
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The analysis relates to the current literature in four ways. First, the emphasis by the interviewees 
on the hidden costs associated with implementing P3s warrants deeper analysis. The literature 
generally refers to hidden costs as a constraint preventing the formation of P3s. However, most 
respondents referred to hidden costs from an operational perspective, after the P3 has been 
formed. The overriding theme from the interviews is that hidden costs are a difficulty that can be 
managed. However, hidden costs add to both the expense and complexity associated with 
developing world R&D and value-chain P3s.  
 
As noted, none of the P3s from which the respondents were drawn have achieved successful 
operations, according to the opinions of those interviewed. This raises the question: are hidden 
costs of P3s a factor in the slow fruition of achieving positive results? Based on the discussions 
for this paper, the answer is yes—the hidden costs identified here are a factor in the longer-than-
anticipated gestation periods. This is a subject that merits further research and discussion, as 
there is little mention of this issue in the literature. It bears repeating that agricultural P3s are a 
new and growing phenomenon in the developing world, which also contributes to the paucity of 
working models or successful examples. 
 
The second item that warrants further analysis is the role of enablers in creating P3s. 
Specifically, an analysis of the critical role of individuals with the formation of R&D P3s and the 
role of specialists in creating value-chain P3s is not found in the literature. As this current paper 
demonstrates, people matter; without the initiative and insight of key individuals, the P3s that are 
part of this analysis would not exist. The ramifications of this are profound, as this suggests that 
policies and institutions are secondary to the role of individuals in identifying innovative, 
organizational and technological solutions to poverty and hunger. The literature does 
acknowledge a role for social entrepreneurs in driving organizations in new directions, as earlier 
discussed. However, this requires more attention; it may also confirm that the public and private 
sectors, for various reasons, are not capable of developing and implementing solutions to hunger 
and poverty. 
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The third item of interest is the role of technology and knowledge in value-chain P3s. Value 
chain partnerships are dependent on process technologies and non-codified forms of knowledge 
that influence the ability to generate profits in low-margin commodity exports. Based on the 
observations brought up in the interviews, value-chain P3s may face limitations in both scale and 
scope due to the inability of competitors to work together as a number of respondents noted the 
difficulty in preventing the transfer of proprietary process and product knowledge to competitors. 
Value-chain P3s may be more complex than the literature suggests, and possibly more difficult 
to start up than R&D P3s; they require a different non-scientific knowledge to achieve 
operations. In place of scientific knowledge, value-chain P3s require a technically oriented 
facilitator who understands local conditions, the operating characteristics of large food 
distributors, processes of acquiring start-up funding, and global trading patterns. The facilitator 
requires the requisite ability to identify export opportunities in multiple countries.  
 
Last, while both R&D and value-chain P3s anchor heterogeneous networks critical to delivering 
technology and capacity to poor farmers, each P3 may need a different style of functioning 
network at opposite stages of their development. Based upon the responses for this paper, the 
R&D P3 begins operations on a linear basis by forming relationships depending on its 
technology needs, generally starting with one partner, and then expanding operations as the 
process matures and the technology is ready for field trials and distribution to farmers. 
Conversely, the value-chain P3, by design, immediately begins by developing heterogeneous 
networks to develop the capacity to educate farmers and to provide farmers and farmer 
cooperatives with the ability to link to distant and technically sophisticated developed world 
marketplaces. This suggests that the start-up costs of a value-chain P3 will greatly exceed those 
of an R&D P3. 
 
Additionally, this paper amplifies previous research on the incentives and constraints influencing 
the formation of both types of P3s. Most of the issues brought up in the interviews are consistent 
at some level with existing literature. This suggests that the existing body of research on P3s has 
identified many of the issues that practitioners of P3s specified as critical to the understanding of 
P3s. There are a number of factors limiting this paper that provide future research trajectories. 
First, this is a qualitative analysis conducted with a “silo” perspective, limiting the ability to 
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draw explicit inferences; thus the contextualized lessons cannot be extrapolated. Second, as 
discussed, there are a number of biases, including geography, sample size, and the absence of 
successful and operational P3s, that may influence the interpretations of this study. These 
limitations provide opportunities for new research methods. This paper, and the study of P3s, can 
be greatly extended by the use of social network analysis to statistically and graphically 
illuminate the relationships between the different institutions as well as the different processes 
that govern and shape the relations between organizations. P3s are part of a large, complex 
global system of institutions, actors, and relationships that have emergent properties based on 
feedback loops. This means it is not possible to sub-divide the system into its component parts 
for analysis without eliminating critical elements that are necessary to the understanding of how 
the system functions; as such, alternative research methods are required. In the absence of new 
methods such as social network analysis, it will be extremely difficult address the strengths and 
limitations of R&D and value-chain P3s in alleviating poverty and enhancing food security in the 
developing world.  
5.6 Strategic Implications  
 
The interview results for this paper lend credence to the descriptions of the multiple functions of 
an agricultural P3. There can be no doubt that P3s perform the role of an intermediary by linking 
heterogeneously configured organizations into functioning R&D innovation systems. This 
conforms closely to the Mode II form of knowledge development, where networks have replaced 
the vertically organized public and private sector R&D structures as the primary developers of 
new knowledge. The partnerships in this analysis are also the innovation brokers described 
earlier, as they provide a structure for the development and implementation of technologically 
driven innovative responses to poverty and hunger that appear to be beyond the ability of either 
the public or private sectors to address. In this approach and based on the interviews, the P3 is 
the structure that connects special people with special processes in special places. This suggests 
that innovation depends on collaboration, something the P3 is suited for. It further suggests that 
innovation is dependent upon social entrepreneurs and creative institutions that permit 
organizational boundaries to be challenged. Therefore, this analysis indicates that P3s are good 
strategic choices because they provide a structure that mobilizes ideas, individuals, and 
institutions for the development and implementation of agriculturally oriented and 
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technologically driven solutions to poverty and hunger at the farm level in the developing world. 
P3s connect farmers to global markets and global technologies in a manner that public- and 
private-sector organizations appear to be incapable of accomplishing in the absence of 
collaboration; this pattern acknowledges limitations to these individual sectors in combating 
global hunger. 
 
This paper adds to the knowledge of agricultural P3s in six ways. First, this research illuminates 
how time, complexity, financial reporting, and acquiring financial support are hidden costs of 
implementing and sustaining P3s. Second, this paper expands the knowledge of the relationships 
between both R&D and value-chain P3s and network configuration. Third, the requirement for 
different types of networks at different stages of the development of the P3s suggests that the 
value-chain P3 requires higher start-up costs. Fourth, we now know more about the critical role 
individuals occupy in creating R&D P3s and the role of P3 specialists in the formation of value-
chain P3s. Fifth, value-chain P3s face unique challenges managing non-codified knowledge and 
trade secrets, limiting the number of private sector partners per partnership. Sixth, based upon 
interview data, there appears to be a short-term capacity shortage of scientists, researchers, and 
P3 specialists involved with developing world agricultural P3s that may inhibit the growth of 
new partnerships. 
 
There is no off-the-shelf approach or process for developing and implementing P3s. There is a 
lack of standard practices and an absence of a global institutional method of absorbing and 
transferring lessons from previous P3 experiences. Without this type of institutionalized support, 
P3s remain a boot-strap process operating in an institutional vacuum. In the continued absence of 
institutionalized global learning networks, each P3 will be a standalone process, meaning it will 
be difficult to develop economies of scale on a global level with agricultural P3s; this 
significantly limits their potential for alleviating poverty. Developing and implementing P3s, 
based on this analysis, constitute more of a dark art rather than a science. However, it is clear 
that both public and private sectors see huge potential in improving incomes and livelihoods, for 
smallholder producers while simultaneously improving food and nutrition security for the 
world’s poor as the number and variety of partnerships continues to grow. Creating the 
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institutional capacity to achieve the development objectives of P3s in agriculture remains a 
global challenge.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE-PRODUCER PARTNERSHIPS (P4S) IN CANADA 
 
 6.1 Introduction  
 
The concept of public–private–producer partnership (P4) is relatively new in the agricultural 
sector. Some use the commonly applied P3 (public–private partnership) terminology, which is 
used widely in governments around the world, while others propose it be modified to P4, to more 
fully incorporate the role of agricultural producers and producer organizations in the partnership.  
This chapter performs a case-study analysis on four P4s currently in operation in Canada that are 
representative of this rapidly evolving subset of agricultural P3s that are characterized by the 
critical role of producer organizations in the structure of the partnership. 
 
P3s are generally defined in the literature and in practice as institutions that involve cooperation 
between public, private and collective organizations and people (which in other sectors 
frequently, but not always include primary producers). These collaborative organizations involve 
sharing risks, cost and resources as well as long-term commitment (e.g., 10 to 30 years). Such 
partnerships are initiated to pursue shared objectives, and depend on complementarities between 
partners. The term public-private-producer partnership covers a wide variety of interactions 
including university-industry-producer association research projects, multi-party and multi-
sectoral research consortia and local development programs between small businesses, producers 
and government. Producer organizations refer to any agricultural-based, product-specific 
organization that is formed by independent farmers and producers to collectively manage any 
part of their industry. Typically, producer organizations develop to collect production levies to 
support R&D and market development activities. P4s spur innovation and may, in general, have 
advantages over other institutional arrangements at fostering R&D and new product and market 
development as they link the R&D requirements of producers and their financial resources to 
market outcomes by involving producers in each stage of the innovation process.  
 
The first case study is the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers, which expands the analysis of this 
organization as it is discussed in Chapter 3. The second case study is the Centre de 
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développement du porc du Québec (CDPQ), swine-producer partnership located in Quebec. The 
third case study is the Okanagan Plant Improvement Corporation (PICO), a specialty fruits 
partnership located in the Okanagan Valley in British Columbia. The final case study is the 
Vineland Research and Innovation Centre (VRIC), a recently developed P4 located in Ontario. 
6.2 Methodology 
 
Two distinct methodologies were utilized to conduct the case studies. The first was confidential 
interviews with key personnel in the selected P4s, and the second was a record analysis of all 
publically available information on each P4. As P4s are dependent on the activities of key 
people, the interviews were designed to illuminate the constraints and opportunities associated 
with these partnerships. The interview questionnaire was developed from a detailed literature 
analysis on previous research on agricultural P3s. Please see Annex C for the questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire was designed to examine three facets of P4s: (1) inputs (background, structures, 
relationships, resources); (2) processes (business models, funding sources, function and 
sustainability); and (3) outputs (measures of success, reporting structures, information exchange, 
dissemination and changes in business practices). These questions provide insights into the 
challenges and opportunities associated with P4s and link the current research with previous case 
studies. The objective of conducting one-on-one confidential interviews was to develop a deeper 
understanding of the challenges and opportunities associated with forming and managing P4s in 
Canada that could not be derived from other methods. Confidentiality was offered as a number of 
interviewees indicated they could not permit their statements to be public as the P4s analyzed 
depend on multiple sources of revenue and on relationships with a wide variety of partners that 
could be compromised if statements contained in the case studies were directly attributable to the 
interviewees as current members of the P4s. A total of 17 individuals were interviewed for the 
four case studies. The record analysis was designed to provide factual information to support and 
expand upon the findings of the interviews. The organization of the case studies follows the 
structure of the questionnaire as explained above. 
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6.3 Case Study 1: Saskatchewan Pulse Growers 
6.3.1 P4 Inputs 
 
The Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (SPG) is a pulse-crop producer association consisting of over 
18,000 members who pay a non-refundable production levy to support R&D. A number of 
factors facilitated the creation of the SPG. The first was the hiring of a pulse breeder from 
Washington State in the 1960s. The second was the desires by a small number of producers to 
begin to grow pulse crops in Saskatchewan. In the 1970s, due to rotation schedules surrounding 
wheat and barley, there was a large amount of acreage devoted to summer fallow; pulse crops, 
due to their ability to increase soil nitrogen levels, could turn fallow land into productive land. 
Saskatchewan’s soil composition, cool summers and cold winters are conducive to the 
production of pulse crops. The third was the creation of the Crop Development Centre (CDC) at 
the University of Saskatchewan in 1971 with a mandate to develop new crops for producers as 
price pressures on traditional crops such as wheat and barley created an opportunity for 
Saskatchewan producers to diversify. In 1976 a small group of producers formed the SPG to 
educate Saskatchewan producers on the benefits of growing pulse crops (SPG, 2012). In 1983 
the growing SPG, again led by a small cadre of producers, partially in response to the success of 
the Washington and Idaho pea and lentil check-off program, worked with the Provincial 
Government to implement legislation to support the creation of a popular-vote-dependent, non-
refundable production levy to support R&D at the CDC (Government of Saskatchewan, 1984). 
The levy was approved by a vote from the producers and put into effect through provincial 
regulation (Government of Saskatchewan, 1984).
 
 From 1983 until 1997 the levy supported SPG 
R&D on a contract basis with the CDC.  
 
Government fiscal austerity programs in the 1990s left the CDC without secure funding for its 
breeding programs. Concurrent to this development was strong growth in Saskatchewan’s pulse 
sector, leading to enlarged check-off funds. The growth in revenues permitted the SPG to enter 
into negotiations with the CDC for a long-term and exclusive variety development program. 
From 1984-89, levy revenues averaged $230,000 per year; from 1990-94, $435,000 annually; 
and from 1995-99, $1.3 million yearly (Gray and Scott, 2003: 9). The producer-run SPG sought 
access to new varieties without paying royalties or technology user fees (Gray and Scott, 2003: 
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10). The result of these developments was the Variety Release Agreement (VRA) between the 
SPG and the CDC in 1997, which formalized the P4 between the SPG and the CDC. The SPG, 
under the VRA, would receive, in a timely manner and on a cost-effective basis, new and 
improved pulse varieties without royalty payments. Conversely, the CDC received from the SPG 
a long-term agreement to support pulse breeding and 320 acres of land to support its breeding 
program. The VRA, currently in effect, was renewed in 2000 and again in 2005, with the 
program being extended for fifteen years with $21,000,000 to be supplied by the SPG to support 
the CDC program (SPG, 2012). The SPG, through the VRA with the CDC, collaborates with the 
provincial government, the federal government, other provincial producer associations and 
international breeders and consumers of pulse crops to provide Saskatchewan producers timely 
technologies and strategies needed to underpin growth and profitability. 
6.3.2 P4 Processes 
 
The SPG is governed by a seven-member board of directors and managed by a staff of 14 
specialists. Directors are elected to serve a three-year term with a limit of serving two 
consecutive terms. Board members must be registered growers of pulses, by having paid a levy 
in the past two years before seeking election. Companies and organizations that pay levies are 
permitted to designate a representative for nomination. The board is responsible for policy and 
strategic direction. It has an advisory group consisting of key members from industry, the 
provincial government, CDC breeders, Pulse Canada and a number of technology and market 
specialists to provide research-driven advice. The SPG advisory group creates a two-level 
partnership with the Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, one at the policy level, the other at 
the operations level. The board sets the long-term R&D trajectory of the SPG by the allocation of 
funds between breeding/genetic, agronomy and process and utilization programs. The board of 
directors is also advised by an R&D committee that reviews all research proposals put forward 
for board’s approval. The SPG receives feedback from producers, brokers, processors and 
consumers through a number of venues including the Annual General Meeting, the annual Pulse 
Days—an industry convention—and through its multitude of media outlets. 
 
Through joint committees with the provincial government and the CDC the SPG aligns 
provincial policy and funding and CDC R&D capabilities with producer levies by anchoring an 
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innovation system that encompasses the entire value chain from producers to processors and 
international export markets. Over 90% of Saskatchewan pulses are exported. There are three 
key organizations: the SPG, the provincial government and the CDC. The provincial government 
is a key supporter of the CDC by funding a large number of positions and supporting 
infrastructure. Furthermore, through various programs such as the Agricultural Development 
Fund (ADF) and grants, the government supports R&D by providing additional and leveraged 
funding. In 2010-11, the ADF provided $1.5 million for pulse R&D and $675,000 for operations 
at the CDC (SPG, 2012: 11). 
 
In 2010–11 the SPG received $11 million from the producer levy (SPG, 2012: 21). The SPG 
spent $8.6 million on R&D and varietal development, and $3.5 million on market development 
and communications (SPG, 2012: 21). In 2010–11, the SPG funded $17.5 million in 68 new 
projects. They also committed to providing $9.1 million to the CDC under the VRA over the 
next five years (SPG, 2012: 4). The SPG provides about $900,000 yearly to Pulse Canada for 
national and international market development and regulatory management. Over the previous 
five years, the SPG has leveraged its $32.9 million in R&D spending to acquire an additional 
$34.3 million in cash and in-kind contributions to support pulse crop research. In 2010–11, the 
SPG supported 43 programs and projects related to genetics, 27 in agronomy and 19 in 
processing and utilizations. The SPG funds R&D at six other Canadian institutions, including the 
NRC-PBI and is supporting an international genomics sequencing consortium. 
 
The VRA, as noted, was originally signed in 1997 to provide royalty-free access to new varieties. 
It has been renewed multiple occasions and is now in effect until 2021. Under the VRA, the SPG 
has become the largest funder of pulse R&D in Canada supplanting the provincial and federal 
governments as the dominant source of funds (Gray et al., 2008: 11). Since 1997, 95 varieties 
have been released under the VRA. These varieties included 38 types of lentils, 29 types of pea, 
20 types of chickpea, 7 types of bean, and 1 type of faba bean. Two studies on returns to 
producer R&D, conducted in 2003 and 2008, demonstrated that producers were creating 
increasing economies of scale from R&D, particularly in genetics, suggesting a need for greater 
increases in R&D spending to maximize these benefits (Gray et al., 2008: 18). It was suggested 
that the absence of an IPR regime, in conjunction with the trust generated by the lack of IPRs, 
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increased the speed and rate of adoption of new varieties by SPG producers, which creates a 
more efficient and timely process of responding to consumer changes (Gray et al., 2008: 18, 31). 
Put simply, the SPG/CDC partnership increases the speed of technology transfer by eliminating 
transactions costs related to IPRs and royalty payments, creating a competitive advantage for 
SPG producers. This process eliminates the incentive for producers to “brown-bag” seeds, by 
providing access to certified seeds without royalties or paperwork, which increases the rate of 
adoption of new varieties and technologies, engendering a more efficient innovation system. 
6.3.3 P4 Outputs 
 
There are a number of methods of measuring the output, and success of the SPG. The first are the 
two studies on producer returns to levy supported R&D. A 2003 analysis demonstrated the SPG 
received a 13.5-1 (Gray and Scott, 2003: iii) return on levy supported R&D. A 2008 follow-on 
analysis demonstrated a 15.8-1 (Gray, et al., 2008: 3) return to R&D investments including a 
27.2-1 return on genetics R&D. A second measure is the amount of acreage devoted to pulse 
crops in Saskatchewan. Land seeded in pulse crops grew from less than 200,000 acres in 1984 to 
4.73 million acres in 2013. A third measure is the dominance of the SPG in global export 
markets. In 2011, Canada was responsible for 56% of global lentil exports and 54% of pea 
exports (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2013). In 2010, Saskatchewan produced 97% of 
Canada’s lentils and 72% of its peas (SPG, 2012). In 2010, Canada exported $2.1 billion in 
pulses, with $1.8 billion coming from Saskatchewan (SPG, 2010: 7). A final measure of the 
efficacy of the P4 is the endurance of the non-refundable levy. It has been the subject of a 
number of votes via plebiscite since its inception in 1983 and has always been sustained. This 
stands as a long-term measure of producer satisfaction with the levy. Additionally, Alliance 
Grain Traders, the world’s largest pulse trader has established pulse processing facilities in 
Saskatchewan and is in the process of establishing an R&D facility in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. 
This suggests that the investments in R&D by producers through the SPG have created a 
feedback loop resulting in downstream investments in processing and R&D facilities. 
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6.4 Case Study 2: Centre de Développement du Porc du Québec 
 
6.4.1 P4 Inputs 
 
A number of inter-related factors led to the formation of Centre de développement du porc du 
Québec (CDPQ). The first was related to long-term reduction in public sector resources allocated 
to pork R&D that began in the 1970s, and continued until the early 1990s and the creation of 
CDPQ. One result of the austerity measures was a growing shortage of industry specialists as the 
provincial government was replacing only one position for every two lost to retirements or 
departures. The second was a growing demand from provincial producers for R&D leadership 
due to growing foreign competition. The third was a desire by the Ministère de l’Agriculture, des 
Pêcheries et de l’Alimentation du Québec (MAPAQ) to both centralize all aspects of pork R&D 
and to transfer the responsibility of managing this to the private sector. The fourth was a need to 
incorporate the growing field of genetics into R&D for the benefit of Quebec producers. At the 
time of the formation of CDPQ, the austerity measures had led to a real risk that the swine 
expertise that had been developed over a period of decades might be lost. This risk was 
magnified by the potential of missing the benefits of the growing genetics revolution. An 
industry survey conducted among producers, processors and public servants led to the idea of 
CDPQ—a non-profit focused on supplying needed R&D expertise to the Quebec swine industry. 
 
In 1992, the CDPQ began operations as MAPAQ transferred responsibility for managing the 
genetic, health, herd analysis and evaluation tests programs to CDPQ. To help operationalize 
CDPQ, MAPAQ provided five years of funding at $1.6 million per year (CDPQ, 2012a). 
MAPAQ also provided facilities and the general manager to CDPQ. After the first year of 
operation, based upon negotiations with industry and CDPQ, the MAPAQ began transferring 
civil servants and public assets related to swine R&D and program management to the CDPQ. 
The CDPQ was tasked with filling the R&D void; ultimately, the goal was to produce and to 
develop technological and process innovations for the Quebec swine industry to lower input 
costs and increase yields for producers.  
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6.4.2 P4 Processes 
 
Currently, CDPQ employs over 50 people with an annual budget of nearly $5 million (CDPQ, 
2012a: 7). The MAPAQ has supplied funding ranging from $1.175 to $1.6 million yearly, from 
1992 to the present (CDPQ, 2012a). The Fédération des producteurs de porcs du Québec (FPPQ) 
provides an average $1.3 million in funding based upon a $0.10 per head levy on slaughtered 
hogs. The FPPQ implemented this levy in 2001 as a means of supporting swine R&D (CDPQ, 
2012a). CDPQ also receive $1.12 million per year from selling R&D and technical services to 
the private sector. This has increased from $50,000 in the last five years alone. Lastly, the CDPQ 
manages $1.0 million in public projects. The CDPQ’s funding has evolved considerably in its 
lifetime, moving from being dependent entirely on public funding, to becoming a value-added 
swine R&D specialist with multiple sources of funding. There are three primary sources of 
funds: the MAPAQ, the FPPQ, and from contract research projects for industry and government. 
It took 15 years to develop the technical and scientific staff and expertise necessary to facilitate 
this transformation. Last year, CDPQ received funds from 41 different organizations. Out of 
these 41 organizations, 22 are private, three are academic, 10 are industry or producer 
associations, and six are public agencies or publicly funded research centres. 
 
Research projects conducted by the CDPQ cover a broad range of areas using a mix of expertise. 
The search engine that has been developed for the organization’s website identifies 11 areas: 
buildings and equipment; animal welfare and behaviour; economics; use of data; genetics; 
nutrition, diet and breeding governance; animal health; public health; live animal measuring 
technologies; meat products and governance of agrifood organizations.
 
 In 2011–2012, the board 
of directors authorized the CDPQ to participate in 12 new R&D projects valued at $4.6 million 
(CDPQ, 2012b: 6).
  
From 2007–08 to 2010–11, the board authorized over $23.5 million in new 
R&D projects, while the total value of the new and pending projects is $5.9 million. Besides 
R&D, the CDPQ produces decision-making tools that aim to help producers and other actors 
from the swine industry (CDPQ, 2012b: 15–21). For example, the CDPQ offers information 
related to production costs, price projections and market value. Additionally, competitiveness 
indicators are developed in order to facilitate benchmarking and comparative studies (CDPQ, 
2012b: 20–22). Every year, the CDPQ participates in a study about production costs that is 
conducted by the FPPQ. Moreover, results from tests in station and herd analyses are used to 
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develop the indicators. The results allow actors from the swine industry to gain knowledge 
related to their own performance. The CDPQ works closely with the Canadian Center for Swine 
Improvement, Ontario Swine Improvement, the Western Swine Testing Association, and the 
Atlantic Swine Center. The CDPQ is using its expertise in swine genetics to become useful to the 
beef and sheep industries as the technologies are transferable between the sectors with minimal 
revision. 
 
For the 2011–2012 year, the active voting members of the CDPQ’s board of directors are drawn 
from various producer associations and other organizations. The president, Normand Martineau, 
is from the FPPQ. The vice-president is from the Canadian Meat Council. Other board members 
are drawn from the Quebec Association of Animal Industry and Cereal Producers (Association 
Québécoise des Industries Animales et Céréalières), the Society of Quebec Hog Producers 
(Société des Eleveurs de Porcs du Québec) (2 members), the Coop (La Coop Fédérée), The 
MAPAQ, and the FPPQ (2 members) (CDPQ, 2012b: 4). In addition, the board of directors 
includes four active non-voting members, one each from Laval University, McGill University, 
the University of Montreal and AAFC. There six advisors, one each from the Quebec 
Association of Animal Industry and Cereal Producers, the Society of Quebec Hog Producers, the 
Coop, the Canadian Meat Council and the FPPQ. There are two permanent board members, both 
key employees of the CDPQ. 
 
At its core, the CDPQ is a partnership between the MAPAQ and the FPPQ, as together they 
provide approximately 50% of its budget. From there the CDPQ collaborative model is contract-
based determined by the needs of producers, both levels of government and industry. CDPQ uses 
its expertise to link its various stakeholders into an evolving and iterative innovation value-chain 
designed to lower input costs and increase yields for its partner organizations. Although 
primarily focused on the needs of Quebec producers, the CDPQ serves the national swine 
industry as evident by the wide and national array of partner organizations and funders. The key 
to the evolution of the CDPQ was the need to develop independent streams of revenue to lessen 
its dependence on public funding. Interviews indicated that the CDPQ early on experienced 
difficulties between the short-term focus of public funds versus the longer timeframes associated 
with developing technologies with market applications. This, along with the introduction of 
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genetics and structural changes to the swine industry from global competition, provided the 
impetus for the CDPQ to develop new sources of funding based upon its swine R&D 
specialization. The CDPQ has developed its own genetics program and its own pure breed herd. 
As noted above, it took 15 years to developed the internal capacity to create independent R&D 
and royalty revenues that have only in the past five years become substantial cash flows, 
increasing from $50,000 five years ago to the current $1.12 million, which is about 22% of 
current 2011-12 revenues (CDPQ, 2012b: 6). 
 
From a financial perspective, the CDPQ remains challenged. The MAPAQ, due to austerity 
concerns, is generally expected to reduce its level of funding in the near future. Furthermore, the 
swine industry, in Quebec and nationally, faces pressures from the rising costs of animal feed, 
namely corn, due to demands from ethanol production, and from the high value of the Canadian 
dollar, which inhibits exports. Therefore, it is anticipated that both MAPAQ and the FPPQ will 
both lower their levels of funding. The interviewees acknowledged that in the short-term, year-
to-year, this may impact the operations of CDPQ, but noted that the evolution of the CDPQ has 
always been driven by changes to the structure and process of its funding sources. Therefore, the 
CDPQ will continue to evolve and develop additional sources of funding related to the needs of 
its stakeholders. It was suggested the CDPQ will adapt by becoming more efficient from an 
operations perspective and by becoming more relevant to the needs of industry.  
6.4.3 P4 Outputs 
 
The CDPQ has become the center of Quebec’s swine industry, replacing a moribund public 
agency with an industry-centric collaborative business model that through the infusion of 
producer money and private technologies has created new operating standards for industry by 
making all aspects of R&D more accountable to stakeholders. The CDPQ connects Quebec 
producers to the rest of the world in a manner that was unimaginable at its inception 20 years 
ago. It coordinates the R&D activities for the swine at the direction of producers, consumers and 
processors while managing and conducting R&D with universities, public laboratories and 
industry associations. There are a number of measures of success including the continued 
development of non-public sources of funding, all at some-level dependent upon producing 
tangible results for stakeholders. The growth in the scale of operations, including the 
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development of a genetics program and a pure breed herd and the expansion of services offered 
ranging from public program management to providing scientific, technical and economic 
services to the swine industry, illustrate how the CDPQ adds value for its stakeholders. The 
CDPQ turned its challenges (industry recognition and overreliance on public funding) into 
assets.  The key legacy of the CDPQ is its brand name for excellence in swine R&D. The CDPQ 
must add value through its R&D to remain in operations; in the absence of relevant outputs, its 
stakeholders would cease funding the CDPQ. As the majority of R&D is conducted on a contract 
basis, the CDPQ must continually respond to changing market and industry conditions to remain 
both relevant and solvent.  
6.5 Case Study 3: Okanagan Plant Improvement Corporation 
 
6.5.1 P4 Inputs 
 
The introduction of plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) in Canada in the early 1990s provided the 
impetus to create the Okanagan Plant Improvement Corporation (PICO). PICO was created as a 
partnership between the British Columbia Fruit Growers’ Association (BCFGA) and the Pacific 
Agri-Food Research Centre (PARC) at Summerland and Agassiz, B.C. AAFC provided start-up 
capital and provided PICO with office space at PARC. Further funding came from Western 
Economic Diversification Canada programs and the BCFGA. The original board of directors 
included AAFC officials and members of the BCFGA. PARC also provided land for PICO to 
develop and operate a rosebud orchard at Summerland, presently the only virus-free rosebud 
orchard in Canada (PICO, n.d.). The introduction of PBRs led the century-old relationship 
between the B.C. producers and PARC to become formalized and more financial in nature. 
 
PICO’s original mandate was to be the exclusive marketing agent for PARC by licensing new 
apple, cherry, berry, and soft fruit varieties domestically and internationally. Prior to PICO, 
PARC supplied varieties primarily for the B.C. soft fruit sector without licensing or PBR 
protection. The B.C. soft fruit sector lacked the economies of scale to support a domestically 
funded and managed breeding program. To help offset R&D costs, PICO was tasked with 
creating an international demand for PARC varieties (Warner, 2012). The B.C. soft fruit sector 
also faced competitive pressures from Washington State, Minnesota, and upstate New York, all 
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substantially larger and capable of challenging the market position of B.C. fruit growers, 
domestically and internationally. B.C. producers found them competing against the lower-priced 
fruits of Washington State producers, who benefitted not only from economies of scale in R&D 
and production, but also from direct and indirect subsidies (Sardinha and Steele, 2011: 12). To 
help protect domestic producers while establishing an international footprint with PBR protected 
varieties, Canadian producers, under a “Canada First” process, receive varieties for a period of 
around five to six years before international competitors do; they also pay lower royalties and are 
not under acreage restrictions as is the case with non-Canadian licensees. Furthermore, if the 
customers are in the Northern Hemisphere, they may face restrictions on their ability to compete 
in markets where Canadian producers have an established presence, including but not limited to 
Canada. Ownership of PARC varieties remain with the Crown and the public share of the 
royalties are transferred to the treasury by PICO. 
6.5.2 P4 Processes 
 
The original business model and funding structure of PICO changed after five years of operation. 
Financial problems with the B.C. soft fruit industry forced the BCFGA to withdraw its yearly 
operational funding. PICO was re-structured to become a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
BCFGA, operating independently of both the BCFGA and PARC. PICO began applying for and 
receiving funding from AAFC under the Matching Investment Initiative (MII) program to 
replace the lost producer funding. As a result, PICO was forced to move it operations away from 
PARC, as it could not receive federal funding while sharing public facilities. Additionally, the 
board was re-structured, leaving AAFC without direct input over PICO. The royalty agreement 
with the Crown was revised to provide PICO with a larger share of the revenues; this allowed 
PICO to compensate for lost funding, and to support the transition from a marketing agent 
towards a market-based and consumer-oriented developer of new knowledge and technology. 
PICO changed its operating mandate to become the exclusive commercialization agent for PARC 
in Western Canada for tree and soft fruits, and to be an authorized international licensee and 
distributor of the same products. Additionally, PICO has become the conduit for translating 
R&D for the benefit of the B.C. soft fruit industry. This transformation occurred because the 
process of establishing technical proof of new varieties became complex and highly specialized, 
forcing PICO to adapt by developing and leveraging expertise in PBR management to add value 
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to the B.C. soft fruit sector. PICO is now a highly specialized R&D and commercialization 
organization employing seven people; it focuses on the identification, evaluation, propagation, 
and commercialization activities for both PARC and the BCFGA. Through relations built with 
other breeding programs and nurseries, PICO is, on a global scale, positioned to identify varieties 
and technologies that may be beneficial to the BCFGA. PICO has identified and commercialized 
a number of high-value and differentiated products developed outside of PARC, such as the 
Ambrosia apple. PICO has also commercialized products from New Zealand, Japan, and the 
United States that have market value for Canadian producers (Ambrosia Growers, 2001: 7). 
Research has demonstrated consistently that the new varieties bring higher returns to B.C. soft 
fruit producers (ON Strategy Case Studies, n.d.). 
 
PICO has developed its own R&D program. Presently, PICO receives funding from royalties and 
from the Growing Forward Program under the Developing Innovative Agricultural Products 
(DIAP). It is estimated that PICO receives around $1 million per year from royalties to help fund 
R&D (Authors estimate from online data and interviews). To manage DIAP and to work with 
producers and the BCFGA, PICO has hired a product development specialist who prioritizes the 
R&D needs of the BCFGA and links PICO and PARC with other growers associations in Canada 
to develop economies of scale and create a national growers testing program. PICO also 
conducts market research, develops marketing strategies, and operates sensory panels to gauge 
consumer preferences and create products that will meet marketplace acceptance (AAFC, 2012). 
PICO has been instrumental in working with producers and multiple levels of government in a 
long-running program designed to replace older trees with higher density trees that produce new 
varieties with higher margins for producers (Farmwest, 2007: 5–6). In some cases, apple orchard 
densities have increased by more than 1000% (Farmwest, 2007: 5–6). 
 
Despite the long running relationship among PICO, the BCFGA, and PARC, there are a number 
of ongoing concerns about the long-term sustainability of the partnership. First, a number of 
interviewees expressed concern about the long-term reduction in the number of scientists 
employed at PARC. It was noted that a recently retired cherry breeder has not been replaced. 
Cherries are the primary source of royalty income for both PARC and PICO (PICO, 2009). It is 
estimated that 80% of the cherries grown worldwide come from PARC-developed varieties 
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(Boparai et al., 2012: 2). This has created producer insecurity—AAFC/PARC have developed a 
global brand for world-class cherries and some producers are concerned that this could be 
jeopardized by a lack of public research. Furthermore, it was noted that there are a number of 
other vacancies at PARC that negatively impact the BCFGA and PICO. The B.C. industry is 
entirely dependent upon PARC for new varieties and technologies. The industry asserts that it 
cannot afford to support its own breeder, and non-Canadian public breeders are unable or 
unlikely to breed varieties appropriate to the unique Canadian environment.  
 
 A second area that feeds insecurity is the mixed and muddled messages AAFC sends to the B.C. 
soft fruits sector. In a recent Parliamentary Committee meeting on the Agriculture for the 
Growing Forward 2 program, the past president of the BCFGA noted that producer associations 
were concerned by the lack of transparency on the part of AAFC, as a number of time-intensive 
research proposals were recently rejected based upon unclear ‘11th-hour’ criteria (Sardinha, 
2011). This costs producers time and money and it forces producer associations to be wary of 
any commitment from AAFC as the rules can change and create financial injury through the 
misallocation of scarce resources. The lack of transparency and the last-minute program and 
funding changes from AAFC create uncertainty for producers and inhibit producer organizations 
such as the BCFGA from making long-term funding and personnel commitments to collaborative 
projects with AAFC. One item that was repeatedly brought up was the assumption by many 
producers that the expansion of producer-funded and managed P4s represents a long-term 
strategy on the part of AAFC to download fiscal responsibility for R&D to producer 
associations. 
 
The third area of concern relates to the nature of the relationship between PICO and PARC. On 
its website and documents, and in the confidential interviews with PICO employees, PICO 
claims to be the exclusive commercialization agent for PARC for the apple, cherry, berry, and 
soft fruits varieties (PICO, 2012). However, in confidential interviews with AAFC/PARC 
employees, it became clear that PICO has exclusive rights to apple and cherry varieties for 
Western Canada only, and has to bid for the right to commercialize PARC varieties in the rest of 
Canada and internationally in competition with other potential licensees. Therefore, the nature of 
the relationship is ambiguous as each party has a divergent perspective.  
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6.5.3 P4 Outputs 
 
Despite the above challenges, changes to the structure and funding of PICO, and questions 
concerning the specific nature of the partnership between PICO and PARC, the relationship has 
been extremely successful for all parties including the BCFGA. In 2009, PICO was awarded the 
Federal Partners in Technology Transfer (FPTT) award for Excellence in Technology Transfer 
from the Government of Canada in recognition of PICO’s success in commercializing and 
distribution of PARC developed cherry varieties. PICO has commercialized over 100 PARC 
cherry varieties and generated over $2 million in royalties to AAFC through the development 
and implementation of over 250 license agreements in Canada and internationally (PICO, 2009). 
PICO has developed into an international R&D and commercialization hub that links the 
BCFGA with global markets and varieties. Although PICO works primarily with PARC, it has 
licensing agreements with a wide variety of private firms and international nurseries. PICO 
allows the BCFGA to be early adopters of new varieties and technologies providing a 
competitive advantage in a highly competitive environment. Apple and cherry trees take seven 
years mature before the first harvest and cost approximately $20,000 per acre to plant—any 
breeding error could impose a huge financial loss for producers. Through its R&D, PICO 
manages this risk for producers. PICO has encouraged the BCFGA to think strategically by 
offering a long-term approach to innovation: linking upstream R&D with downstream 
applications and by eliminating the ad hoc approach to technology development and transfer.  
 
PICO represents a new business model for funding and carrying out collaborative R&D. 
Interestingly, it receives no funding from producers through the BCFGA, and it operates 
independently of AAFC/PARC. The BCFGA receives no returns from PICO; all revenues from 
royalties are applied to operations and R&D at PICO in consultation with producers through the 
BCFGA. As PICO is engaged with AAFC on a number of collaborative funding projects that are 
guided by a board of directors drawn from the BCFGA, it qualifies as a producer P4. The 
interviews indicated that PICO has changed how its partner organizations, both formal and 
informal, conduct R&D; the collaborative and networked approach created by PICO has made all 
partners more accountable to stakeholders by the constant dialogue over R&D and technology 
transfer. The BCFGA suggested the industry is dependent on both PICO and PARC for the 
continual stream of new high value and high margin varieties for its survival. 
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Measuring the impact and success of PICO is not a direct or simple process. As it enters its third 
decade of operations, PICO must be considered successful on this measure alone. Additionally, 
PICO has developed a specialized value-added process that generates relatively independent 
revenue streams. It was suggested that PICO represents an industry good (or more formally a 
common-pool good) as cost-effective and risk-free technology transfer is critical to the survival 
of the industry and the financial performance of individual producers.  
6.6 Case Study 4: Vineland Research and Innovation Centre 
 
6.6.1 P4 Inputs 
 
Created in 1906 by an endowment from M.F. Rittenhouse, the Vineland Research Station was 
mandated to create a soft fruit industry in Southern Ontario through R&D driven by input from 
growers. Although in 1911, the federal government established a presence at Vineland through 
The Dominion Entomological Lab, from 1906 to 2007 the Vineland Research Station was the 
property of the Government of Ontario and in 1945 was renamed the Horticulture Research 
Institute of Ontario (HRIO) (VRIC, 2010). In 1996, management of Vineland was transferred to 
the University of Guelph as part of a program of fiscal downloading. Historically, Vineland 
existed to serve the R&D needs of the soft fruit industry through the directives of its many 
partners. 
 
By 2006, Vineland (HRIO), due to cutbacks and a lack of strategic direction, had fallen into a 
state of disrepair, both physically and institutionally. Additionally, the soft fruit industry of 
Ontario faced challenges related to declining yields, declining profitability, and declining quality 
of some crops (Vineland Renaissance Project, 2006: 13). These challenges were directly 
attributed to reductions in R&D investments in the industry, a reduction in the number of 
scientists employed by HRIO, and the inability to effectively transfer the results of R&D 
endeavors from Vineland to producers (Vineland Renaissance Project, 2006: 13). The innovation 
system was too fragmented, as it was based on old bureaucratic silo-based structures, with each 
sector operating in a system of confederated isolates the overall system, from a holistic 
perspective, was no longer relevant to the changing needs of government, industry, or 
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consumers. Essentially, the innovation system that supported the soft fruit industry was in a state 
of disrepair and was not producing tangible results. A 2008 independent industry analysis, 
funded by Vineland, confirmed that competitor soft fruit producing regions were more efficient 
and profitable and thus constituted a threat to the survival of Ontario’s fruit sector (Deloitte, 
2010: 2). Ontario’s system was deemed too fragmented, which inhibited collaboration and led to 
uncompetitive products and declining market positions from an industry-level perspective 
(Deloitte, 2010: 3). 
 
As a result, a commission was formed to determine the best method of re-energizing the 
horticulture industry of Ontario. The primary objective of this study was to find a way to best 
utilize the existing resources at HRIO to provide a process that would link R&D activities and 
expenditures to marketplace opportunities while integrating science with sound business 
practices. To do so, the panel recommended the creation of a not-for-profit and independent 
innovation centre at Vineland that would become a regional, national, and global hub of 
horticulture R&D and commercialization (Vineland Renaissance Project, 2006: 26). In contrast 
to its historic function of serving the needs of its partners and parent organizations, Vineland 
would become the focal point for creating a horizontally configured innovation system that 
would systematically identify and rectify the problems contributing to the under-performance of 
the horticulture sector. The objective was to energize the existing relationships from the multiple 
levels of government, the various producer and processor associations, and the agriculture 
schools of Ontario to the consumer with a new model of operation built upon collaboration with 
a consumer-centric focus. Because the horticultural and soft fruit industry was under financial 
stress, the costs of creating and operating the not-for-profit would not be transferred onto 
industry (Vineland Renaissance Project, 2006: 13). 
 
The commission recommended that the Government of Ontario provide $25 million and transfer 
the assets of the HRIO to the non-profit. The panel also recommended the creation of an 
independent board of directors selected with the understanding that the newly minted Vineland 
Research and Innovation Centre (VRIC) was, in and of itself, an innovation, representing a 
departure from past business models in agricultural R&D and governance. The funding from the 
province, along with the ability to leverage the assets at Vineland, would sustain 10 years of 
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operations and facilities development required to develop revenue streams from commercializing 
the results of their R&D endeavours.  
6.6.2 P4 Processes 
 
Presently, VRIC employs over 70 people working on three core scientific research disciplines: 
Consumer Insights and Product Innovation; Applied Genomics; and Horticultural Production 
Systems. These three disciplines support the four strategic research goals: creating new and 
differentiated horticultural products; driving down production costs; delivering the health and 
environmental benefits of horticulture; and safeguarding horticultural crops against 
environmental stress. VRIC is governed by a board of 12 directors drawn from a wide range of 
critical stakeholder groups. The board is supported by scientific advisory and stakeholder 
advisory boards. Although the federal and provincial governments are key stakeholders, they are 
not on the board of directors; this reflects the independence of VRIC.  
 
VRIC has an annual budget of about $9 million drawn from a wide range of sources. The current 
accounting system cannot accurately disaggregate expenses from funding sources; therefore, all 
figures are approximations derived from interviews and the analysis of public data. The core 
costs of $3 million come from AAFC and OMARFRA. VRIC receives funding from a multitude 
of sources. In 2010, VRIC was awarded funding under the Growing Forward Horticulture 
Clusters program. As part of this agreement, VRIC has assumed the responsibility for 
administering the national Horticulture Clusters program for AAFC. The Federal- Canadian 
Agricultural Adaptation Program (CAAP), OMAFRA, and the Federal Development Agency for 
Southern Ontario (FeDev) constitute the balance of the key sources of program funding for 
VRIC. VRIC has organized webs of grants and granting as the program manager of an emerging 
large-scale innovation chain. Last year, VRIC invested over $4 million in applied R&D (VRIC, 
2011: 12–13) and received $780,000 in industry contributions for research. Revenues from 
royalty payments were $150,000 last year; developing this revenue stream is a long-term process 
requiring time to develop and commercialize agricultural technologies. It is estimated that VRIC 
has acquired over $30 million in additional funding since its founding (Authors’ estimates from 
public and private sources). 
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VRIC is replacing government grants by becoming the program manager and conduit of 
resources of all types to support the development of the horticulture innovation chain. VRIC has 
multiple contracts with both AAFC and OMAFRA to administer and manage key programs. 
Interestingly, VRIC has not changed its core partners, but rather has created a new, open system 
of innovation that is dependent upon collaboration. VRIC has two levels of partners. The first 
level consists of a semi-permanent group of government and key institutional stakeholders such 
as universities and producer groups; the second level is a transient set of partnerships created 
through contracts and programs. In the new science model being developed at VRIC, technology 
transfer occurs at the project level. VRIC occupies the gatekeeper role in a growing innovation 
system consisting of over 30 partner organizations. It uses interlocking projects to leverage 
national R&D assets to revitalize the horticulture industry and create new markets. VRIC utilizes 
its unique structure of public program management and private sector investment and 
engagement, and its consumer-centric focus to engender innovation. 
 
Among the many programs and projects under the umbrella of VRIC, three illustrate the scale 
and scope of its operations and objectives. The first, the World Crops Program, is developing 
new crops to meet the demand from the rapidly growing Chinese, South Asian, and Caribbean 
communities in the Greater Toronto Area. It has been estimated that these communities import 
over $700 million worth of vegetables yearly (VRIC, 2012a: 14). VRIC is the center of a large-
scale project to develop new locally grown varieties to link the prosperity the Southern Ontario 
horticulture industry to the changing demographics of Toronto and area. This endeavour is 
centered upon a network that includes VRIC and producer, processor, and grocers’ associations. 
The second program leverages the robotic and automation technological assets of Ontario, 
derived from the automotive sector, to increase productivity and cost competitiveness in the 
horticulture sector. VRIC has created a number of projects, with funding from both public and 
industry sources, to automate the entire value chain to reduce industry-wide labour and fuel costs 
(VRIC, 2012b: 8). The third program involves developing a new system of innovation based 
upon collaboration that can respond to the competitive, technological, environmental, and 
demographic challenges facing horticulture.  
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In the interviews, the board of directors stood out above all as the most important structure of 
VRIC. The board spearheads the governance, expertise, and ideas that provide the foundation for 
the networks of interdependent relations between science, industry, and consumers. The work of 
the board provides a means of achieving a new model in agricultural R&D that is neither private 
nor public, but represents a radical departure from previous top-down models associated with 
governments and producer associations. The independence derived from the board of agricultural 
experts has been credited with providing the governance that drives the open and accountable 
structure of VRIC—a structure that accelerates innovation.  
 
VRIC represents a new business model, but as a part of a new and poorly understood system of 
innovation with a long-term outlook, it faces some challenges. The first challenge is funding. As 
the original plan acknowledged, VRIC supplies a public or industry good to a sector that lacks 
the means of conducting R&D, and therefore it remains dependent on government funding. The 
timeline for developing plant varieties is sometimes measured in decades, while government 
programs are much more limited in duration. The second challenge involves conflicts or clashes 
related to cultures. The evolving horizontally configured and collaboratively based system of 
innovation that VRIC is tasked with creating and managing runs counter to the silo and 
bureaucratic system it is replacing. As VRIC is neither public nor private, its methods of 
operations challenge existing orders, as the old system is not collaborative but rather is vertically 
integrated; the new scientific model is collaborative, existing in a transient web of inter-linked 
contracts, projects, and programs. It was noted in the interviews that VRIC and the innovation 
system it is creating represent the end of the paradigm created in the 1886 Experimental Farms 
Stations Act and the end of contextualizing agricultural R&D on the public–private dichotomy.  
6.6.3 P4 Outputs 
 
VRIC is entering its sixth year of operations. It has met the first objective of revitalizing the 
Vineland facilities and creating an organization capable of engendering large-scale change. It has 
created a research staff and has developed multiple programs and processes for creating new 
markets and improving the efficiency and productivity of the horticulture sector through the 
application of science. VRIC has changed both the process and structure of R&D. It has 
centralized the management of R&D management that provides focus; it increased the level of 
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funding; and it hast created a more balanced and focused approach to R&D by linking 
marketplace needs with research capabilities by making the process of funding more accountable 
and transparent. The openness generated by the linkages created between stakeholders reinforces 
the transparent nature the nascent innovation system. 
 
As VRIC is a work in progress, it is difficult to develop a set of metrics to measure success. In 
the medium run, success will be determined by the amount of acres and store shelf space devoted 
to new varieties from the World Crops Program. Other metrics may include the rate of growth, 
productivity, and profitability of the horticulture sectors of both Canada and Southern Ontario 
from the endeavours of VRIC R&D. The scientific advisory board has identified the need to 
develop a quantifiable set of indicators to measure the efficacy of VRIC. This requires 
developing an internal job-costing and reporting system that segregates operational and overhead 
costs from project costs. It also requires the creation of measures of the impact of R&D funding 
to assist governments to assess their role. Personnel, including a Chief Operating Officer, have 
been hired to create a reporting system capable of measuring the activities of VRIC. 
6.7 Analysis 
 
Agricultural P4s in Canada represent a new paradigm in the management and financing of 
agricultural R&D. There is no one underlying factor behind their ascent in Canadian agriculture; 
rather, there are a number of inter-related factors responsible for the transformation of 
agricultural R&D into a range of horizontal governance models. The combined effects of 
globalization, federal and provincial austerity programs, and new technology and shifting IPR 
regimes have broken down the boundaries between the public and private spheres of operations. 
These factors have collectively engendered collaboration in agricultural R&D. One result of 
these transformations is the growing role of producer associations in the financing and 
management of agricultural R&D in Canada through the use of P4s. P4s reflect the end of the 
vertically integrated and hierarchal R&D system centered on a public–private dichotomy and a 
shift to a new system that is horizontally configured, globalized, and consisting of heterogeneous 
organizations using dissimilar processes to form innovation networks. 
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The P4s studied in this chapter depend on some public support, either in the form of money or 
through the use of public assets and personnel. One item of significance is the length of time it 
takes to develop alternative sources of revenue either from royalties or from supplying 
specialized R&D services. In the cases of the P4s in this study, both types of processes took 
about 15 years to bring to fruition as measured by the changes in cash flows. Government, and in 
particular AAFC, is critical to the successful formation of the Canadian P4s studied in this 
report. Although there is a strong organic element to the P4s studied here—at some level each 
developed due to the actions of a small group of people—governments have the assets and 
financial tools that are essential for P4 ventures to be successful. In each case, the P4s needed 
help from governments in the form of grants, annual payments, or the outright transfer of the title 
of public R&D assets to the partnership, including, in a couple of cases, the transfer of key 
personnel.  
 
P4s fill a niche that the public and private sectors cannot. The objective of P4s is to 
commercialize science; therefore, technology transfer is key to their success and survival. P4s in 
this study integrate science and business by providing new means of collaborating and 
communicating with stakeholders. This, in turn, helps accelerate the R&D process by linking 
expenditures with marketplace opportunities. It also makes partners and stakeholders more 
accountable to each other. P4s provide a strong voice for partners, especially producers who 
benefit by their early and constant involvement in the R&D process, which is evident in the 
pulse, and B.C. soft fruit sectors. As a matter of survival, agricultural P4s must develop unique 
product and process expertise that can be translated into a recognizable brand. Excellence in 
commercializing R&D is one obvious focus—the CDPQ exemplifies that approach. 
Additionally, through the R&D process, P4s link disparate partners into coherent innovation 
systems that stop key actors from being isolated from new ideas and products. Creating high-
value products, which create high returns for producers and industry, is a key characteristic 
shared by the P4s. Collaboration, communication and commercialization all underscore effective 
technology transfer. In the end, P4s must lower input costs, or increase yields and productivity or 
create new markets.  
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6.8 Conclusion 
 
P4s represent a new and unexamined subset of agricultural P3s by shifting the focus from public-
private collaboration between governments and/or academia and the private sector to public-
private collaboration centered on producer organizations. This study indicates that producer 
organizations represent a paradigm shift in the financing and management of agricultural R&D 
and innovation. By utilizing production levies and the governance capabilities of the producer 
organizations, P4s have developed into a new business model to collectively manage product-
specific industries in Canada to fill the void created by public austerity and by the failure of the 
private sector to respond to the needs of producers. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 What Was Known 
 
The origins of P3s can be traced back to a number of inter-related factors beginning with 
combined effects of public austerity programs and the growth in the acceptance of the neo-liberal 
and new public management theories that changed the relationship between government and 
society. Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing to the present, P3s have emerged as 
organizations to augment and replace government in the financing, construction and management 
of public infrastructure-goods such as roads, schools and hospitals. Faced with declining 
revenues and reduced bureaucracies, governments have been forced to partner with the private 
sector and to adopt private sector management practices in the provision of public-goods. As a 
result, P3s have merged as both a practice and policy for governments in performing some of 
their traditional functions. 
 
As the literature analysis in chapter one demonstrated, the study of P3s is also an emerging field 
of analysis as the majority of the scholarly articles has been published within the last five-years. 
The primary source of research on P3s is in the public administration/new public management 
area where the focus has been on the use of P3s as collaborative ventures between governments 
and the private sector to finance and manage the construction and operation of new infrastructure 
projects. P3s are characterized as organizations that merge the expertise of both the public and 
private sectors by the equitable sharing of risk and reward through the establishment of principle-
agent relationships. P3s increase the management capabilities of governments by relying on the 
private sector to finance and management projects, which, in turn, generate profits for the private 
sector. 
 
In agriculture, P3s developed due to a number of factors, including but not limited to public 
austerity measures. Again, beginning in the late 1970s and continuing to the present, the public 
sector, due to ideology and declining revenues, has reduced its involvement in the financing and 
generation of agricultural R&D. Additionally, the development and implementation of formal 
IPR and PBR regimes has led to the privatization of formerly public-funded agricultural R&D 
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programs. In combination, these factors—ideology, austerity, privatization and the new IPR 
regimes—have created conditions conducive for the use of P3s for the generation of agricultural 
R&D.  
 
As discussed in chapters one and two, the use of P3s is an established practice in multiple 
sectors, at the local, national and international levels.  This has created a condition where 
practice exceeds research as the limited number of peer-reviewed articles demonstrates. 
Specifically, there is a paucity of case studies, limited application of theory to agricultural P3s 
and a lack of models for analysis. In place of theory there are a number of concepts that provide 
descriptions and narratives to often only help to characterize agricultural P3s.  
 
Agricultural P3s have been characterized as “innovation brokers” as they link a wide-array of 
disparate organizations into functional innovation networks that finance and govern the 
development and introduction of new agricultural technologies. P3s have emerged to address the 
complexity in agricultural R&D; neither the public nor private sectors are able to succeed 
without collaboration. Furthermore, P3 growth also has responded to the emergence of self-
governing producer organizations that do not conform to the public-private dichotomy that once 
characterized agricultural R&D.  
7.2 What We Have Learned 
 
This research offers eight advancements to the theory of agricultural P3s.  
First, agricultural R&D is being transformed from a vertically structured process based upon a 
public-private dichotomy to a horizontally configured process operating on a global basis with a 
wide range of hard-to-categorize actors that challenge the public-private perspective. 
Agricultural P3s, based upon the results of this study, appear to be best suited to meeting the 
challenges of this transformation. Specifically, the collaborative structure of P3s permits these 
organizations to act as gatekeepers controlling the flow of money, ideas, technologies and key 
personnel in R&D oriented innovation networks. It has been demonstrated that P3s frequently 
perform the role of innovation brokers by providing the structural nuclei of a number of 
dissimilar innovation networks operating at national, regional and global levels of operations. 
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Due to their collaborative structure and process, agricultural P3s also provide an evolving 
business model to link users of R&D, primarily self-organized and self-governed producer 
organizations in the developed world and a wide range of hard-to-define organizations operating 
in the developing world, to the capabilities of public and private agricultural research centers. 
P3s perform a variety of functions that control the generation of R&D for food security. While 
many agricultural P3s emerged as a means of replacing lost public funding of R&D, they have 
evolved into collaborative models that accelerate the R&D process by capitalizing on the core 
competencies of their partners, creating economies of scale and scope from collaboration that 
appear to be unobtainable in traditional management systems.  
 
Second, as P3s link dissimilar institutions and networks into coherent and functioning innovation 
networks, the evidence suggests that the use of agricultural P3s can confer a competitive 
advantage on users at the national and international levels of operations. As agricultural R&D is 
being transformed from a linear supply-push model to a spiral and networked demand-pull 
model, P3s in this study integrate science and business by providing new means of collaborating 
and communicating with stakeholders. This, in turn, helps accelerate the R&D process by linking 
expenditures with marketplace opportunities and requirements. It also makes partners and 
stakeholders more accountable to each other. P3s provide a strong voice for partners, especially 
users who benefit by their early and constant involvement in the R&D process. This, in turn, 
leads to higher returns from investments into R&D and a more efficient and transparent method 
of technology transfer. 
 
Third, agricultural P3s appear to be best suited for operating in orphan crops and largely ‘empty’ 
spaces that for a variety of reasons are ignored or overlooked by both the public and private 
sectors. As this study suggests, agricultural P3s have emerged to fill gaps in the financing, 
management and generation of R&D that have been created due to evolving IPR/PBR regimes, 
privatization and downloading programs and the inability of public or private actors to respond 
adequately to the challenge of food security in the developing world. Specifically, P3s fill niches 
that are beyond the ability of traditional organizational models and existing policy responses. 
 
 147 
Fourth, due to the diversity of partners and functions there is no standard agricultural P3; rather 
their structure is entirely dependent upon the attributes of the partners, and the purpose of the 
partnership—technology transfer, capacity development, financing of R&D, development of 
R&D networks or the creation of global value-chains, or the creation of a new agricultural sector. 
As demonstrated, and to be explored below, P3s develop as a result of the work of individuals 
responding to intractable problems by mobilizing networks of insiders. Therefore, the structure 
of P3s is dependent upon the type of partners—producer associations, public sector agencies, 
philanthropic organizations, NGOs, IGOs, and private sector partners. Furthermore, the objective 
of the P3 also determines the structure and the type of network surrounding P3s. This study 
identified and categorized a number of application-specific P3s. The producer P3, common to the 
developed world in a number of sectors including pulses and canola, which specializes in the 
financing and commercialization of R&D are organic partnerships created by users responding to 
market failures. The development P3, common to the developing world, where capacity 
development often precedes technology transfer are the result of a wide-array of organizations 
dedicated to the challenge of food security and the task of market-making. The inter-
governmental P3, where the primary partners are national R&D bodies collaborating with a wide 
range of public and private partners are more about non-market coordination. P3s may be further 
delineated by their purpose, be it for the development of R&D, to develop technical and political 
management capacity or to construct global food supply-chains or commodity suppliers. 
 
Fifth, agricultural P3s, more often than not, are created due to the efforts of a small group of 
individuals who through experience and insider knowledge recognize opportunities for 
collaborative R&D ventures. While theories of institutional design and incentives provide some 
insight into this, there are undoubtedly some quite idiosyncratic aspects to most venture. P3s are 
not only the result of policies and programs; chance and circumstance are almost always part of 
the story. As demonstrated, there is evidence to support the claim that the creation of P3s is 
dependent upon organizational boundary pushers—also known as social entrepreneurs—people 
using insider connections and knowledge to develop hybrid responses to problems related to 
food security and agricultural R&D that are beyond the capability of existing policies, programs 
and actors. Additionally, there is a growing body of evidence that indicates that the use of P3s 
specialists may be an area that warrants further analysis, particularly for the use of P3s in the 
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developing world where the lack of organizational and technical capacity may hinder 
collaboration. Given the critical role of leadership in these ventures, public and international 
agencies are advised to focus on creating incentives and processes to help identify individuals 
with the vital leadership qualities that increasingly personify exceptional partnerships by 
leadership.  
 
Sixth, P3s are expensive, have high transaction costs and require large upfront capital 
investments in people, processes and facilities. They are rarely the products of privatization of 
formerly publicly funded R&D operations; instead, generally they are new and emerging 
collaborative business models that transcend the public-private dichotomy. They are vulnerable 
to the vagaries of their partners—particularly funding agencies—for their survival. Agricultural 
P3s are particularly vulnerable to disruptions in cash flows as these organizations operate on 
R&D timelines that can be measured in the decades while most governments, granting agencies 
and foundations operate on much shorter periods, sometimes year-to-year.  
 
Seventh, agricultural P3s have long gestation periods as the development and commercialization 
of agricultural R&D, especially in the plant-sciences, is a process that can takes years from 
concept to field testing, regulatory approval and commercialization. Many P3s need to build 
rather than buy the core capabilities that support the R&D and commercialization process, 
adding to the time it can take to generate market-ready products that deliver cash flow. 
Therefore, agricultural P3s are high-risk ventures characterized by uncertainty. In place of 
providing specific infrastructure projects such as roads or hospital—common to the literature of 
generic P3s—agricultural P3s are created to generate R&D based technological innovation as 
part of a value-added process where the returns on investments are difficult to calculate and it is 
uncertain if or when they may be realized. 
 
Last, the complexities associated with creating and managing agricultural P3s may hinder their 
development. As discussed above, P3s are heavily contextualized organizations defined by their 
partners and objectives, so that each model is somewhat novel, which limits the ability to copy or 
emulate.  Each P3 faces multiple challenges in building and sustaining relationships with 
partners with dissimilar institutional characteristics, especially facing the constant challenge of 
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securing funding and meeting the unique and varied reporting requirements of a multiplicity of 
granting agencies, and often the dissimilar conditions from operating on multiple continents. The 
literature is deficient in regards to these challenges.   
This thesis also contributes to our methodological tool-kit for analyzing P3s.  
The methodologies used in this research advance the knowledge of the analysis of agricultural 
P3s. Social network analysis (SNA) provides an analytical tool to graphically and statistically 
measure the function of P3s in a networked environment. As agricultural P3s are a part of an 
emerging complex of organizations and institutions that increasingly depend upon collaboration 
in all phases of the generation of R&D, SNA is a tool that can illuminate relationships, networks 
and sub-networks and processes that govern technological innovation. Specifically, SNA 
provides a quantitative and hypothesis-based tool for evaluation that can identify, categorize and 
ordinally rank organizations, networks and processes to provide a deeper understanding of the 
complexities associated with the use of agricultural P3s in the R&D process that previously 
eluded researchers. SNA can also be employed to identify, operationalize and measure variables 
such as ideas, terms and theoretical concepts that impact or influence relational-based and 
collaborative agricultural R&D. 
 
For example, the use of a bibliometric model to evaluate and measure the impact of collaboration 
on the generation of R&D in a fast-evolving system characterized by new organizations and 
processes is novel. It allows the isolation and evaluation of key variables such as the number of 
collaborative partners and the institutional configuration to determine their impact on knowledge 
dissemination and technology transfer. This makes it possible to identify emerging trends that 
influence the generation of R&D. It also permits the use of comparative measures as evidence to 
assist in resource allocation decisions.    
7.3 Policy Implications 
 
This research leads to at least five policy insights. 
1. P3s should not be viewed as a tool for downloading or the privatization public 
agricultural R&D programs. Although their origins can be traced back to a number of 
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factors related to privatization, they represent a new paradigm in the generation of R&D 
for food security. P3s represent a new paradigm in agricultural R&D and innovation 
based upon collaboration and interconnectedness. The public–private dichotomy that 
ruled agriculture no longer applies in a globalized environment characterized by public 
austerity. They are expensive and high risk institutions that operate in spaces where 
neither the public nor the private sectors operating alone appear to be well suited. As 
such, they should only be considered for high risk ventures related to R&D, market and 
product development, and technology transfer when market failures are in evidence.  
2. New tools and policies for developing incentives to create and operate P3s are needed. 
Agricultural P3s are not primarily the result of overt policy and programs, but rather the 
result of the initiatives of well-placed and motivated individuals. P3s appear to be 
personified by leadership from industry experts who can recognize and respond to 
opportunities. This suggests that incentives, not programming, may be a more important 
variable for triggering new P3s for agricultural innovation. The caveat is that there 
appears to be shortage of P3 experts, particularly in the developing world. Many of these 
social entrepreneurs emerged from public and private agricultural research systems—now 
that many of them have folded into these often scarcely resourced P3s, the supply of 
motivated, skilled and networked individuals may dry up. 
3. Public policy in the agricultural R&D space, in both the developed and developing world, 
may need to be revised to reflect the growing importance of collaboration between the 
mix of sectors, including public, private, producer and philanthropic. The evidence in this 
study suggests that trust and transparency are becoming critical determinants that govern 
the generation and dissemination of technological solutions to food security. 
Governments have yet to respond to the changed culture and norms. 
4. Long-term financial and technical support is vital for the successful development of P3s. 
As discussed, agricultural P3s have long gestation periods due to the uncertainties of 
research and the related processes for commercialization of science. It appears from this 
work that the duration and security of funding is of greater importance than the short-
term scale of contributions. 
5. In the developed world, agricultural P3s provide both the incentive and structure for 
producer organizations to fund and manage the R&D process. These institutions link 
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producer investments with public and private assets and research capabilities and in turn 
coordinate industry and government priorities. P3s have forced producer associations to 
think strategically, considering both upstream investments and downstream commercial 
applications, thereby facilitating a long-term and systematic approach to innovation. In 
the end, P3s have proven to be critical to the successful commercialization of many 
publicly funded technologies and to represent an attractive policy instrument for the 
creation of new markets. The Canadian experience in both the pulse and canola sectors 
highlights the potential. 
7.4 Limitations 
 
1. The study of agricultural P3s is limited by the confidentiality of the operations of P3s. As 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6, a number of factors regarding the protection of operational 
secrets and the desire for anonymity during interviews of key employees and stakeholders 
illuminate this challenge to researchers. As each P3 is engaged in competitive market 
operations, there is a strong tendency to limit access to any R&D or operational process 
that may provide competitors with information and insights that could harm the P3 being 
investigated. The additional desire for anonymity on the part of employees and 
stakeholders also highlights this limitation. One key reason for confidential interviews is 
to prevent statements from being attributed to the interviewees, as each P3 is dependent 
upon material and financial support from a wide range of organizations that could use any 
perceived slights as a reason for changing their support; the possibility of 
misunderstandings is an ever-present threat in this digital era. 
2. Despite the use of quantitative tools in this dissertation, to a degree, all case studies on 
agricultural P3s do have a narrative-based element to them. This means we know their 
story—how they formed and what opportunities and constraints affect their operations—
but we are unable to directly observe processes such as decision making and dealing with 
problems unique to P3s (such as those that were discussed in chapters 5 and 6). 
Therefore, there may be institutional and cognitive gaps in their operations that is beyond 
the view of researchers. 
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7.5 Directions for Future Research 
 
1. There is a need for the development of econometric models to empirically measure the 
return on investment on agricultural P3s.Greater knowledge on the economic returns 
from P3s would enable policy-makers and researchers to determine when P3s are a better 
model for generating agricultural R&D than traditional public or private organizations. 
The work on this dissertation suggests that such an analysis would need to take into 
account that P3s don’t just replicate the roles of government or industry but do tasks that 
neither can do. However, in the absence of a large-scale analysis comparing the returns 
from P3s to other public investments in agricultural R&D it will be difficult to assess 
when the use of P3s is warranted. 
2. As discussed, there is a plethora of hard to-categorize P3s in operation delineated by the 
composition of partners, by the R&D objectives, and by sector. As noted in this research, 
there are hundreds of agricultural P3s in operation on a global scale. Therefore, there is a 
need for a sharper typology that categorizes P3s from more of an analytic perspective. 
This would be a significant undertaking that would require the identification of all 
funding, research, philanthropic, public and private partners involved in each P3. This 
will allow the development a typology of P3s that include the function, size, number of 
partners, types of different partners, and by geographic location and type of network. 
Interestingly, SNA would provide the analytic tool to both advance this much needed task 
and then to analyze the network effects of such systems. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A: List of and coding for organizations in Chapter Three 
 
Actor Location Institution Type Network 
GRDC Australia P3 Export 
PBA Australia P3 Export 
SARDI Australia Government Export 
VDPI Australia Government Export 
NSWDPI Australia Government Export 
QDPIF Australia Government Export 
DAFWA Australia Government Export 
ICARDA CGIAR P3 Global 
ICRISAT CGIAR P3 Global 
CLIMA Australia P3 Global 
ACIAR Australia Government Export 
COGGO Australia P3 Export 
CDC/SPG Canada P3 Global 
Pullman-ARS USA Government Export 
CSIRO Australia Government Global 
U of Adelaide Australia University Export 
NPBP Australia P3 Export 
Muresk Inst. Australia University Export 
NDSU USA University Export 
GCI-S Africa S Africa Government Export 
MSU USA University Export 
Prosser-ARS USA Government Export 
U of Wis USA University Global 
CIAT CGIAR P3 Global 
CSU USA University Export 
U of Idaho USA University Export 
U of Guelph Canada University Export 
NRC Canada Government Export 
AAFC-Saskatoon Canada Government Export 
AAFC-Morden Canada Government Export 
AAFC-Lacombe Canada Government Export 
IH AAFC Canada Government Export 
IOA Australia Government Export 
WAHRI Australia P3 Export 
FFICRC Australia P3 Export 
Tasmanian Inst Agr Res Australia Government Export 
Punjab Agr Univ India University Export 
UWA Australia University Export 
U of NFLD Canada University Export 
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Guelph AAFC Canada Government Export 
MII AAFC Canada P3 Export 
SC AAFC Canada Government Export 
Purdue USA University Export 
New Mexico USA University Export 
Montana State Univ USA University Export 
Scott AAFC Canada Government Export 
Univ Manitoba Canada University Export 
Univ Alberta Canada University Export 
AAFRD Canada Government Export 
ACIDF Canada P3 Export 
APGC Canada P3 Export 
WGRF Canada P3 Export 
Northern Pulse Growers USA P3 Export 
CILR Australia P3 Export 
John Innes UK P3 Global 
NC State USA University Export 
Queensland U Australia University Export 
ANU Australia University Export 
U of Newcastle Australia University Export 
U of Melbourne Australia University Export 
KDNARI Japan Government Export 
USDA-STPaul USA Government Global 
CLAN Asia P3 Developing 
FIA Austria Government Developing 
AGERI Egypt Government Developing 
MTT Finland Government Developing 
DSMZ Germany Private Developing 
University of Frankfurt Germany University Global 
University of Hannover Germany University Global 
CRA Italy Government Developing 
UC Davis USA University Global 
TIGR USA Private Global 
IFPRI Spain P3 Developing 
Egypt NARS Egypt Government Developing 
Tunisia NARS Tunisia Government Developing 
Ethiopia NARS Ethiopia Government Developing 
BARC Bangledash Government Developing 
ICAR India Government Developing 
PARC Pakistan Government Developing 
Morocco NARS Morocco Government Developing 
AREEO Iran Government Developing 
Turkey NARS Turkey Government Developing 
Aleppo University, Syria Syria University Developing 
BAU Bangledash University Developing 
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Rajshahi University, 
Bangladesh Bangledash University Developing 
Alemaya University, 
Ethiopia Ethiopia University Developing 
GAU Georgia University Developing 
LARI Lebanon Government Developing 
CRIDA India Government Developing 
NCPGR India Government Developing 
CAAS China Government Developing 
CRIFC Indonesia Government Developing 
DAR Myanmar Government Developing 
NARC Nepal Government Developing 
PCARRD Philippines Government Developing 
SLDOA Sri Lanka Government Developing 
DOAT Thailand Government Developing 
MARDV Vietnam Government Developing 
MARY Yemen Government Developing 
NCPGR India India Government Developing 
NRCPB India Government Developing 
IARI India Government Developing 
SVPUAT India University Developing 
TLP CGIAR P3 Developing 
EIAR Ethiopia Government Developing 
LZARDI CGIAR P3 Developing 
Gates Foundation USA P3 Developing 
IIPR India Government Developing 
PBI-CA Univ Germany Germany University Developing 
BMZ Germany Government Developing 
KVL Denmark University Developing 
PRC Bangledash Government Developing 
BARI Bangledash Government Developing 
U of Helsinki Finland University Developing 
BAZ Germany Government Developing 
U of Wolverhampton UK University Developing 
U of Gottingen Germany University Developing 
CSIC Spain Government Global 
IFAPA Spain Government Global 
NYRC Israel Government Developing 
U of Greenwich UK University Developing 
Wageningen University Netherlands University Global 
IAMZ Spain Government Developing 
ISA Spain Government Developing 
UC-Riverside USA University Developing 
WARDA CGIAR P3 Developing 
IRRI CGIAR P3 Developing 
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INRA HQ France Government Global 
GLIB/FP6/FP7 EU P3 EU 
INIFAP Mexico Government EU 
GenXPro Germany Private EU 
Svetošimunska 25 Croatia Government EU 
Universita di Pisa Italy University EU 
U.P.M. Spain University EU 
C.B.G.P Spain Government EU 
CNRS France Government EU 
Bielefeld University Germany University EU 
AEP France P3 EU 
MPI Germany University EU 
GCNRG France Government EU 
TWTSInT UK P3 EU 
JWGU Germany University EU 
University of Dundee at 
SCRI UK University EU 
BRC Hungary University EU 
Animal Sciences Group Netherlands University EU 
University of Córdoba Spain University EU 
MIPS Germany University EU 
Schothorst Feed Research Netherlands Private EU 
UAAR Denmark University EU 
SWRSAA Switzerland Government EU 
FIB Belgium Government EU 
IPK Germany Government EU 
RISØ Denmark Government EU 
IVV, Fraunhofer Institute Germany P3 EU 
NARCN Norway Private EU 
ESA France University EU 
PRI-NETH Netherlands P3 EU 
ILB Sweden P3 EU 
PAS Poland Government EU 
University of Leon Spain University EU 
CLS UK Government EU 
University of Sevilla Spain University EU 
IBMC Portugal University EU 
CEREOPA France University EU 
NIAB UK P3 EU 
UPN-SP Spain University EU 
CESFAC Spain University EU 
CZU Czech Republic University EU 
University of Reading UK University EU 
IGER UK University EU 
UNIP France P3 EU 
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PBAI Poland University EU 
ARO Israel Government EU 
ABIO Bulgaria Government EU 
AEL Spain Government EU 
University of York UK University EU 
Murdoch University Australia University EU 
IG-ABC Hungary Government EU 
IRM Italy Government EU 
University of Ghent Belgium University EU 
GL-TTP France P3 EU 
ADAS UK Private EU 
ARRIAM Russia Government EU 
FAKS Egypt University EU 
FAN Gaza/West Bank University EU 
IAV Morocco University EU 
INRAT Tunisia University EU 
EMBRAPA Brazil Government EU 
UCB Brazil University EU 
SIPPE China Government EU 
University of the 
Witwatersrand S. Africa University EU 
ITQB Portugal Government EU 
PCGIN UK P3 EU 
PGRO UK P3 EU 
CIMMYT CGIAR P3 EU 
APPO Belgium P3 EU 
UFOP Germany P3 EU 
EC EU Government EU 
IITA CGIAR P3 EU 
DEFRA UK Government EU 
LESP France University EU 
UFPE Spain University EU 
IBRC Japan Government EU 
FST U of Tunis Tunisia Government EU 
Université de Nantes Italy University EU 
LM Univ Munchen Germany University EU 
U of MN USA University EU 
LSPPPBV France Government EU 
U of Oxford UK University EU 
PPRI S. Africa Government EU 
USD Algeria University EU 
Université d’Abobo-Adjamé Ivory Coast University EU 
Université de Picardie France University EU 
INP-ENSAT France Government EU 
Limagrain France Private EU 
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Wherry & Sons Ltd UK Private EU 
SR Noble USA P3 EU 
IPG-BZFAR Hungary P3 EU 
Stanford University USA University EU 
Nancy University France University EU 
NKMU Taiwan University EU 
University of Georgia USA University EU 
CBBC Tunisia Government EU 
NPZ Germany Private EU 
BioPlante France P3 EU 
Serasem France P3 EU 
Agrovegetal SA Spain Private EU 
Array-On GmbH Germany Private EU 
ITACyL Spain Government EU 
Saatzucht Steinach GmbH Germany Private EU 
U of Valladolid Spain University EU 
Angers INRA France Government EU 
Dijon INRA France Government EU 
Montpellier INRA France Government EU 
Nantes INRA France Government EU 
Poitou Charentes INRA France Government EU 
Rennes INRA France Government EU 
Toulouse INRA France Government EU 
Versailles-Grignon INRA France Government Global 
UMR-LEG Bretenieres 
INRA France Government EU 
Lusignan INRA France Government EU 
Mauguio INRA France Government EU 
Castanet-Tolosan INRA France Government EU 
ILM France Government EU 
Agrovegetal SA Spain Private EU 
Array-On GmbH Germany Private EU 
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Appendix B: Formulation of the Negative Binomial Distribution
7
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Γ= gamma function; λ= mean or expected value of negative binomial distribution; α=over 
dispersion parameter. 
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7
 See Cameron and Trivedi, 2008 pages 100-102; and UCLA, 2007 pages 4-7. 
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  Log pseudolikelihood = -515.12316                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0421
Dispersion           = mean                       Wald chi2(6)    =      13.06
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =        205
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -515.12316  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -515.12316  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -515.12609  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -515.51588  
Fitting full model:
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -521.04516  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -521.04516  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -521.05894  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -539.45029  
Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -1027.9854  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -1027.9854  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -1027.9866  
Fitting Poisson model:
. nbreg TimesCited Fund_2 Fund_3 Fund_4 MII_2 Prod_2 Comb, robust irr
BIC:                         -18.387     BIC':                         20.094
AIC:                           5.104     AIC*n:                      1046.246
Maximum Likelihood R2:         0.056     Cragg & Uhler's R2:            0.056
McFadden's R2:                 0.011     McFadden's Adj R2:            -0.004
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.066
D(197):                     1030.246     LR(6):                        11.844
Log-Lik Intercept Only:     -521.045     Log-Lik Full Model:         -515.123
Measures of Fit for nbreg of TimesCited
. fitstat
                                                                              
       alpha     1.880426   .2707331                      1.418094    2.493489
                                                                              
    /lnalpha     .6314984   .1439743                      .3493139    .9136829
                                                                              
       _cons     .9605032   .2118731     4.53   0.000     .5452395    1.375767
        Comb     .1350114   .2860519     0.47   0.637      -.42564    .6956628
      Prod_2     .0284211   .3367385     0.08   0.933    -.6315744    .6884165
       MII_2     .0942558    .488082     0.19   0.847    -.8623674    1.050879
      Fund_4     .6934953   .3503017     1.98   0.048     .0069165    1.380074
      Fund_3     .8593384   .3439631     2.50   0.012     .1851831    1.533494
      Fund_2     .5646162   .3786179     1.49   0.136    -.1774612    1.306694
                                                                              
  TimesCited        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -515.12316                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0421
Dispersion           = mean                       Wald chi2(6)    =      13.06
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =        205
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -515.12316  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -515.12316  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -515.12609  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -515.51588  
Fitting full model:
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -521.04516  
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -521.04516  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -521.05894  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -539.45029  
Fitting constant-only model:
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -1027.9854  
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -1027.9854  
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -1027.9866  
Fitting Poisson model:
. nbreg TimesCited Fund_2 Fund_3 Fund_4 MII_2 Prod_2 Comb, robust
                                                                              
       _cons      .958277   .0768645    12.47   0.000     .8076254    1.108929
        Comb     .1869656   .0894654     2.09   0.037     .0116166    .3623145
      Prod_2     .0658009     .10335     0.64   0.524    -.1367614    .2683632
       MII_2     .1183992     .12468     0.95   0.342    -.1259691    .3627675
      Fund_4     .6671167   .1158973     5.76   0.000     .4399623    .8942712
      Fund_3     .8418488   .1085454     7.76   0.000     .6291038    1.054594
      Fund_2     .5442039   .1003992     5.42   0.000      .347425    .7409827
                                                                              
  TimesCited        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -1027.9854                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0522
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(6)      =     113.31
Poisson regression                                Number of obs   =        205
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1027.9854  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1027.9854  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1027.9866  
. poisson TimesCited Fund_2 Fund_3 Fund_4 MII_2 Prod_2 Comb
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Appendix C: Questionnaire for Chapter Six 
 
I. Background Information (P4 Inputs) 
 
1. Please tell us a bit about your public private partnership. 
  [PROMPT: date est, expected duration, size, # partners / names of players, 
#employees, location(s), scope of operations] 
2. What were your goals/priorities in selecting your P4 partners? 
3. What is the overarching mandate of your P4? [PROMPT: functional priority] 
4. How did your P4 evolve? [PROMPT: out of previous/historical relationships, did one of 
the partners lead the process? Was it incited through external incentives – if so, which? 
5. Does your P4 conduct and/or support research in any form? If applicable, please tell us 
about your current research program. [PROMPT: how funded (grant, industry, other, in 
kind contributions)? Scale, scope] 
6. Do you collaborate with other organizations/firms that are NOT formally part of your P4? 
If so, describe. 
7. What is the nature of your collaborative model(s)? Are they forced or based upon a 
history of relationships? Who is your most important (NON P4) collaborator? 
[PROMPT: terms] 
8. How did you find / select / negotiate with your current list of stakeholders/partners? 
 Seeking (informal, historical relationships, etc or ‘tender’) 
 Formalizing strategies 
9. Who do you view as your P4’s primary stakeholders? 
10. Please describe a typical day/week/cycle in your organization.  
II. P4 Processes 
 
11. What are the main incentives for your partners to be involved in this P4? [PROMPT: 
access to new knowledge, new product offerings, funding, new markets, etc] 
12. In your opinion, what are the best practices to employ when establishing a public private 
partnership?  
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13. What do you view as the main obstacles to the long-term sustainability of a P4? Does 
long term sustainability matter? 
14. How is your P4 funded? Has the funding mechanism changed or will it change over its 
life? 
15. What is the role of government in these types of arrangements? [PROMPT: observer, 
funder, supporter, steerer, full-on partner] Will government remain a major component 
or operator in your organization or will that change over time? 
16. How important is a balance of both public and private investment in your P4? [PROMPT: 
are there strategic ‘optics’ that go with including both sectors?]  
17. In your opinion, do public private partnerships (P4s) enhance or detract from the overall 
functioning of markets? Necessary evil or a value-add?  
18. Have you been involved in a P4 that failed? Details. Has your P4 had failures with 
respect to any major partner or project? Why do you think that failed? 
III. P4 Outputs 
 
19. How do you define and measure success within the scope of your P4? How does this 
compare with how your primary organization (as a partner) operates? [PROMPT: ROI, 
#patents/products, etc] 
20. How does the P4 business model compare to your member organizations' business 
models? Are P4 business operations vastly different from previous approaches by 
partners? If so, in what way? 
21. Please explain. Has the operation of the P4 changed the business practices of the member 
organizations? How?  
22. How do you exchange information with P4 partners and/or collaborators? 
23. As a P4, have you ever been blocked in any of your endeavors/goals/strategies to push 
P4-related products/services downstream… either in terms of the product or in terms of 
reaching new markets? Please explain. 
24. How and what do you report in terms of your output of the P4? [PROMPT: are these 
reports publicly available?] 
25. Have there been any unintended outcomes/outputs of the P4? Good or bad? 
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26. If you were to craft this P4 arrangement all over again, what elements would you change? 
[PROMPT: terms, partners, collaborators, business model, practice] 
27. What do you view as the primary legacy of this P4? 
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Appendix D: A Discussion on the Provenance of Each Article/Chapter 
 
Due to presentations and the nature of research, there was some collaboration involved on each 
of the investigations. The level of collaboration is explained in Table D.1 below.  
Table D.1 Provenance of Each Article/Chapter 
 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 
Idea 90% Boland; 
10% Phillips 
80% Boland; 
20% Phillips 
100% Boland 100% Boland 
Theory 80% Boland; 
20% Phillips 
100% Boland 90% Boland; 
10% Phillips 
100% Boland 
Model 95% Boland; 
5% Ryan 
100% Boland 100% Boland 100% Ryan 
Data 100% Boland 100% Boland 100% Boland 100% Boland 
Analysis 100% Boland 100% Boland 100% Boland 100% Boland 
Conclusions 90% Boland; 
10% Phillips 
100% Boland 90% Boland; 
10% Phillips 
90% Boland; 
10% Phillips 
Writing/editing/publication 
efforts 
90% Boland; 
10% Phillips 
80% Boland; 
10% Phillips; 
10% McPhee-
Knowles 
90% Boland; 
10% Phillips 
90% Boland; 
10% Ryan 
Conference Presentation 50% Phillips; 
50% Ryan 
100% 
McPhee-
Knowles 
100% 
McPhee-
Knowles 
60% Boland; 
20% Phillips; 
20% Ryan 
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Table D.2 Dissemination of Thesis Chapters 
Chapter Title and Form of Distribution  Known Usage and Uptake 
3 “Public–Private Partnerships for the 
Management of National, Regional 
and International Innovation 
Systems: A Social Network 
Analysis of Knowledge Translation 
Systems” contains two articles that 
were merged for this thesis. They 
were individually presented at the 
Triple Helix VIII and IX peer-
reviewed conferences on innovation 
systems. Each article has also been 
presented at two other peer-
reviewed conferences (VALGEN 
and CAIRN)  
The first presentation was purchased and 
published by the Canadian Agricultural 
Innovation and Research Network (CAIRN). 
The first presentation/draft of this article was 
also published by online by the Open SUIC 
Digital Commons Network and has been 
downloaded 331 times. 
4 “Collaboration and the Generation 
of New Knowledge in Networked 
Innovation Systems: a Bibliometric 
Analysis” was presented at the 
Triple Helix X Conference 
This presentation was one of 35 out of over 
450 papers from this conference selected by a 
peer-review process to be published in 
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences. It 
has been cited once since publication. 
5 “A Typology of Research and 
Development Agricultural Public-
Private Partnerships Common to 
the Developing World Bio-
economy” began as an independent 
investigation for the International 
Development Research Centre 
(IDRC) of the Government of 
Canada and the Syngenta 
Foundation for Sustainable 
Agriculture (SFSA) 
This investigation went through a peer-review 
process at IDRC prior to being presented to 
IDRC and industry. It has also been presented 
at the peer-reviewed International Consortium 
on Applied Bio-Economy Research (ICABR).  
6 “Public–Private–Producer 
Partnerships (P4s) in Canada” 
began as an independent 
investigation for the Innovation and 
Growth Policy Division of 
Agrifood and Agriculture Canada 
(AAFC), which commissioned a 
study on P4s in Canada to help 
develop specific AAFC policies for 
creating and supporting P4s in 
Canada 
This investigation has been presented to senior 
members of the Innovation and Growth Policy 
Division of Strategic Policy Branch of AAFC. 
It was then presented to the AAFC Agri-
Innovators’ Committee, consisting of the 
Deputy Minister of AAFC and select industry 
leaders. Recently, it was presented to the 
Federal, Provincial and Territorial (FTP) 
Working Group on Collaboration in 
Agricultural R&D to address specific policy 
questions. 
7  Conclusion The findings of the multiple investigations 
have been presented and evaluated by multiple 
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peer-review processes as discussed above. 
 
